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3Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays in ﬁnancial economics.
The ﬁrst chapter analyses the fundraising process in the hedge fund industry
and the role ﬁnancial intermediaries play in this process. Using the SEC form D
ﬁlings, I document that broker-sold funds underperform directly-sold funds by 2%
(1.6%) per year on a risk-adjusted basis before (after) fees. Also directly-sold funds,
on average, have larger average investor’s size, larger minimum investment size, and
charge higher performance fees comparing to broker-sold ones. Empirical results
are consistent with a stylized model of fundraising. I estimate the model implied
average broker’s compensation to be $1.5 million per year.
The second chapter (co-authored with Albert S. Kyle and Anna A. Obizhaeva)
introduces a new structural model of stock returns generating process. The model
assumes that stock prices change in response to buy and sell bets arriving to the
market place as predicted by market microstructure invariance. These bets are
shredded by traders into sequences of transactions according to some bet-shredding
algorithms. Arbitrageurs take advantage of any noticeable returns predictability,
and market makers clear the market. This structural model is calibrated to match
empirical time-series and cross-sectional patterns of higher moments of returns. We
calibrate hard-to-observe parameters of bet-shredding using the method of simulated
moments, analyse its properties, and show how much shredding has increased over
time.
The third chapter studies cross-sectional and time series variation in the size of
repurchase programs. I ﬁnd that this variation is explained by the variables mo-
tivated by market microstructure invariance theory. My results suggest that when
determining the size of repurchase programs, managers may target percentage im-
pact costs of these programs or target inventory levels suﬃcient to allocate their
future bets about their companies.
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Chapter 1
Fundraising in the Hedge Fund
Industry
High search and due diligence costs due to the opacity of the hedge fund industry
make the fundraising process challenging even for hedge funds with a good reputa-
tion and a strong track record. Financial intermediaries, such as brokers, consul-
tants, and placement agents, help funds and investors to ﬁnd one another and to
overcome barriers to transact. This paper studies, empirically and theoretically, the
role of intermediaries in the fundraising process of hedge funds.
There is yet no consensus about the role and social value of intermediaries. Some
people think that intermediation is socially useful. This view is usually justiﬁed with
several arguments. First, intermediaries may help counterparties ﬁnd one another
and transact, by exploiting their positional advantage and industry knowledge, as
per Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987). Second, intermediaries may help alleviate
adverse selection problems, as per Booth and Smith (1986) and Garella (1989).
Third, intermediaries may add value by decreasing the costs of making decisions
and executions, as per Spulber (2001).
Others think that intermediaries impose unnecessary costs on society. Judge
(2014) argues that intermediaries often promote institutional arrangements to max-
imize their economic rents, and illustrates her point using examples of real estate
agents, stock brokers, mutual funds, and exchanges. Warren Buﬀett opposed and
9
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publicly criticized intermediaries on numerous occasions. For example, in 1996 class
B shares of Berkshire Hathaway were issued as a response to unit trusts that sold
fractional units of Berkshire’s shares to small investors.
To analyze empirically the role that ﬁnancial intermediaries play in the fundrais-
ing process of hedge funds, I download and process the entire collection of form
D ﬁlings that hedge funds report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“the SEC”) under Regulation D. These ﬁlings have information on all third parties
involved in the fundraising process. It allows one to identify the hedge funds oﬀered
to investors directly and those sold to investors through intermediary brokers.
I match this dataset with the Morningstar hedge funds database using a fuzzy
match algorithm. My ﬁnal dataset combines information on fundraising process,
contract characteristics, and performance of hedge funds.
First, I ﬁnd that, on average, broker-sold funds underperform the directly-sold
funds by a substantial margin. Following Fung and Hsieh (2004), I ﬁnd that broker-
sold funds again consistently underperform directly-sold funds by 1.6% on a risk-
adjusted basis after accounting for fees. As suggested by Berk and van Binsbergen
(2013), the measure of the dollar value added of broker-sold funds is, on average,
$210,000 per month lower than that of directly-sold funds.
Second, I construct gross returns series using the modiﬁed methodology de-
veloped by Brooks, Clare and Motson (2007), Hodder, Jackwerth and Kolokolova
(2012), and Kolokolova (2010), and document that broker-sold funds underperform
directly-sold funds by 2% per year before fees as well. The pre-fee dollar value
added by broker-sold funds is, on average, $190,000 per month lower than that of
directly-sold funds. Since pre-fee risk-adjusted performance is a likely indication of
skill, this evidence contradicts the view that intermediaries help to identify skillful
funds.
Third, I ﬁnd that, on average, funds sold by brokers charge lower incentive fees
compared to funds sold directly, whereas there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in terms
of management fees.
Fourth, I ﬁnd that funds sold directly have a larger minimum and average in-
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vestment size than funds sold by brokers. Regulators deﬁne investors who qualify
for the accredited investor status based on their income or net worth, suggesting
that size is correlated with sophistication of investor. Therefore, this evidence im-
plies that broker-sold funds and directly-sold funds may target diﬀerent clienteles;
directly-sold funds attract, on average, more sophisticated investors than broker-sold
funds.
Finally, I analyze heterogeneity of brokers, classifying brokers into in-house and
outside brokers based on the similarity of names of a fund and a broker. I ﬁnd
that funds sold by in-house brokers underperform directly-sold funds by 2.1% per
year on a risk-adjusted basis after accounting for fees, while funds sold by outside
brokers underperform directly-sold funds by 1.4% per year. Funds sold by in-house
and outside brokers underperform directly-sold funds by 2% per year on a risk-
adjusted basis before accounting for fees. Moreover, funds sold by outside brokers
have lower incentive fees than funds sold directly, while the incentive fees of funds
sold by in-house brokers do not diﬀer from those of funds sold directly. Funds that
are sold through outside brokers have a lower minimum investment sizes than that
of directly-sold funds, while the minimum investment sizes of funds sold through
in-house brokers do not diﬀer from that of directly-sold funds.
The choice of fundraising channels is an equilibrium outcome; therefore these
empirical ﬁndings have no causal interpretation, but rather provide an empirical
description of an equilibrium. I present a stylized theoretical model of fundraising
in the hedge fund industry and show that the implications of the model are consistent
with documented empirical ﬁndings. The model builds on the work of Nanda,
Narayanan and Warther (2000) and Stoughton, Wu and Zechner (2011).
There are two funds that diﬀer in skill: a good fund and a bad fund. Hedge
funds do not have their own capital and have to raise funds from outside investors.
Since the hedge fund industry is opaque, the process of ﬁnding and vetting a suitable
fund is costly. To assist with fundraising, a hedge fund may hire an intermediary
broker, who will certify the type of the fund and persuade investors to allocate
their capital into the fund. Investors diﬀer in their search and due diligence costs.
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Sophisticated investors have low search and due diligence costs, others have no
industry connections and face high search and due diligence costs. I solve for a
separating equilibrium, in which funds endogenously choose portfolio management
fees and capital-raising channels, whereas investors decide to invest into hedge funds
on their own or based on recommendation of an intermediary.
This equilibrium has a simple intuition. The existence of both types of funds is
socially optimal, since both funds generate positive returns, which are greater than
the outside option. Some investors, however, are not able to invest in the hedge
fund industry without ﬁnancial advice. Only sophisticated investors can ﬁnd the
good fund, while other investors with high due-diligence costs are not able to do so.
The broker steps in to resolve this ineﬃciency. The broker is able to lower the costs
of investors by internalizing the due-diligence process and this allows the high-cost
investors to allocate their endowments into the hedge fund industry. In return, the
broker requires compensation. The bargaining power of the broker and the relative
outperformance of the good fund over the bad fund are crucial for the existence
of a separating equilibrium. The good fund separates from the bad fund when it
generates a suﬃciently high return that is enough to compensate for investors’ search
and due diligence costs. Investors in the good directly-sold fund get higher after-fee
returns compared to the after-fee returns of the investors in the bad broker-sold
fund, regardless of the fee that the bad broker-sold fund charges.
I calibrate the model and estimate the implied average compensation that brokers
receive for their capital introduction services. I assume that the compensation of
a broker is proportional to the total dollar fees that a hedge fund collects from its
investors. I estimate the total dollar fees using data on the assets under management,
the performance, and the compensation structure of the hedge fund. Assuming
that the bargaining power of the broker equals to 1/3, which corresponds to the
equilateral division of the surplus among the fund, the investors, and the broker,
I ﬁnd the average annual compensation of the broker to be equal to $1.5 millions.
This is roughly consistent with the annualized estimated diﬀerence between the
dollar value added by broker-sold funds and directly-sold funds in the data.
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The paper is related to several strands of literature. It contributes to the liter-
ature on capital formation. Duﬃe (2010) discusses the problem of slow movement
of investment capital to trading opportunities and its implications for asset price
dynamics. Berk and Green (2004), Garleanu and Pedersen (2016), Vayanos (2004),
Pastor and Stambaugh (2012), and Vayanos and Woolley (2013) model the asset
management industry theoretically. There is also an extensive empirical literature
that studies capital formation in the asset management industry. Chevalier and
Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) ﬁnd that investors allocate their capital
into mutual funds with a positive past performance and ﬂee from mutual funds with
negative past returns. The hedge fund literature also ﬁnds that the performance of
funds is an important factor that aﬀects capital ﬂows. For example, Goetzmann,
Ingersoll and Ross (2003) and Fung et al. (2008) ﬁnd that alpha generating hedge
funds experience larger capital inﬂows than funds that do not have alpha. Horst
and Salganik-Shoshan (2014) ﬁnd that capital ﬂows to the highest performing strate-
gies and to the better performing funds within the strategy. Baquero and Verbeek
(2015) document that funds with a longer positive track record get more capital. Lu,
Musto and Ray (2013) study the indirect advertising of hedge funds and ﬁnd that it
helps to attract capital. Baquero and Verbeek (2009) use a regime-switching model,
while Jorion and Schwarz (2015) use form D ﬁlings to separate fund inﬂows and
outﬂows and analyze ﬂows to performance relationship. Getmansky (2002) studies
the life-cycles of hedge funds at the individual and strategy level and ﬁnds that age,
assets under management and the standard deviation of returns negatively aﬀects
fund ﬂows. Joenva¨a¨ra¨, Kosowski and Tolonen (2013), Getmansky et al. (2015), and
Aiken, Cliﬀord and Ellis (2015) analyze the eﬀect of liquidity restrictions on capital
ﬂows. My paper contributes to this literature by analyzing capital formation in the
hedge fund industry and the role that intermediaries play in this process.
This paper is also related to studies on distribution channels and marketing in
the asset management industry. Investors pay substantial amounts of money in
the form of sales loads and broker commissions. This raises the questions of why
they pay such high fees to intermediaries and what beneﬁts these investors get in re-
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turn. Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009) and Del Guercio and Reuter (2014)
ﬁnd that mutual funds sold by brokers signiﬁcantly underperform funds sold directly
(both before and after fees). Possible explanations include the substantial intangible
beneﬁts that brokers provide and the partition of mutual fund clientele into sophis-
ticated and disadvantaged investors. As opposed to mutual fund retail investors,
hedge funds investors are usually sophisticated ﬁnancial institutions and individuals
qualiﬁed for accredited investor status. It may be understandable to ﬁnd evidence
of underperformance in broker-sold mutual funds, but it is more surprising to ﬁnd
the same result in a hedge funds setting. The authors also document that directly-
sold mutual funds charge lower fees than mutual funds sold through brokers. I ﬁnd
the opposite result for the incentive fees of hedge funds, while I ﬁnd no diﬀerence
in hedge funds’ management fees across diﬀerent fundraising channels. Further-
more, Christoﬀersen, Evans and Musto (2013) establish that underperformance of
broker-sold funds mostly arises in mutual funds that are sold through outside bro-
kers rather than in-house brokers. The authors also document that in-house brokers
receive a higher front load comparing to outside brokers. In contrast, I ﬁnd that
hedge funds oﬀered through in-house brokers underperform both directly sold funds
and funds sold through outside brokers. Also, hedge funds sold through in-house
brokers charge higher incentive fees than funds sold through outside brokers.
The empirical analysis of this paper is closely related to that of Agarwal, Nanda
and Ray (2013). The authors ﬁnd that hedge funds that are selected by institu-
tions investing directly outperform hedge funds that are selected by institutions
that use advisory services. They analyze raw and style-adjusted after-fee perfor-
mance of hedge fund investments aggregated at the level of hedge fund family, while
granularity of data in my study allows to perform analysis at the individual fund
level.
The theoretical part of the paper is related to the work of Stoughton, Wu and
Zechner (2011), who model the interaction of active portfolio manager, ﬁnancial
adviser, and investors under various settings. Similar to their model, investors’
choice of performing due diligence on their own or delegating it to the broker depends
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on their due diligence costs, but I emphasize the endogeneity of the choice of capital
raising channels by hedge funds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data and
outlines the key economic variables that are used in the analysis. Section II doc-
uments the empirical ﬁndings on the fundraising process of hedge funds. Section
III presents a simple model of fundraising that reconciles the empirical ﬁndings and
estimates the model-implied compensation that intermediaries receive for capital
introduction services. Finally, section IV concludes the discussion.
1.1 Data
I use a combination of two databases. The ﬁrst database is constructed from form
D ﬁlings. The second is a Morningstar hedge funds database. Additional data is
downloaded from Thomson Reuters and the David A. Hsieh Data Library.
1.1.1 Form D ﬁlings
Although hedge funds qualify for exemptions to formal registration of fundraising
oﬀerings, the Securities Act of 1933 requires all funds that raise capital from investors
(with at least one U.S. investor) to notify regulators about the fundraising process
by ﬁling a form D with the SEC. A fund is required to ﬁle a notice no later than 15
calendar days after the date of the first sale of the fund’s oﬀering. As long as the
fund remains open, it is required to update ﬁlings on an annual basis as well as in
the case of detected mistakes in the previous ﬁlings.1
Table 1.1 summarizes all the data ﬁelds in the form D. Fund reports admin-
istrative information and information about its fundraising process: its name, the
address of its principal place of business, the names and addresses of the executive
oﬃcers, the amount of capital raised, the number and types of investors, and each
1See detailed information about oﬀering exemptions in Rules 504, 505, and 506 of Regulation
D. Source: Sections 230.501 through 230.506 appear at 47 FR 11262, Mar. 16, 1982. Note that
amendment to form D ﬁling is denoted as D/A. Hereto, I refer to both initial form D notice and
its amendments as form D ﬁlings. Compliance guide about ﬁling and amending a Form D notice
may be found at https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/formdguide.htm.
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person who is paid directly or indirectly in connection with the fundraising process.
The information that funds disclose in Form D ﬁlings must be free of biases, since
misreporting and failure to comply with the SEC requirements imposes signiﬁcant
reputational and legal risks and may result in criminal penalties.
Form D ﬁlings are publicly available. I download and process all the electronic
form D ﬁlings from the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval
system (EDGAR).2 I start in January 2010, when all hedge funds were required
to submit forms electronically. Thus, the downloaded sample covers period from
January 2010 to December 2016.
Each fund in the EDGAR system is uniquely identiﬁed by its Central Index Key
or CIK number. Thus, by knowing the name of the fund or its CIK number, one
gets access to information about its fundraising. For example, a search for Citadel
Global Equities fund will produce ten form D ﬁlings over the period from July 2009
to September 2016. From the ﬁlings, we learn that the fund was originated with
Citadel Advisors in July 2009. The fund raised $100 millions from one investor at
the origination date. Then, it raised $153 millions from seven investors by August
2010 and $446 millions from ﬁfty-nine investors by September 2016.
In imposing strict standards on the marketing of hedge funds, the SEC requires
funds to disclose in their form D ﬁlings information about any entity which is directly
or indirectly compensated for advertising and oﬀering a fund to investors. This in-
formation allows one to diﬀerentiate between the funds sold to investors by brokers
and the funds oﬀered to investors directly.3 The disclosed information consists of
brokers’ biographical information, their Central Registration Depository (“CRD”)
number within the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) system and
the list of states in which they advertise oﬀerings. For example, I classify Citadel
Global Equities Fund as a directly-sold fund, since it does not employ any interme-
diary in the fundraising process, while Renaissance Institutional Equities Fund is an
example of a broker-sold fund, since it is sold to clients by Renaissance Institutional
2The EDGAR depository is accessible at https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm.
3Hedge funds report information about intermediary brokers that are involved in fundraising
process in Item 12 of form D ﬁlings, Sales Compensation
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Management LLC.
Table 1.2 displays the largest open directly-sold and broker-sold funds in 2015.
For example, Medallion fund of Renaissance Technologies raised $6.5 billions by
2015, while D.E. Shaw Oculus International fund of D.E. Shaw & Co that raised
$13 billions with the help of broker.
I classify intermediary brokers into in-house brokers and outside brokers based on
the similarity of the names of the fund and the broker. For example, Fortress Convex
Asia fund LP uses the capital introduction services of Fortress Capital Formation
LLC. In this case, I classify Fortress Capital Formation LLC as an in-house broker.
ING Clarion Market Neutral LP is sold by Citigroup Global Markets and Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith Inc. In this case, I classify both brokers as outside
brokers. Funds are classiﬁed as being sold by in-house brokers when they employ
only in-house brokers. If a fund is sold by outside brokers, I refer to such fund as
outside broker-sold fund. Thus, Fortress Convex Asia fund LP is classiﬁed as an
in-house broker-sold fund and ING Clarion Market Neutral LP is classiﬁed as an
outside broker-sold fund.
Table 1.3 displays ten broker ﬁrms in the capital introduction business which
market the largest number of hedge funds. The list of the top brokers in this business
comprises top investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and J.P.
Morgan. For example, over the considered period, Goldman Sachs intermediates
as many as 377 hedge funds. The average (median) amount of capital raised by
funds that are intermediated by Goldman Sachs is $350 millions ($98 millions). The
average (median) number of investors in funds that are intermediated by Goldman
Sachs is 149 (30) investors. According to anecdotal evidence, big broker ﬁrms often
oﬀer their wealthy clients opportunities to invest in hedge funds through online
platforms without having to go to the funds themselves.
Figure 1.3 shows the fundraising dynamics over the period from January 2010 to
December 2015 comparing hedge fund industry with other alternative investments.
I analyze four main alternative investment business types: hedge funds, private
equity, venture capital and other investment funds, which includes fund of funds,
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commodity trading advisors(“CTAs”) and commodity trading operators (“CTOs”).
Figure 1.3 is split into four panels. Panels A, B, C and D display hedge funds,
other investment funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds, respectively.
Focusing on the diﬀerence between the fundraising channels, the ﬁgure visualizes the
amount of capital that was raised by directly-sold and broker-sold funds over the
considered period.
To estimate the amount of capital inﬂows, I use reported information on the
Total Amount Sold that the fund reports in form D ﬁlings. I consider two cases:
capital inﬂows at the fund’s inception and capital inﬂows during the life of the fund.
In the ﬁrst case, the amount of capital raised at inception is directly reported in
the Total Amount Sold variable. In the second case, it may be estimated as an
increment of the Total Amount Sold variable between two consecutive fund’s ﬁlings.
I outline the methodology on capital inﬂows estimation in Appendix.
The hedge fund industry enjoyed capital inﬂows which steadily grew from 2010 to
2015, spiking above the average level in 2014 and recovering to the previous trend of
inﬂows at $300 billions per year. The spike in capital inﬂows in 2014 coincides with
the lifting of the SEC’s advertisement ban, which was implemented in September
2013, following the JOBS Act directive.
1.1.2 Morningstar database and risk-adjusted returns
I use the Morningstar CISDM hedge fund database available from Wharton Re-
search Data Service (“WRDS”). The database contains fund-level information on
live and liquidated hedge funds. It keeps the most recent snapshot of fund’s adminis-
trative information, such as name, address, inception date, compensation structure,
minimum investment size, and liquidity restrictions. It also records the fundâĂŹs
after-fee performance and assets under management at a monthly frequency.
I use Morningstar data to estimate the performance and skill of the hedge fund.
Hedge funds usually employ various risky trading strategies. Thus, to make a sensi-
ble comparison of hedge funds, I control for their exposure to systematic risk factors
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and calculate their alphas. I estimate the tradable alpha regressing the annualized
monthly excess return, Reit, on seven tradable risk factors, as suggested by Fung and
Hsieh (2004):
Reit = αi + βMkt · SNPMRFt + βSmB · SMBt + βT10y · BD10RETt+
βCr.Spr. · BAAMTSYt + βpBD · PTFSBDt + βpFX · PTFSFXt+
βpCOM · PTFSCOMt + ǫ˜it.
(1.1)
To account for market exposure, I use annualized returns on the S&P500 index,
SNPMRFt. Adjusting for exposure to the size factor, I use an annualized return
spread between the Russell 2000 and the S&P500 index, SMBt, obtaining a time
series for the Russell 2000 and the S&P500 indexes from Thomson Reuters Datas-
tream.
To control for yield curve exposure, I follow the literature and use the annualized
excess returns of the U.S. 10-year Treasury constant maturity bond, BD10RETt. A
tradable yield curve level factor that is used in this paper is Bank of America Merrill
Lynch’s U.S. 10-year Treasury constant maturity bond returns, which I download
from Thomson Reuters Datastream. As a robustness check I used 10-year discount
factors from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis’ Treasury yield curve estimates.4
The correlation between the two time series is 0.96.
Accounting for credit spread exposure, I use an annualized return spread between
Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bond, BAAMTSYt, and the U.S. 10-year Treasury
constant maturity bond. To proxy Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bond, I use the
tradable Barclays Long Baa U.S. Corporate index, which can be downloaded from
Thomson Reuters Datastream.
Finally, adjusting for the dynamic nature of the hedge funds’ strategies, I fol-
low Fung and Hsieh (2004) and use a trend-following bond factor, PTFSBDt, a
trend-following currency factor, PTFSFXt, and a trend-following commodity fac-
4FED’s yield curve can be downloaded from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED):
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200628/200628abs.html.
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tor, PTFSCOMt, which are constructed from look-back options and can be down-
loaded from David A. Hsieh’s Data Library.5
For every fund i in month t, I estimate its annualized monthly alpha, αˆit, with a
two-year rolling-window regression (1.1). The ﬁnal sample consists of 29,051 fund-
month observations.
Although, investors care about after-fee returns on their hedge fund investment,
skills of funds are reﬂected in pre-fee returns. Hedge fund databases usually take the
perspective of investors and report fund performance and net asset values (“NAV”)
after accounting for fees. To reconstruct pre-fee returns, I apply the modiﬁcation of
methodology that was used in Brooks, Clare and Motson (2007), Hodder, Jackwerth
and Kolokolova (2012), and Kolokolova (2010)
I make several assumptions that reﬂect the general practice on the calculation of
hedge funds’ fees. [1] Pro-rata management fees are paid at the end of the month on
pre-fee net asset value at the end of the month. [2] Incentive fees are accrued on a
monthly basis, but are only paid at the end of the calendar year; reported after-fee
net asset value and performance account for accrued incentive fees. [3] Hedge funds
use the high-watermark provision and incentive fees are paid in case pre-fee net
asset value adjusted for management fees are above the current high water mark.
[4] The high-water mark is reset to a pre-fee net asset value if it exceeds the current
high water mark; otherwise the high-water-mark stays as in the previous month. [5]
Management and incentive fees remain constant over time.6 [6] The equalisation
credit/contingent redemption scheme is used to calculate net asset value to ensure
that the fund managers are compensated correctly for positive performance, while
investors, who might invest in funds at diﬀerent time are treated fairly and equally.7
For each fund I estimate the pre-fee net asset value, NAV ∗(t), and the pre-
fee return, R∗(t), using available data on after-fee net asset value, NAV (t), after-
fee return, R(t), management fee (in percentage terms), fM , and incentive fee (in
5David A. Hsieh’s Data Library is accessible at https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/ dah7/HFRFData.htm.
6In reality hedge funds may update their compensation structure as documented by Deuskar
et al. (2011), Agarwal and Ray (2012) and Schwarz (2007).
7âĂŸEqualisation Credit/Contingent RedemptionâĂŹ accounting procedure is described and
discussed in McDonnell (2003).
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percentage terms), fI .
The hedge fund database reports after-fee net asset value, which is calculated
as a pre-fee net asset value adjusted for management fees (in dollars), FM (t), and
accrued incentive fees (in dollars), FI(t):
NAV (t) = NAV ∗(t)− FM(t)− FI(t). (1.2)
Dollar management fees are calculated based on the net assets of the fund at the
end of the month, as per assumption [1]:
FM(t) = NAV ∗(t) · fM/12. (1.3)
Incentive fees accrue if the net asset value after management fees and net capital
ﬂows are above the high water mark, following assumptions [2], [3], and [4]:
FI(t) = max(0;NAV ∗(t)− FM(t)−Netﬂows(t)− HWM(t)) · fI . (1.4)
Solving the system of equations (1.2), (1.3), and (1.4), I express the pre-fee net asset
value, dollar management fees, and the dollar incentive fees


NAV ∗(t) = NAV (t) + FM(t) + FI(t) (1.5)
FM(t) = [NAV (t) + FI(t)] · fM/121− fM/12 (1.6)
FI(t) = [NAV (t)−Netﬂows(t)− HWM(t)] · fI1− fI ·
I [NAV (t)− Netﬂows(t) > HWM(t)]
(1.7)
Dollar incentive fees (1.7) are accumulated only if the assets of the fund are above
the high water mark, NAV (t) − Netﬂows(t) > HWM(t); otherwise, the fund does
not get any incentive fees.
Finally, I estimate the pre-fee return, R∗(t), as a growth rate between the pre-
fee assets under management at the beginning of the month and the pre-fee assets
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under management at the end of the month, adjusted for dollar netﬂows during the
period:
1 +R∗(t) =
NAV ∗(t)− Netﬂows(t)
NAV ∗(t− 1)− FM (t− 1) . (1.8)
At the beginning of the investment period, assets under management are equal to
pre-fee net assets at the end of the previous period adjusted for management fees.
Also, the pre-fee net asset value has to be adjusted for netﬂows, which I estimate as
in the literature on fund ﬂows ( Sirri and Tufano (1998), Agarwal, Daniel and Naik
(2004)).
Netﬂows(t) = NAV (t)−NAV (t− 1) · (1 +R(t)). (1.9)
Finally, Substituting (1.2) and (1.9) into (1.8), I estimate the pre-fee return R∗(t).
1.1.3 Matching form D ﬁlings and Morningstar database
I match the form D ﬁlings with Morningstar database by the name of the fund using
a fuzzy matching method.
First, I estimate the pairwise generalization of Levenshtein (1966) edit distance,
a measure of dissimilarity, between the funds in Form D and Morningstar databases.
I eliminate the pairs that have a dissimilarity score above 200. Second, I eliminate
pairs of matched form D and Morningstar funds that report inception dates of more
than six months apart from each other. Finally, I manually verify the results of the
matching procedure.
The matched sample consists of 1,728 individual funds that in total submitted
7,824 form D ﬁlings. It represents 15% of Reg D funds and 8% of funds that are listed
in the Morningstar database. Among the matched funds 92% of funds are identiﬁed
as hedge funds and 8% of funds are identiﬁed as other investment funds. A low
match rate is explained by the fact that the universe of Reg D funds consists only of
funds that are open for investment and have at least one US investor. Additionally,
not all form D funds may choose to be listed in Morningstar database.
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Jorion and Schwarz (2015) are able to match in total 3,816 form D funds with
14,581 form D ﬁlings, using the Hedge Fund Research (HFR) and Lipper TASS
databases. The match rate between the form D funds and Morningstar funds is
consistent with the match rates of form D funds with hedge funds that report to
TASS (1,896 funds).
In the matched sample there are 1,103 of directly-sold funds and 625 of broker-
sold funds.
Focusing on the heterogeneity of brokers, I further diﬀerentiate the broker-sold
funds into funds that are oﬀered to investors through in-house brokers and funds
that are sold to by outside brokers. In the matched sample of broker-sold funds I
identify in total 537 funds that are sold by outside brokers, 56 fund that are sold by
in-house brokers and 32 funds that are sold through both.
The matched database inherits all the biases that are usually associated with
Morningstar database.
First, the information that hedge funds report to Morningstar database is not
veriﬁable. Fund managers usually list their funds in hedge fund databases to market
their funds and attract potential investors. Agarwal, Mullally and Naik (2015) and
Getmansky, Lee and Lo (2015) provide a comprehensive review of the limitations
and potential biases in hedge fund data.
Often funds backﬁll returns prior to the date when they starts reporting to the
data vendor. Thus, a fund manager has an incentive to list his hedge fund in a
database after a period of good performance. As discussed in Edwards and Park
(1996), this potentially leads to misleadingly good track records and may result in
upward bias in expected returns due to this instant history or backﬁll bias.
Joenva¨a¨ra¨, Kosowski and Tolonen (2014) estimate a backﬁll bias of around
twenty months by analyzing snapshots of databases that have been taken on diﬀer-
ent dates. Following the literature practice, I exclude the ﬁrst twenty-four months
of returns observations since the inception of the funds to mitigate this bias.
Second, there is also survivorship bias. Funds have an incentive to stop reporting
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their performance after a period of bad performance. Therefore, underperforming
funds may be under-represented, again biasing upwards the estimates of expected
returns. To mitigate this bias, I consider both live and defunct funds moved to
hedge fund graveyard ﬁles.
Third, Morningstar hedge fund data, unfortunately, contains signiﬁcant numbers
of missing assets under management. Following Joenva¨a¨ra¨, Kosowski and Tolonen
(2014), I ﬁll in any missing observations with the most recent observations of the
past.
Table 1.4 presents summary statistics on annual capital inﬂows, the number
of investors, and the number of new investors across funds that are directly sold
to investors and funds that are oﬀered to investors through brokers from form D
ﬁlings. Panel A presents the summary statistics for the whole sample of form D
funds. Panel B presents summary statistics for the matched sample in order to
examine any potential biases introduced by the matching procedure.
Annual capital inﬂows into hedge funds do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across distri-
bution channels. On average, directly-sold funds and broker-sold funds raise $49
millions per year. The median amount of capital raised by directly-sold funds is $3
millions and $5 millions for broker-sold funds. There are on average 12 investors
in directly-sold funds and 33 investors in broker-sold funds. The average size of
investment in a broker-sold fund is 2.75 less than that of a directly-sold fund.
I do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the matched sample and the total
form D sample of funds, comparing a sample that consists of matched funds and
sample of all form D funds on their observable characteristics.
1.2 Empirical evidence
This section provides an empirical description of the fundraising process of the hedge
funds, focusing on the diﬀerences between “direct” and “brokered” distributions.
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1.2.1 After-fee performance across distribution channels
To compare the performance of funds between fundraising channels, I construct two
portfolios of funds. The ﬁrst one consists of directly-sold funds, representing the
anti-intermediation view. The second one comprises hedge funds that are oﬀered
to investors through brokers, representing the pro-intermediation view. The port-
folios of funds are rebalanced monthly, so that newly originated funds are included
and liquidated funds are excluded appropriately. Assuming an initial investment of
$100, I track the portfolios of the funds’ after-fee performance from January 2010
to December 2015.
Figure 1.4 plots the after-fee performance dynamics for the portfolios of funds.
Panel A shows the performance of the portfolio of funds where the constituent
funds are equally-weighted. Panel B displays the performance of portfolios of funds
where the constituent funds are value-weighted. Portfolio of directly sold funds
outperforms portfolio of broker sold funds over considered ﬁve year period. For the
equally-weighted scheme, the portfolio of directly-sold funds increases from $100
to $130, with an annualized return of 5.38% per year over ﬁve years, while the
portfolio of broker-sold funds rises from $100 to $125, with an annualized return of
4.56% per year. The diﬀerence is more pronounced when the value-weighted scheme
is considered. Portfolio of directly sold funds increases from $100 to $136 with
annualized return of 6.34% per year, while portfolio of broker sold funds increases
from $100 to $126 with annualized return of 4.73% per year. The results also hold
when I consider the full sample of hedge fund returns without adjusting for backﬁll
bias. I present the results in Figure 1.7 in the Appendix.
Investors, however, should care about risk-adjusted returns. I estimate two-
year rolling alpha of the portfolios of funds, adjusting performance for systemic
risk exposure using equation (1.1). Figures 1.5 presents the time-series dynamics
of the after-fee alphas of the portfolio of directly-sold funds and the portfolio of
broker-sold funds. The ﬁgure is split into two sub-ﬁgures, which correspond to the
equally-weighted scheme in Panel A and the value-weighted scheme in Panel B. The
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after-fee alpha of directly-sold hedge funds is persistently higher than the after-fee
alpha of the broker-sold hedge funds regardless of portfolio-weighting scheme. For
the equally-weighted scheme, the after-fee alpha of the directly-sold hedge funds is
equal on average to 4.42% per year versus 3.37% per year for the broker-sold hedge
funds. For the value-weighted scheme, the average alpha of the portfolio of directly-
sold funds is equal to 4.43% as opposed to 3.55% for the portfolio of broker-sold
funds.
I implement another robustness check and perform panel data analysis. For each
hedge fund i in month t, I estimate its annualized monthly alpha, αˆit, with a two
year rolling-window regression (1.1). Then I estimate the diﬀerence between the
alphas of the directly-sold funds and the broker-sold funds with a panel regression
αˆit = β0 + βB · Bit + βX ·Xit−1 + βt + ǫ˜it, (1.10)
where Bit is a dummy variable that is equal to one if fund i is sold through brokers
and it is equal to zero if the fund raises capital directly. I use a set of controls, Xit−1,
which includes the assets under management of hedge fund in a previous month, the
age of the fund, and its vintage. I also control for aggregate demand shocks with
time ﬁxed eﬀects, βt. The coeﬃcient of interest that measures the diﬀerence in the
alphas of directly-sold and broker sold-funds is βB.
Panel A of Table 1.7 presents the results of the estimation of regression (1.10).
I ﬁnd that the after-fee alpha of the broker-sold funds is, on average, 1.6% per year
lower than that of directly-sold funds. The results are economically signiﬁcant and
robust for inclusion of the fund’s size, age, vintage year controls and time ﬁxed
eﬀects. I also ﬁnd consistent results (reported in Appendix Table 1.16) for the
sample of funds without correction for backﬁll bias.
I also compare the dollar value added measure of Berk and van Binsbergen (2013)
for directly-sold funds and that of broker-sold funds. I ﬁnd monthly dollar value
added to investors, Sˆit, as a product of the after-fee alpha of the hedge fund and
its assets under management in a given month. I perform panel data analysis and
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report results in Panel A of Table 1.8. I ﬁnd that investors in the broker-sold fund
receive, on average, $210,000 per month less than investors in directly-sold funds.
The results are robust when controlling for the age of the fund, its vintage and time
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Exploiting heterogeneity across brokers, I analyze the diﬀerence in performance
between funds that are sold by in-house brokers and funds that are oﬀered by outside
brokers. I perform a formal analysis with the following panel regression:
Yit = β0 + βI · BIit + βO · BOit + βX ·Xit + βt + ǫ˜it, (1.11)
where Yit = αˆit denotes the fund’s annualized risk-adjusted performance. BIit is a
dummy variable that is equal to one when the fund is oﬀered to investors by an
in-house broker and is equal to zero otherwise. BOit is a dummy variable that is
equal to one when the fund is sold to investors through an outside broker and is
equal to zero otherwise.
Table 1.9 displays the results of the estimation of regression (1.11). I ﬁnd that
the result of the under-performance of broker-sold funds is mostly driven by funds
that are sold through in-house brokers. The average after-fee alpha of funds that
are sold through in-house brokers is 2% lower than that of directly-sold funds, while
average after-fee alphas of funds that are oﬀered through outside brokers is 1.4%
lower than that of directly sold funds. Performing a formal F-test and comparing the
diﬀerence between in-house broker-sold and outside broker-sold funds, I ﬁnd that
the alpha of funds that are sold by in-house brokers is statistically diﬀerent from
the alpha of funds that are sold by outside brokers. The results are robust when the
fund’s size, vintage, and year-month controls. Furthermore, I perform additional
robustness checks by estimating the regression (1.11) on the sample that does not
correct for backﬁll bias, which is displayed in Table 1.18 in the Appendix.
The above ﬁndings on the underperformance of broker-sold hedge funds relative
to directly-sold funds are consistent with the ﬁndings in the mutual funds literature.
Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009) were the ﬁrst to establish that broker-
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sold mutual funds, with an average after-fee alpha of -2.28% per year, underperform
directly-sold mutual funds, with an average after-fee alpha of -1.07% per year, by
1.21% per year. Del Guercio and Reuter (2014) and Reuter (2015) ﬁnd similar results
when considering diﬀerent weighting schemes. Authors document the diﬀerence in
equally-weighted after-fee alphas between the two groups of funds of 1.15% and that
of the value-weighted after-fee alphas 0.64% per year. Christoﬀersen, Evans and
Musto (2013) ﬁnd that a 1% increase in the excess load paid to broker decreases
mutual fund after-fee future performance by 0.24% over the next year. In contrast to
my results, the authors ﬁnd that the underperformance is mostly driven by mutual
funds that are sold through outside brokers rather than in-house brokers.8
1.2.2 Pre-fee performance across distribution channels
Addressing the question of whether brokers help to identify skillfull hedge funds, I
analyze the pre-fee risk-adjusted performance of funds across distribution channels.
I estimate the two-year rolling pre-fee alpha of portfolios of funds, adjusting their
pre-fee returns for systemic risk exposure using equation (1.1). Figures 1.6 presents
the time-series dynamics of the pre-fee alphas of the portfolio of directly-sold funds
and the portfolio of broker-sold funds. The ﬁgure is split into two sub-ﬁgures,
which correspond to the equally-weighted scheme in Panel A and the value-weighted
scheme in Panel B.
The pre-fee alpha of the portfolio of directly-sold hedge funds is persistently
higher than the pre-fee alpha of the portfolio of broker-sold hedge funds regardless
of the portfolio-weighting scheme. I ﬁnd that for the equally-weighted scheme, the
alpha of the portfolio of directly-sold hedge funds is equal, on average, to 5.78%
versus 4.48% per year for the portfolio of broker-sold funds. For the value-weighted
scheme, the average alpha of directly-sold funds is equal to 5.53% versus 4.95% for
the broker-sold funds.
I implement another robustness check and compare the skill of the funds across
8Christoﬀersen, Evans and Musto (2013) refer to outside brokers as non-aﬃliated brokers and
in-house brokers as captive brokers.
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distribution channels with a panel regression (1.10). Panel B of Table 1.7 presents
the estimation results of the panel regression. I ﬁnd that the funds that are sold to
investors through brokers underperform funds that are oﬀered to investors directly
by 2% per year before accounting for fees. The results are robust for the inclusion
of fund-level controls and time ﬁxed eﬀects. I perform a robustness check, using
sample without adjusting for backﬁll bias and ﬁnd consistent results reported in
Panel B of Table 1.16 in the Appendix.
I also compare the dollar value added by directly-sold hedge funds and broker-
sold hedge funds. I ﬁnd the monthly dollar value added of the hedge fund as a
product of the pre-fee alpha of the hedge fund and its assets under management in a
given month. The dollar value added measure estimates the amount of money that
the hedge fund extracts from the ﬁnancial markets. I perform a panel data analysis
and report the results in Panel B of Table 1.8. I estimate that the value added by
a broker-sold fund is, on average, $190,000 per month lower than the value added
by a directly-sold hedge fund. The result is robust in controlling for the age of the
fund, its vintage and the time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Next, analyzing heterogeneity across brokers, I study the diﬀerence in skill be-
tween funds that are sold by in-house brokers and funds that are oﬀered by outside
brokers. Table 1.10 displays the estimation of the regression (1.11). I ﬁnd that
hedge funds that are oﬀered by in-house brokers, on average, have the same pre-fee
alpha as hedge funds that are sold through non-aﬃliated brokers and underperform
directly-sold hedge funds by 2% per year. The results are robust for the inclusion
of the size of the fund and its vintage year and controlling for time-variant demand
shocks. Furthermore, I perform an additional robustness checks by the estimating
regression (1.11) on the sample that does not correct for backﬁll bias and ﬁnd similar
results, which I report in Table 1.19 in the Appendix.
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1.2.3 Fees across distribution channels
Next, I assess whether intermediaries help investors to ﬁnd funds that charge lower
fees. To answer this question, I use information about management fees and in-
centive fees that hedge funds report in Morningstar database. Since only the most
recent contract characteristics are kept in the database, I perform a formal compar-
ison using the following cross-sectional regression:
Yi = β0 + βB · Bi + λt + ǫ˜i, (1.12)
where Bi is a dummy variable that is equal to one when fund is broker-sold and
is equal to zero otherwise. The regression includes a control for the fund’s vintage
year, λt.
Table 1.11 compares the fees of hedge funds across the distribution channels.
Columns (1) and (2) estimates the diﬀerence in the management fees of broker-sold
and directly-sold hedge funds. On average, hedge funds charge their investors 1.4%
management fees, but I do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between funds with
diﬀerent distribution channels. I also do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the management fees that funds sold through in-house brokers and funds oﬀered
through outside brokers charge their investors. These results are not surprising
since hedge funds uses management fees to cover their operational expenses.
Next, I estimate the diﬀerence in incentive fees that directly-sold funds and
broker-sold funds charge their investors and present the results in columns (3) and
(4). I ﬁnd that directly-sold funds, on average, charge a incentive fee of 18.35%,
which is 1.4% higher than the incentive fee of broker-sold funds. Analyzing the
heterogeneity of broker-sold funds, I establish that funds that are sold by outside
brokers charge incentive fees that are, on average, 1.5% lower than fees that directly-
sold funds charge, while funds that are sold by in-house brokers charge the same
incentive fees as directly sold funds. Performing an F-test, I ﬁnd that the incentive
fee that funds sold by in-house brokers charge are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
incentive fees that funds sold by outside brokers charge.
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The above results diﬀer from the ﬁndings of the mutual fund literature. Bergstresser,
Chalmers and Tufano (2009) establish that the non-distributional expenses of mu-
tual funds that are sold through intermediaries are 23 basis points higher than those
of mutual funds that are sold to investors directly, concluding that brokers do not
help investors to identify mutual funds with lower non-distribution fees.
1.2.4 Clientele across distribution channels
I complete the empirical analysis by analyzing whether investors of broker-sold hedge
funds diﬀer from investors of directly-sold hedge funds. Since hedge funds are very
secretive and do not disclose information about their investors, I use a minimum
investment size and an average investment size as empirical proxies of the size of
the hedge fund’s marginal investor and average investor. To estimate the diﬀerence
in the hedge funds’ clientele across the distribution channels, I estimate a regression
(1.12).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.12 estimate the diﬀerence in the minimum invest-
ment size of broker-sold and directly-sold hedge funds. The minimum investment
size of directly-sold funds is, on average, $1 million, which is $0.27 millions more
than that of directly-sold funds. Further, analyzing the heterogeneity of brokers, I
ﬁnd that the minimum investment size of funds sold through in-house brokers does
not diﬀer from that of directly-sold funds, while the minimum investment size of
funds sold through outside brokers is $0.21 millions lower than that of directly-sold
funds. Performing an F-test, I ﬁnd that the minimum investment size of in-house
broker-sold funds is statistically diﬀerent from the minimum investment size of out-
side broker-sold funds.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.12 estimate the diﬀerence in the average in-
vestment size of broker-sold and directly-sold hedge funds. Comparing the average
investment size, I ﬁnd that broker-sold funds have a $12 millions lower average
investment size than directly-sold funds.
These ﬁndings suggest that funds may target a diﬀerent clientele.
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1.3 Theoretical motivation
I presents a simple model of fundraising in the hedge fund industry. I then reconcile
empirical ﬁndings with the model implications and estimate the compensation that
brokers receive for capital introduction services.
1.3.1 Model of fundraising
Suppose there are three types of agents: hedge funds, investors, and brokers, who
intermediate between hedge funds and investors. There are two risk-neutral funds
that diﬀer in their portfolio management skills: a good fund and a bad fund. Let
θ denote a type of fund, where θ ∈ {G, B} corresponds to the good fund and the
bad fund, respectively. The good and the bad funds deliver positive pre-fee risk-
adjusted returns, αG and αB, respectively, with αG > αB > 0. I assume that alphas
are known to the funds themselves, but unobservable to investors and the broker.
The fund does not have capital and has to raise it from investors. It can either
directly raise capital from investors or use capital introduction services oﬀered by the
broker. For its portfolio management services, the fund charges performance-based
fees, which are calculated as the fraction of generated proﬁts. The fund chooses a
fee and capital raising channel to maximize the total dollar fees that it collects from
its investors.
There is also a continuum of risk-neutral investors. Each investor is endowed
with a unit of capital, which he may either invested in one of the hedge funds or in
an outside option (return of the outside option is normalized to zero). All investors
qualify for the status of accredited investor and may invest in hedge funds. To
capture heterogeneity among clientele, I assume that investors diﬀer in their search
and due diligence costs. There are professional investors with low search and due
diligence costs and mainstream accredited investors who have high search and due
diligence costs. I assume that the search and due diligence costs of investors, c, are
uniformly distributed at interval from 0 to C¯, c ∼ U [0; C¯].
The investor has the following options. He may search for a fund himself and
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invest on his own after paying due diligence costs. Or, he may hire the intermediary
broker and invest his money into a fund recommended by the broker. In the latter
case, the broker performs due diligence and certiﬁes the quality of the fund.
Due diligence is important since the hedge fund industry is opaque and there are
fraudulent funds that investors should be aware of. Analyzing form ADV disclosures
of registered hedge funds, Brown et al. (2008) ﬁnd that approximately 16% of hedge
funds have committed a felony or have ﬁnancial-related charges or convictions. As
pointed out by Garleanu and Pedersen (2016), hedge fund prospective investors
usually undertake extensive analysis by studying the track record and evaluating
the investment process and the risk management of funds. Fraudulent, negative
alpha funds exist on the oﬀ-equilibrium path. Therefore, investors who do not
perform due-diligence may loose money investing in these funds.
The broker performs due diligence and a certiﬁcation of the fund at cost, cI > 0.
For the capital introduction service, the broker charges the fund some fraction of the
fund’s fees. The broker and the fund bargain with each other and split the collected
dollar fees. I assume that the bargaining power of the broker is an exogenous
parameter, G ∈ (0; 1). Although I do not solve for an optimal contract for the
broker, the performance-related compensation ensures that the broker acts in the
interest of investors and allows for avoiding a moral hazard problem between the
broker and the investors.
The fundraising game has a simple sequential structure, which is illustrated in
Figure 1.1. At time 1, the good fund and the bad fund simultaneously announce
fees that they charge for portfolio management services and their choices of capital
raising channels. At time 2, the investors decide whether to invest into the hedge
fund industry on their own or hire an intermediary broker.
Strategies.
Let fθ be a fee that a type-θ fund charges its investors. Let Xθ be the fund’s choice of
capital raising channel. If the type-θ fund is sold to investors directly then Xθ = 0.
If the type-θ fund is sold to investors by the broker, then Xθ = 1. The strategy of
type-θ is a vector, sθ = (fθ, Xθ), such that sθ ∈ R+×{0, 1}. The good fund and the
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Figure 1.1: Time line of the fundraising game
bad fund have strategies sG and sB, respectively.
The investor decides either to perform a costly due diligence of the hedge fund
industry at cost c and invest into one of the funds on his own or to approach the
intermediary broker and follow his investment advice. In both cases, the investor
pays a portfolio management fee, fθ, upon investing into the type-θ hedge fund.
The decision of the investor depends on his search and due diligence costs c and the
strategies of the funds sG and sB.
Payoffs of players.
Let’s denote the proﬁt of type-θ hedge fund Πθ
(
sθ; s−θ;C(sθ, s−θ)
)
. It depends on
the strategy of the type-θ fund sθ, the strategies of the other fund s−θ, and a pro-
portion of investors, who decide to invest in the fund, denoted as C(sθ, s−θ) ⊂ [0; C¯].
Given strategy sθ = (fθ, Xθ), the proﬁt of the type-θ fund is determined as
Πθ
(
sθ; s−θ;C(sθ, s−θ)
)
= Πθ
(
(fθ, Xθ); s−θ;C(sθ, s−θ)
)
= (1.13)


fθ ·
∫
C(sθ,s−θ)
dc, if Xθ = 0 (1.13a)
(1−G) · fθ ·
∫
C(sθ,s−θ)
dc, if Xθ = 1. (1.13b)
If the type-θ fund decides to be sold to investors directly (Xθ = 0), then its proﬁts
are equal to the total dollar fees raised from the investors, as in (1.13a). If the type-θ
fund decides to be sold to investors through the broker (Xθ = 1), then the fund and
the broker split the total dollar fees and the fund gets a fraction 1 − G, which is
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determined by its bargaining power, as in (1.13b).
Let’s denote Uθc the utility of the investor with due diligence cost c, who allocates
his endowment into the type-θ fund. It is equal to
Uθc = αθ − fθ − c · I{Xθ = 0}. (1.14)
If the investor invests on his own, then his utility equals to the after-fee return of the
type-θ fund adjusted for due-diligence costs. If the investor follows ﬁnancial advice,
then his utility equals to the after-fee return on the type-θ fund.
Let’s denote the proﬁt that the broker gets ΠI
(
sθ; s−θ;C(sθ, s−θ)
)
. It is equal to
the compensation that the broker gets for the capital introduction service adjusted
for due diligence cost cI . The proﬁt of the broker may be expressed in terms of the
proﬁt that the fund receives as follows:
ΠI
(
sθ; s−θ;C(sθ, s−θ)
)
=
( G
1−G · Πθ
(
sθ; s−θ;C(sθ, s−θ)
)
− cI
)
· I{Xθ = 1}. (1.15)
The broker makes a proﬁt when the fund is broker-sold (Xθ = 1) and he gets no
proﬁt when the fund is directly-sold to investors (Xθ = 0).
Definition of “cut-off” equilibrium.
I deﬁne the Nash equilibrium of the fundraising game as follows:
(i) The good fund chooses strategy sG to maximize its proﬁts
ΠG
(
sG; sB;C(sG, sB)
)
≥ ΠG
(
s′G; sB;C(s
′
G, sB)
)
for any
s′G ∈ R+ × {0, 1}/{s′G 6= sG}.
(ii) The bad fund chooses strategy sB to maximize its proﬁts
ΠB
(
sB; sG;C(sB, sG)
)
≥ ΠB
(
s′B; sG;C(s
′
B, sG)
)
for any
s′B ∈ R+ × {0, 1}/{s′B 6= sB}.
(iii) There is a cut-oﬀ marginal investor with due diligence cost cˆ(sθ, s−θ) who is
indiﬀerent about investing on his own or using the advice of a broker (or investing
in an outside option). Investors with costs that are lower than the cost of the
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marginal investor, i.e. C(sG, sB) =
[
0;min{cˆ(sG, sB), C¯}
]
will invest on their own.
Investors with costs that are greater than the cost of the marginal investor, i.e
C(sB, sG) =
(
min{cˆ(sB, sG), C¯}; C¯
]
will approach the broker for investment advice.
(iv) The proﬁt of the broker covers his due diligence cost, ci.
Note that I restrict a space of the investor’s strategies to “cut-oﬀ” strategy, which is
determined by the marginal investor with a search and due diligence cost, cˆ(sθ, s−θ).
Since the investors base of the fund C(sθ, s−θ) may be fully described by a thresh-
old search and due-diligence cost cˆ(sθ, s−θ) of the marginal investor, it allows me
to simplify the notation for the proﬁt of the type-θ fund in the following way,
Πθ
(
sθ; s−θ; cˆ(sθ, s−θ)
)
.
PROPOSITION. There exists a separating pure strategies “cut-off” equilibrium in
the fundraising game. A good fund is directly-sold to investors and charges fee f ∗G =
αG
2
. A bad fund raises capital through a broker and charges fees f ∗B = αB.
s∗G =
(αG
2
, 0
)
, (1.16)
s∗B =
(
αB, 1
)
. (1.17)
A marginal investor with due diligence cost cˆ∗ gets zero utility and is indifferent
between investing into the hedge fund industry on his own or using the investment
advice of a broker:
cˆ∗ =
αG
2
, (1.18)
UGc∗ = UBc∗ = 0. (1.19)
Investors with costs c < cˆ∗ invest by themselves and those with c > cˆ∗ follow the
recommendation of broker.
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The necessary conditions for the existence of separating equilibrium are as follows:
max
{
1− αG
4 · C¯ ;
cI
αB · (C¯ − αG2 )
}
6 G < 1 (1.20)
αB < cˆ
∗ =
αG
2
< C¯. (1.21)
This separating “cut-oﬀ” equilibrium of the fundraising game is illustrated in Figure
1.2.
Figure 1.2: Separating equilibria of the fundraising game
Solution.
I verify the existence of the separating “cut-oﬀ” equilibrium by conﬁrming the op-
timality of strategies of the players’ strategies.
Good fund.
The good fund chooses optimally its fee and capital raising channel to maximize
its proﬁts (1.13). Since the capital raising choice of the fund is binary, the proﬁt
maximization over a two-dimensional vector-strategy sG = (fG, XG) simpliﬁes to
two one-dimensional maximization problems. The ﬁrst optimization corresponds
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to the choice by the good fund of engaging in direct capital raising. The second
optimization corresponds to a choice by the good fund of raising capital through the
broker.
First, let’s calculate the proﬁts that the good fund gets if it chooses to be directly-
sold (Xθ = 0). Its investor base includes either all the investors with due dili-
gence costs that are smaller than threshold cˆ or the entire population of investors,
C(sG, sB) =
[
0;min{cˆ(sG, sB), C¯}
]
. The good fund chooses fee fG to maximize its
proﬁts subject to the feasibility condition on fees and the participation constraint
of the marginal investor.
ΠG
(
(fG, 0); sB; cˆ(sG, sB)
)
= max
fG
fG ·
∫ min{cˆ((fG,0);sB),C¯}
0
dc (1.22)
subject to
0 6 fG 6 αG (1.22a)
αG − fG − cˆ((fG, 0); sB) = 0. (1.22b)
The fee feasibility constraint (1.22a) states that the fund can not charge a fee fG
that is bigger than the return αG that it generates. The participation constraint
(1.22b) says that the marginal investor has to be indiﬀerent about receiving utility
αG − fG − cˆ upon investment into the fund and the utility of zero upon investment
in an outside option.
Solving the maximization (1.22), I am interested in the interior case. There is
also a less interesting corner case when even the highest cost investor decides to
invest into the hedge fund on his own (cˆ > C¯). In this case, all investors, after
performing their due-diligence, invest in the good fund only. I consider a more
realistic case when cˆ < C¯. Then the optimization problem (1.22) is equivalent to
the following quadratic optimization:
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max
fG
fG · (αG − fG) (1.23)
subject to
0 6 fG 6 αG. (1.23a)
The hedge fund’s choice of fee aﬀects its proﬁts directly through fee fG and indirectly
through the size of its investors base αG−fG. The good fund exercises its monopoly
power and sets a fee optimally at, fG = αG2 . Thus, the strategy of the good fund
that chooses to be sold to investors directly is sG = (αG2 , 0) and its proﬁts are:
ΠG
(
(
αG
2
, 0); sB; cˆ(sG, sB)
)
=
α2G
4
. (1.24)
The threshold search and due diligence costs are equal to
cˆ =
αG
2
. (1.25)
To ensure the interior case occurs, which makes it suboptimal for high-cost investors
to invest on their own, the following condition has to be satisﬁed:
cˆ < C¯. (1.26)
Substituting (1.25) into (1.26), I get the second condition in (1.21).
Second, let’s calculate the proﬁts that the good fund gets if it chooses to be sold
through broker (XG = 1). In this case, both funds are oﬀered to investors through
a broker. However, the broker will only market the good fund, since in this case, he
will receive higher compensation. Thus, all investors will be channelled to the good
fund and C(sG, sB) = [0; C¯]. The good fund that is sold through the broker will
choose fee fG to maximize its proﬁts subject to the feasibility condition on the fee
and the participation constraint of the broker.
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ΠG
(
(fG, 1); sB; cˆ(sG, sB)
)
= max
fG
(1−G) · fG ·
∫ C¯
0
dc (1.27)
subject to
0 6 fG 6 αG (1.27a)
G · fG ·
∫ C¯
0
dc > cI . (1.27b)
The fee feasibility constraint (1.27a) is similar to (1.22a). The broker helps to attract
all investors to the good fund and gets a fraction G of the total dollar fees. The
participation constraint of the broker (1.27b) ensures that the compensation that
he receives is enough to cover his due diligence cost cI .
Since the good fund gets all the investors regardless of the fees that it charges, it
optimally sets a fee to extract all proﬁts, leaving investors indiﬀerent about investing
into the fund or investing into the outside option. Thus, the good fund that chooses
to be sold to investors through the broker sets fee fG = αG. Its optimal strategy is
sG = (αG, 1) and its proﬁts are equal to the (1−G) fraction of the generated surplus
αG · C¯.
ΠG
(
(αG, 1); sB; cˆ(sG, sB)
)
= (1−G) · αG · C¯. (1.28)
The proﬁts of the broker equals the fraction G of the generated surplus after ac-
counting for the due diligence costs of the broker.
ΠI
(
(αG, 1); sB; cˆ(sG, sB)
)
= G · αG · C¯ − cI . (1.29)
Finally, the good fund optimally chooses the capital-raising channel by comparing
proﬁts (1.24) that it gets if it is directly-sold to investors with the proﬁts (1.28)
that it gets if it is sold to investors through a broker. For the good fund to become
directly-sold, the following incentive compatibility condition must be met:
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ΠG
(
(
αG
2
, 0); sB; cˆ(sG, sB)
)
> ΠG
(
(αG, 1); sB; cˆ(sG, sB)
)
. (1.30)
Substituting (1.24) and (1.28) into condition (1.30) gives the ﬁrst constraint on the
bargaining power (1.20) of the broker:
G ≥ 1− αG
4 · C¯ . (1.31)
Bad fund.
The bad fund optimally chooses a fee and capital raising channel which maximizes
its proﬁts (1.13). Similar to the analysis for the good fund, I consider two separate
cases, which correspond to the choice of fundraising of the bad fund.
First, let’s calculate the proﬁts that the bad fund gets if it chooses to be sold
to investors through broker (XB = 1). Investors with search and due diligence
costs c > cˆ approach the broker and invest their capital in the fund that the broker
recommends. Its investor base is C(sB, sG) = (cˆ(sB, sG); C¯] for the interior case
when cˆ < C¯. The bad fund chooses fee fB to maximize its proﬁt subject to the
feasibility condition on the fee and the participation constraint of the broker.
ΠB
(
(fB, 1); sG; cˆ(sB, sG)
)
= max
fB
(1−G) · fB ·
∫ C¯
cˆ(sB ,sG)
dc (1.32)
subject to
0 6 fB 6 αB (1.32a)
G · fB ·
∫ C¯
cˆ(sB ,sG)
dc > cI . (1.32b)
The fee feasibility constraint (1.32a) states that the fund cannot charge a fee fB
bigger than the return αB that it generates. The broker brings investors C(sB, sG) =
(cˆ(sB, sG); C¯] to the bad fund and receives a fraction G of the total dollar fees that
the fund charges. The participation constraint of the broker (1.32b) ensures that
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the compensation that he receives is enough to cover his due diligence cost cI .
The choice of fees of the bad fund has only a direct eﬀect on its proﬁt, since its
investors’ base comes from the broker. Thus, it maximizes its proﬁts by extracting
all proﬁts through fees and making its investors indiﬀerent about investing into the
fund or investing in an outside option. Thus, the bad fund that chooses to be sold
to investors through the broker sets the fee fB = αB. Its strategy is sB = (αB, 1)
and its proﬁts are equal to the (1−G) fraction of the generated surplus αB · [C¯− α2 ]
ΠB
(
sG; (αB, 1); cˆ(sB, sG)
)
= (1−G) · αB · [C¯ − αG2 ]. (1.33)
The proﬁts that the broker gets is a fraction G of the generated surplus after ac-
counting for the due diligence costs of the broker.
ΠI
(
sG; (αB, 1); cˆ(sB, sG)
)
= G · αB · [C¯ − αG2 ]− cI > 0. (1.34)
Condition (1.34) yields the second constraint (1.20) on the bargaining power of the
broker.
G >
cI
αB · (C¯ − αG2 )
(1.35)
Second, consider the case when the bad fund chooses to be directly sold (XB = 0)
and its strategy is described as sB = (fB, 0). When the bad fund decides to be
directly sold, we have to insure that it will not attract any investors regardless of
the fee that it sets. To attract more investors, the bad fund may set zero fees fB = 0.
In this case, its strategy is sB = (0, 0).
I need to ensure that the marginal investor cˆ still prefers to invest into the good
fund that is sold directly rather than into the bad fund that is sold directly and
charges no fees. The marginal investor invests into the good directly-sold fund if
αB − fB − cˆ < αG − fG − cˆ. (1.36)
Since fB = 0 and fG = αG2 , I get
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αB <
αG
2
. (1.37)
The combination of conditions (1.26), (1.31), (1.35), and (1.37) determine the nec-
essary conditions for the existence of a pure strategy separating the “cut-oﬀ” equi-
librium in Proposition 1.
Discussion of equilibrium. I consider several cases in relation to the parameters of
the model to illustrate equilibrium. When the bargaining power of the broker is
high G→ 1, the broker extracts all generated surplus. In this case, condition (1.20)
is always satisﬁed and the good fund never wants to use the capital introduction
services of the broker.
In the case of competition among the brokers, the broker should make enough
proﬁt to cover his due diligence cost cI . If the fund hires a competitive broker, then
the proﬁt of the fund equals the generated surplus adjusted by the due diligence
cost of the broker.
α2G
4
> αG · C¯ − cI . (1.38)
If the due diligence cost is high, then the good fund and the bad fund separate:
cI > αG · [C¯ − αG4 ]. (1.39)
If the due diligence cost is low and condition (1.39) is violated, then only the good
fund survives.
1.3.2 Model implications
Next, I discuss the implications of the the fundraising model and reconcile the model
predictions with the empirical results from Section II.
First, the model has implications for the after-fee return that investors receive
on their hedge fund investments, αθ − fθ. The equilibrium strategy of the good
fund (1.16) implies that the after-fee returns of investors in the directly-sold fund
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are determined by the reservation value for the marginal investor and are equal to
αG
2
. The equilibrium strategy of the bad fund (1.17) implies that broker-sold fund
extracts all generated surplus through fees, making its investors indiﬀerent about
investing in the fund and the outside option. Therefore, the after-fee return of the
broker-sold fund investor is equal to 0. Thus, the after-fee returns of directly-sold
funds are higher than the after-fee returns of broker-sold funds αG
2
> 0.
The empirical patterns that are documented in Figure 1.4, Figure 1.5 and Panel
A of Table 1.7 support the prediction about the after-fee performance of directly-sold
and broker-sold funds.
Second, the model also makes predictions about the pre-fee return of directly-
sold and broker-sold funds. The equilibrium strategies of the good fund (1.16) and
that of the bad fund (1.17) imply that the good fund raises capital directly, while the
bad fund raises funds through the broker. Together with condition (1.37), it implies
that broker-sold funds underperform directly-sold funds, even before accounting for
portfolio management fees αG > αB.
The empirical ﬁndings of Figure 1.6 and Panel B of Table 1.7 support the model
prediction about the pre-fee performance of directly-sold and broker-sold funds.
Third, the model makes a prediction about portfolio management fees that funds
charge. The equilibrium strategy of the good fund (1.16) implies that the directly-
sold fund charges fee, fG = αG2 . The equilibrium strategy of the bad fund (1.17)
states that the broker-sold fund charges fee, fB = αB. Condition (1.37) from Propo-
sition 1 implies that the fees that directly-sold funds charge their investors are higher
than the fees that broker-sold funds charge their investors fG = αG2 > αB = fB.
Table 1.11 presents the results of testing the above prediction. I ﬁnd that
directly-sold funds charge higher incentive fees than broker-sold funds. I do not
ﬁnd, however, any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the management fees of directly-
sold and broker-sold funds.
Fourth, the model makes predictions about clientele of the funds. In equilibrium,
investors with costs smaller than the costs of the marginal investor invest in the
directly-sold fund C(sG, sB) = [0; cˆ], while investors with costs higher than cost of
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the marginal investor invest in the broker-sold fund C(sB, sG) = [cˆ; C¯]. Thus, the
model predicts that the marginal and average investor of the directly-sold fund has
lower costs than the marginal and average investor of the broker-sold fund. If the
sizes of the investors is negatively correlated with their due diligence and search
costs, then the model implies that the marginal investor of the directly-sold fund
with cost cˆ is bigger than the marginal investor of the broker-sold fund with cost
C¯. Also, the average investor of the directly-sold fund with cost cˆ
2
is bigger than
average investor of the broker-sold fund with cost cˆ+C¯
2
.
Using minimum investment size as an empirical proxy of the size of the marginal
investor and the average investment size as a proxy of the size of average investor,
I test the model predictions of the clientele of hedge funds. Table 1.12 displays the
tests of the above prediction.
1.3.3 Compensation for the broker
I estimate the economic magnitude of compensation that broker receives for capital
introduction services. In the fundraising model, the broker and the fund split the
dollar proﬁts. Compensation for the broker is proportional to the total dollar fees
that hedge fund collects from its investors, with the proportionality constant being
equal to the bargaining power of the broker, as in (1.15).
I use information about the fund’s assets under management, performance, and
compensation structure to estimate the total dollar fees. Using methodology for the
reconstruction of the pre-fee returns that is described in detail in the section Data, I
estimate the dollar management fees using equations (1.3) and dollar incentive fees
using equation (1.4). I ﬁnd the total dollar fees collected as a sum of the annual
dollar management fees and the dollar incentive fees. I consider the bargaining power
of the broker to be in the range of 5% to 95%. The lower bound corresponds to the
low bargaining power and the upper bound to the high bargaining power. Knowing
the total annual dollar fees and the bargaining power of the broker, I estimate the
fees that the broker gets for a capital introduction service using equation (1.15).
CHAPTER 1. FUNDRAISING IN THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 46
For every broker-sold fund in the matched sample, I estimate the annual compen-
sation that broker receives. I report the average annual compensation in Table 1.13.
Depending on the bargaining power, the estimates of the annual compensation of
the broker vary from $241,000 to $4.58 million. For a bargaining power of 1\3, which
corresponds to the equilateral division of surplus among the fund, its investors, and
the broker, I estimate the average compensation that the broker receives to be $1.45
million per year.
1.4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes empirically and theoretically the fundraising process in the
hedge fund industry. I analyze form D ﬁlings that hedge funds report to the SEC
with regard to their fundraising process. Information that the funds report in their
ﬁlings allows me to diﬀerentiate between the funds that raise capital directly from in-
vestors and those that use the capital introduction services of intermediary brokers.
I ﬁnd that funds that are sold to investors through intermediaries underperform
funds that are oﬀered to investors directly on a risk-adjusted basis, both before and
after accounting for fees. I also ﬁnd that hedge funds that are sold to investors
directly on average have a larger average investorâĂŹs size, a larger minimum in-
vestment size and charge higher incentive fees compared to funds oﬀered to investors
by brokers. These ﬁndings provide empirical description of the equilibrium.
I also present a stylized model that has a simple intuition and reconciles the
above empirical ﬁndings. In equilibrium, sophisticated investors who are better at
due diligence will sort themselves into better funds, which avoid having to internal-
ize the high cost of hiring a broker, while bad funds hire a broker, which mitigates
capital-raising ineﬃciency, but requires compensation for capital introduction ser-
vices. Brokers’ bargaining power and the relative outperformance of the good fund
over the bad fund are essential for the existence of separating equilibria. The cal-
ibrate model implies that average broker compensation is $1.5 million per year,
which is consistent with the empirically estimate, value-added diﬀerence between
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the broker-sold funds and the directly-sold funds.
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1.5 Tables and ﬁgures
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Table 1.1: Outline of form D ﬁlings
Item Description
1. Issuer’s identity Name and type of entity that initiates fundraising.
2. Principal place of business and contact information Administrative information about the fundraising entity.
3. Related persons Information about all executive officers, directors, and promoters associated with the fundraisning
offer.
4. Industry group Information on the entity’s industry group that most accurately reflects the use of capital raised.
Banking and financial services includes pooled investment funds, which comprises hedge funds, private
equity funds, venture capital funds, and other investment funds.
5. Issuer size Information of revenue range or aggregate net asset value of fundraising entity. Hedge funds and
other investment funds may decline to response to this question.
6. Federal exemptions and exclusions claimed Provision(s) that are claimed to exempt the capital raising from formal offering registration.
7. Type of filing Information on whether the entity is filing a new notice or an amendment to a notice.
8. Duration of offering Information on duration of fundraising offering.
9. Type(s) of securities offered Information on the type of security offered, which includes equity, debt, options, and pooled
investment fund interests.
10. Business combination transactions Information on whether the fundraising offering is made in connection with business combination
transactions, such as merger or acquisition.
11. Minimum investment size Minimum dollar amount of investment that will be accepted from any outside investor.
12. Sales compensation Information about each person that has been or will be paid directly or indirectly any commission
in connection with fundraising.
13. Offering and sales amounts Dollar amount of capital raised up to date.
14. Investors Total number of investors who already have invested in the offering and number of non-accredited
investors.
15. Sales commissions and finders’ fees expenses Information on estimate of sales commissions and finders’ fee expenses.
16. Use of proceeds Estimation of commissions that are paid to related persons.
Table 1.1 describes information about their fundraising process that hedge funds disclose in form D filings. Column Item
outlines main categories of the form D. Column Description provides key information that fundraising entity reports in
item.
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Table 1.2: Largest funds by distribution channel
Fund Fund family Capital raised
PANEL A: Directly sold funds
VERDE ALPHA FUND LTD Verde Asset Management 20,221
GLOBAL ASCENT LTD Global Ascent 16,524
OZ OVERSEAS FUND II LTD OZ Management 15,290
CANYON VALUE REALIZATION FUND LTD Canyon Capital Advisors 14,745
ADAGE CAPITAL PARTNERS LP Adage Capital Management 14,049
CONVEXITY CAPITAL OFFSHORE LP Convexity Capital GP 11,155
ABERDEEN FIXED INCOME FUNDS POOLED TRUST Aberdeen Asset Management 10,783
DYMON ASIA MACRO FUND Dymon Asia Capital 10,733
TUDOR BVI GLOBAL FUND LTD Tudor Investment Corp 10,587
LONE CASCADE LP Lone Pine Capital 10,347
ANCHORAGE CAPITAL PARTNERS OFFSHORE LTD Anchorage Capital Group 10,063
GLENVIEW CAPITAL PARTNERS CAYMAN LTD Glenview Capital Management 9,495
KING STREET CAPITAL LP King Street Capital 9,473
BROOKSIDE CAPITAL PARTNERS FUND LP Brookside Capital Management 8,905
BAUPOST VALUE PARTNERS LP IV The Baupost Group 8,603
PANEL B: Broker sold funds
D.E. SHAW COMPOSITE INTERNATIONAL FUND D.E. Shaw & Co 18,235
RENAISSANCE INSTITUTIONAL EQUITIES FUND LLC Renaissance Technologies LLC 16,192
MESIROW ABSOLUTE RETURN FUND LTD Mesirow Advanced Strategies Inc 15,096
D.E. SHAW OCULUS INTERNATIONAL FUND D.E. Shaw & Co 13,390
RENAISSANCE INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSIFIED ALPHA Renaissance Technologies LLC 10,232
GRAHAM GLOBAL INVESTMENT FUND II SPC LTD Graham Capital Management 10,199
GRAHAM GLOBAL INVESTMENT FUND I SPC LTD Graham Capital Management 9,227
BREVAN HOWARD FUND LTD Brevan Howard Capital Management LP 8,412
MESIROW ABSOLUTE RETURN FUND (INSTITUTIONAL) Mesirow Advanced Strategies Inc 8,196
D.E. SHAW COMPOSITE FUND LLC D.E. Shaw & Co 7,779
DRAWBRIDGE SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES FUND LP Fortress Investment Group LLC 7,056
MILLENNIUM USA LP Millennium Management LLC 6,868
PERMAL FIXED INCOME HOLDINGS NV Permal Asset Management Inc 6,847
WEATHERLOW FUND I LP Evanston Capital Management LLC 6,804
PAULSON ADVANTAGE PLUS LP Paulson & Co 6,419
Table 1.2 presents fifteen directly sold hedge funds (Panel A) and broker sold hedge funds (Panel B) that were open
for investment and raised maximum amount of capital by 2015. Table reports fund’s name, name of management company
and total amount of capital raised (in millions of dollars).
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Table 1.3: Top players in fundraising industry
Name # Funds Capital raised # Investors
1. GOLDMAN SACHS & CO 377 350 149
[98] [30]
2. WELLS FARGO ADVISORS, LLC 364 176 271
[25] [16]
3. MORGAN STANLEY & CO 359 428 436
[77] [99]
4. J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES LLC 295 765 248
[256] [69]
5. MERRILL LYNCH 275 319 469
[118] [158]
6. CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC 242 403 453
[87] [81]
7. CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES LLC 210 367 433
[97] [57]
8. UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES INC 191 443 347
[193] [128]
9. DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC 170 385 76
[23] [6]
10. BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC. 114 395 144
[156] [75]
Table 1.3 provides information on the top broker firms that intermediate fundraising process. Top broker firms are
defined as those companies that intermediate the largest number of funds. Table reports broker’s name, average [median]
amount of capital raised by funds that are intermediated by the same broker firm ( in millions of dollars) and average
[median] number of investors in funds with the same broker. Statistics are calculated using sample of Form D filings
from January 2009 to December 2015 for hedge funds and other investment companies. For each broker statistics are
calculated on sample of funds that are intermediated by this broker, using information that is available in the latest
available form D filings where the broker is reported.
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Figure 1.3: Fundraising in alternative investment industry
Panel A: Hedge funds Panel B: Other investment funds
Panel C: Private equity funds Panel D: Venture capital funds
Figure 1.3 displays fundraising dynamics in alternative investment industry
from 2010 to 2015, using information that funds report in form D filings.
Panel A, B, C and D displays evolution of hedge funds, other investment
funds, private equity and venture capital industries, respectively. Bars
indicate amount of capital ( in billions of dollars, left y-axis) that funds
have raised from investors during a given year. Grey solid bars indicate
capital that was raised by existing directly-sold funds. Grey hatched bars
display capital that was raised by newly opened directly-sold funds. Black
solid bars indicate capital inflows into existing broker-sold funds. Black
hatched bars show capital that was raised by newly opened broker-sold
funds. Black solid line (right y-axis) indicates total amount of capital
raised in a given year. Red dashed line displays total number of funds that
raise capital from investors in a given year ( in thousands, right y-axis).
Appendix describes methodology that is used to estimate capital inflows.
Red dotted line indicates total number existing funds (in thousands, right
y-axis).
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Table 1.4: Summary statistics
Direct Brokered Diff. P-value
PANEL A: form D filings
Average Inflows 47.80 48.50 0.70 (0.92)
Median Inflows 2.66 5.00 2.34
Average [ Inflows >0 ] 66.80 63.30 -3.50 (0.74)
Median [ Inflows >0 ] 9.63 12.00 2.37
Average # Investors 48 142 94*** (0.00)
Median # Investors 15 42 27
Average # New Investors 12 33 21*** (0.00)
Median # New Investors 5 7 2
# Filings 31,031 9,283
# Funds 9,650 1,925
PANEL B: form D filings and Morningstar
Average Inflows 45.50 47.31 1.81 (0.71)
Median Inflows 3.43 4.23 0.80
Average [ Inflows >0 ] 60.30 59.91 -0.39 (0.95)
Median [ Inflows >0 ] 9.04 8.50 -0.54
Average # Investors 75 118 43*** (0.00)
Median # Investors 42 74 32
Average # New Investors 14 27 13*** (0.00)
Median # New investors 6 7 1
# Filings 2,872 1,129
# Funds 1,103 625
Table 1.4 describes information that funds report in form D filings for di-
rectly sold funds and broker sold funds over the period from January 2009
to December 2015. Panel A focuses on the sample of all hedge funds that
file forms D. Panel B presents results for the sample of funds that file
forms D and list their funds at Morningstar database. Table presents in-
formation about the average and median annual capital inflows( in millions
of dollars), average and median annual positive capital inflows (in millions
of dollars), average and median number of investors and average positive
minimum investment size (in thousands of dollars). Methodology that is
used to estimate annual capital inflows is outlined in Appendix. Column
Diff. reports difference between the values for directly sold and bro-
ker sold funds. Column P-value reports p-value (in parenthesis) of T-test
for means across directly sold and broker sold funds groups. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and *** re-
spectively.
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Figure 1.4: Performance of directly sold and broker sold hedge funds
Panel A: Equal-weighting
Panel B: Value-weighting
Figure 1.4 displays after-fee performance of fund of directly sold hedge
funds ( grey solid line) relative to performance of fund of broker sold
hedge funds ( black solid line) over the period from January 2010 to De-
cember 2015, assuming initial investment of $100. The sample of funds con-
sists of funds that are listed in Morningstar database and file form D
filings. Panel A displays after-fee performance of funds of funds where
constituent hedge funds are equally-weighted. Panel B displays after-fee
performance of funds of funds where constituent hedge funds are value-
weighted. Returns of funds are adjusted for backfill bias.
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Table 1.5: After-fee systematic risk exposure of hedge funds
R¯ αˆ βˆMkt βˆSmB βˆT10y βˆCr.Spr. βˆpBD βˆpFX βˆpCOM R
2
PANEL A: Equal-Weighting
Direct 4.79%** 4.42%** 0.12* 0.38*** 0.10 0.25*** -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 68%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Brokered 3.97%* 3.37%* 0.12** 0.32*** 0.07 0.18** -0.07* 0.01 -0.01* 68%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
PANEL B: Value-Weighting
Direct 5.39% 4.433%** 0.13*** 0.31*** 0.07 0.16** -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 66%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Brokered 4.16% 3.552%** 0.12*** 0.25*** 0.05 0.15** -0.01* 0.01 -0.01 62%
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Table 1.5 presents estimation of Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model for fund of directly
sold (row “Direct”) and broker sold funds (row “Brokered”). Panel A displays results for funds
of funds where constituent funds are equally-weighted. Panel B reports results for funds of
funds where constituent funds are value-weighted. The sample of funds is restricted to funds
that are listed in Morningstar database and file form D filings. The seven-factor model (1.1)
is estimated using after-fee monthly returns between January 2010 and December 2015, where
the first 24-months of fund’s performance are excluded to adjust for backfill bias. Table
displays estimated annualized excess after-fee return of fund of fund, R¯, estimated annualized
alpha, αˆ, estimated exposures to market factor, βˆMkt, estimated exposure to size spread factor,
βˆSmB, estimated exposure to yield curve level factor, βˆT10y, estimated exposure to credit spread
factor, βˆCr.Spr., and estimated exposures to bond, commodity and forex trend-following factors,
βˆpBD, βˆpFX and βˆpCOM , as well as the adjusted R
2. Figures in parentheses are the Newey and
West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.
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Table 1.6: Pre-fee systematic risk exposure of hedge funds
R¯ αˆ βˆMkt βˆSmB βˆT10y βˆCr.Spr. βˆpBD βˆpFX βˆpCOM R
2
PANEL A: Equally-weighted
Direct 6.17%*** 5.78%*** 0.12* 0.39*** 0.11 0.25*** -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 69%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Brokered 5.12%*** 4.48%** 0.17** 0.33*** 0.07 0.18** -0.01* 0.01 -0.01* 69%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
PANEL B: Value-weighted
Direct 6.62%*** 5.53%*** 0.14*** 0.32*** 0.07 0.16** -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 65%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Brokered 5.50%*** 4.95%*** 0.11*** 0.26*** 0.05 0.15** -0.01 0.01 -0.01 61%
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Table 1.6 presents estimation of Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model for fund of directly
sold (row “Direct”) and broker sold funds (row “Brokered”). Panel A displays results for funds
of funds where constituent funds are equally-weighted. Panel B reports results for funds of
funds where constituent funds are value-weighted. The sample of funds is restricted to funds
that are listed in Morningstar database and file form D filings. The seven-factor model (1.1)
is estimated using pre-fee monthly returns between January 2010 and December 2015, where
the first 24-months of fund’s performance are excluded to adjust for backfill bias. Table
displays estimated annualized excess pre-fee return of fund of fund, R¯, estimated annualized
alpha, αˆ, estimated exposures to market factor, βˆMkt, estimated exposure to size spread factor,
βˆSmB, estimated exposure to yield curve level factor, βˆT10y, estimated exposure to credit spread
factor, βˆCr.Spr., and estimated exposures to bond, commodity and forex trend-following factors,
βˆpBD, βˆpFX and βˆpCOM , as well as the adjusted R
2. Figures in parentheses are the Newey and
West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.
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Figure 1.5: After-fee alphas of directly sold and broker sold hedge funds
Panel A: Equal-weighting
Panel B: Value-weighting
Figure 1.5 displays a time varying risk-adjusted performance (alpha) for
the equally-weighted and value-weighted funds of hedge funds that are
displayed in Panel A and Panel B, accordingly. Alphas of funds of funds
are estimated with the rolling-window Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
model (1.1). The rolling-window regressions (with 24 months window) are
estimated for each portfolio using monthly after-fee returns between Jan-
uary 2010 and December 2015 (adjusted for backfill bias). Rolling after-
fee alpha of fund of directly sold funds is displayed with grey solid line
and that of fund of broker sold funds is displayed with black solid line.
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Figure 1.6: Pre-fee alphas of directly sold and broker sold hedge funds
Panel A: Equal-Weighting
Panel B: Value-Weighting
Figure 1.6 displays a time varying risk-adjusted performance (alpha) for
the equally-weighted and value-weighted funds of hedge funds that are
displayed in Panel A and Panel B, accordingly. Alphas of funds of funds
are estimated with the rolling-window Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
model (1.1). The rolling-window regressions (with 24 months window) are
estimated for each fund of funds using monthly pre-fee returns between
January 2010 and December 2015 (adjusted for backfill bias). Rolling pre-
fee alpha of fund of directly sold funds is displayed with grey solid line
and that of fund of broker sold funds is displayed with black solid line.
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Table 1.7: Alphas of directly and broker sold hedge funds
Alpha
(1) (2) (3)
PANEL A: After-fee
Bit -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Assetit−1) — 0.007*** 0.007***
— (0.001) (0.001)
Ageit — -0.0001 -0.0005**
— (0.0002) (0.0002)
Vintage No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes
# Obs. 29,051 29,051 29,051
R2 0.02% 4% 7%
PANEL B: Pre-fee
Bit -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Assetit−1) — 0.008*** 0.008***
— (0.001) (0.001)
Ageit — -0.0001 0.0007***
— (0.0002) (0.0002)
Vintage No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes
# Obs. 28,493 28,493 28,493
R2 0.3% 4% 7%
Table 1.7 presents estimates of difference in risk-adjusted performance
between directly sold and broker sold hedge funds with panel regression
αˆit = β0+βB ·Bit+βs·Xit−1+βt+ǫ˜it. Fund level controls Xit−1 include logarithm
of assets under management in the previous period, age, and vintage year
and time fixed effects βt. Panel A displays results for after-fee alphas of
hedge funds. Panel B displays results for pre-fee alphas of hedge funds.
The sample covers hedge funds that are listed in Morningstar database
and file form D filings over period from January 2010 to December 2015.
Figures in parentheses are the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors clustered by month. Sta-
tistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and
*** respectively.
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Table 1.8: Value added by directly and broker sold hedge funds
Dollar value added
(1) (2) (3)
PANEL A: After-fee
Bit -0.214*** -0.209*** -0.211***
(0.051) (0.048) (0.048)
Ageit — -0.0004 -0.017**
— (0.003) (0.004)
Vintage No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes
# Obs. 29,051 29,051 29,051
R2 1% 4% 5%
PANEL B: Pre-fee
Bit -0.198*** -0.182*** -0.189***
(0.058) (0.056) (0.056)
Ageit — -0.001 0.014***
— (0.004) (0.004)
Vintage No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes
# Obs. 28,493 28,493 28,493
R2 0.06% 3% 4%
Table 1.8 presents estimates of difference in dollar value added (in mil-
lions of dollars) by directly sold and broker sold hedge funds with panel
regression Sˆit = β0 + βB · Bit + βs · Xit + βt + ǫ˜it. Fund level controls Xit in-
clude fund’s age, vintage year and time fixed effects βt. Panel A displays
results for after-fee dollar value added by hedge funds. Panel B displays
results for pre-fee dollar value added of hedge funds. The sample covers
hedge funds that are listed in Morningstar database and file form D fil-
ings over period from January 2010 to December 2015 with an adjustment
for backfill bias. Figures in parentheses are the Newey and West (1987)
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors clus-
tered by month. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is
denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.
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Table 1.9: Heterogeneity of brokers
After-fee alpha
(1) (2) (3)
BIit -0.020*** -0.020*** - 0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
BOit -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Assetit−1) 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ageit 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0008
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Vintage No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes
# Obs. 28,854 28,854 28,854
R2 1% 3% 4%
Ho: In-house = Outside
F-test 3.73* 4.36** 4.74**
p-value 0.06 0.04 0.03
Table 1.9 estimates difference in after-fee risk adjusted performance be-
tween directly sold hedge funds and funds that are sold through in-house
broker or outside broker with panel regression: αˆit = β0+βin ·BIit+βout ·BOit +
βx ·Xit+βt+ ǫ˜it. BIit is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the fund is
sold through in-house broker and is equal to zero otherwise. BOit is a dummy
variable that is equal to one when the fund is sold through outside broker
and is equal to zero otherwise. Regression includes fund level controls,
Xit, such as fund’s age, vintage year and time fixed effects, βt. The sample
of funds is restricted to funds that are listed in Morningstar database and
file form D filings over period from January 2010 to December 2015, using
backfill corrected sample of hedge fund returns observations. Figures in
parentheses are the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation consistent standard errors clustered by month. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and *** re-
spectively. Table presents results of F-test for hypothesis that alphas of
funds that are sold through in-house brokers is equal to alphas of funds
that are sold through outside brokers.
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Table 1.10: Heterogeneity of brokers
Pre-fee alpha
(1) (2) (3)
BIit -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
BOit -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Assetit−1) 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ageit 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0006
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Vintage No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes
# Obs. 28,304 28,304 28,304
R2 1% 4% 5%
Ho: In-house = Outside
F-test 0.02 -0.26 0.11
p-value 0.89 0.61 0.74
Table 1.10 estimates difference in pre-fee risk-adjusted performance be-
tween directly sold hedge funds and funds that are sold through in-house
broker or outside broker with panel regression: αˆit = β0+βin ·BIit+βout ·BOit +
βx ·Xit+βt+ ǫ˜it. BIit is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the fund is
sold through in-house broker and is equal to zero otherwise. BOit is a dummy
variable that is equal to one when the fund is sold through outside broker
and is equal to zero otherwise. Regression includes fund level controls,
Xit, such as fund’s age, vintage year and time fixed effects, βt. The sample
of funds is restricted to funds that are listed in Morningstar database and
file form D filings over period from January 2010 to December 2015, using
backfill corrected sample of hedge fund returns observations. Figures in
parentheses are the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation consistent standard errors clustered by month. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and *** re-
spectively. Table presents results of F-test for hypothesis that alphas of
funds that are sold through in-house brokers is equal to alphas of funds
that are sold through outside brokers.
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Table 1.11: Fees of directly sold and broker sold funds
Management fee Incentive fee
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bi 0.000 — -0.014*** —
(0.000) — (0.004) —
BIit — -0.000 — 0.006
— (0.000) — (0.006)
BOit — 0.000 — -0.015***
— (0.000) — 0.004
Vintage Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 5% 5% 4% 5%
#Obs. 1,376 1,370 1,289 1,283
Ho: In-house = Outside
F-test — 0.95 — 5.95**
p-value — 0.33 — 0.01
Table 1.11 presents estimation of cross-sectional regressions (1.12) and
(1.11), comparing fee structure of directly sold and broker sold hedge
funds. Columns (1) and (2) present results for management fees. Columns
(3) and (4) present results for incentive fees. Figures in parentheses are
the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent standard errors. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.
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Table 1.12: Clientele of directly sold and broker sold funds
Min. investment size Aver. investment size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bi -0.272*** — -12.033*** —
(0.086) — (3.608) —
BIit — -0.472*** — -15.566***
— (0.217) — (4.623)
BOit — -0.282** — -5.716*
— (0.091) — (3.293)
Vintage Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 3% 3% 3% 3%
#Obs. 1,365 1,338 1,577 1,570
Ho: In-house = Outside
F-test — 0.69 — 4.76**
p-value — 0.40 — 0.03
Table 1.12 presents estimation of cross-sectional regressions (1.12) and
(1.11), comparing clientele of directly sold and broker sold hedge funds.
Columns (1) and (2) present results for minimum investment size ( in mil-
lions of $). Columns (3) and (4) present results for average investment size
( in millions of $). Figures in parentheses are the Newey and West (1987)
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Sta-
tistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and
*** respectively.
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Table 1.13: Average broker fee: bargaining power
Bargaining Power 5% 10% 20% 30% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
Dollar Fee $0.241 $0.482 $0.964 $1.446 $2.410 $2.893 $3.375 $3.857 $4.339 $4.580
Table 1.13. This table presents estimates of average annual fee ( in millions $) that fund pays to broker, who intermediates
fund’s capital raising process. Fee is estimated for a given broker’s bargaining power. The sample of funds is restricted
to funds that are listed in Morningstar database and may be classified as broker-sold funds according to information
in form D filings. Annual dollar broker fees are estimated under considered fee specification, using the methodology
that is described in Appendix. For a given bargaining power table displays average annual dollar fee across broker-sold
funds.
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1.6 Capital inﬂows estimation
To estimate capital inﬂows into industry, I use the following methodology. Among
various information that fund reports in its form D ﬁlings, is up-to-date information
on total amount of capital raised from investors, which is reported in the ﬁeld Total
Amount Sold.9 To estimate the amount of capital raised by the fund, we should
consider two cases: capital inﬂows at fund’s inception and capital inﬂows during the
life of the fund. In the ﬁrst case, amount of capital raised at inception is directly
reported in Total Amount Sold variable. In the second case, it may be estimated as
an increment of Total Amount Sold variable between two consecutive fund’s ﬁlings.
For example, Citadel Global Equities Fund10, that was opened in July, 2009, reports
capital inﬂow of $100 millions in its ﬁrst ﬁling. The fund reports $ 153 millions as
total amount sold to investors in its next ﬁling in August, 2010. Thus, total capital
inﬂows into the fund between July, 2009 and August, 2010 build up to $53 millions.
As funds sometimes ﬁle amendment to their form D ﬁlings more than once a year,
I estimate an amount of capital raised, using information from the latest ﬁling in a
given year.
Due to self-reporting nature of form D ﬁlings, there are some funds in the sam-
ple that mistakenly report their yearly inﬂows instead of up-to-date total amount
of money raised from investors, which is required by Regulation D. I identify those
funds when inﬂow that are estimated using the introduced methodology are nega-
tive.11 Funds that misreport information about total amount of capital raised are
excluded from analysis.
Unfortunately, form D ﬁlings do not allow to recover an exact timing of capital
inﬂows, but rather estimate capital inﬂows during the period between the ﬁlings.
Therefore, additional assumptions are required to determine the year of capital in-
ﬂows into the fund. As above, I consider two scenarios separately. The ﬁrst case
corresponds to capital raising at fund’s inception. In this case, I assume that capital
9Total Amount Sold is reported in ﬁeld (b) of form D Item 13 (Oﬀering and Sales Amounts).
10Citadel Global Equities Fund LLC is identiﬁed by Central Index Key (CIK) 1468448.
11By construction capital inﬂows is non-negative variable.
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inﬂows happened in the year of the ﬁrst fund’s form D ﬁling. The second scenario
corresponds to the situation when fund is already in operation, meaning that fund
has ﬁled several form D ﬁlings. Speciﬁcally, the earlier ﬁling of the fund is registered
in month, m1, of year, y1, while the next consecutive ﬁling occurs in month, m2, of
year, y2. In this scenario, I assume that capital inﬂows occurred in year y1(y2) if
the period between the two ﬁlings mostly belongs to year y1(y2). Using the example
of Citadel fund, I estimate that capital inﬂows of $100 millions happened in 2009
(corresponds to the ﬁrst case) and $53 millions were raised in 2010 (corresponds to
the second case).
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1.7 Robustness checks
Figure 1.7: Performance of hedge fund portfolios: after fee + no bias correction
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Portfolios
Panel B: Value-Weighted Portfolios
Figure 1.7 displays after-fee performance of fund of directly sold hedge
funds ( grey solid line) relative to performance of fund of broker sold
hedge funds ( black solid line) over the period from January 2010 to De-
cember 2015, assuming initial investment of $100. The sample of funds con-
sists of funds that are listed in Morningstar database and file form D
filings. Panel A displays after-fee performance of funds of funds where
constituent hedge funds are equally-weighted. Panel B displays after-fee
performance of funds of funds where constituent hedge funds are value-
weighted. Returns of funds are adjusted for backfill bias.
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Table 1.14: Performance of Hedge Fund Portfolios: After Fee + Bias
R¯ αˆ βˆMkt βˆSmB βˆT10y βˆCr.Spr. βˆpBD βˆpFX βˆpCOM R
2
PANEL A: Equally-Weighted Portfolio
Direct 4.793%** 4.421%** 0.12* 0.38*** 0.10 0.25*** -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 68%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Brokered 3.968%* 3.366%* 0.12** 0.32*** 0.07 0.18** -0.07* 0.01 -0.01* 68%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
PANEL B: Value-Weighted Portfolio
Direct 5.391% 4.433%** 0.13*** 0.31*** 0.07 0.16** -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 66%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Brokered 4.157% 3.552%** 0.12*** 0.25*** 0.05 0.15** -0.01* 0.01 -0.01 62%
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Table 1.14. Results of Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor models estimation for portfolio of
directly sold and broker sold funds are presented in Table 1.14. Panel A displays results for
the equally-weighted portfolio of funds, while Panel B reports results for the value-weighted
portfolio of funds. Portfolios of directly sold and broker sold funds ( that is constructed
using a sub-sample of funds that report to Morningstar and file forms D) are reported in row
Direct and row Brokered, respectively. The seven-factor model (1.1) is estimated using after-
fee monthly returns between January 2010 and December 2015, where the first 24-months
of fund’s performance are excluded to adjust for back-fill bias. Table displays estimated
annualized expected annualized excess return of portfolio,R¯, estimated annualized alpha, αˆ,
the estimated exposures to the market, βˆMkt, the estimated exposure to size spread factor,
βˆSmB, the estimated exposure to yield curve level factor, βˆT10y, the estimated exposure to
credit spread factor, βˆCr.Spr., and the estimated exposures to bond, commodity and forex trend-
following factors, βˆpBD, βˆpFX and βˆpCOM , as well as the adjusted R
2. Figures in parentheses
are the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***
respectively.
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Table 1.15: Performance of hedge fund portfolios: pre fee + bias
R¯ αˆ βˆMkt βˆSmB βˆT10y βˆCr.Spr. βˆpBD βˆpFX βˆpCOM R
2
PANEL A: Equally-Weighted Portfolio
Direct 6.167%*** 5.781%*** 0.12* 0.39*** 0.11 0.25*** -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 69%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Brokered 5.120%*** 4.481%** 0.17** 0.33*** 0.07 0.18** -0.01* 0.01 -0.01* 69%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
PANEL B: Value-Weighted Portfolio
Direct 6.620%*** 5.532%*** 0.14*** 0.32*** 0.07 0.16** -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 65%
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Brokered 5.504%*** 4.948%*** 0.11*** 0.26*** 0.05 0.15** -0.01 0.01 -0.01 61%
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Table 1.15. Results of Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor models estimation for portfolio of
directly sold and broker sold funds are presented in Table 1.15. Panel A displays results for
the equally-weighted portfolio of funds, while Panel B reports results for the value-weighted
portfolio of funds. Portfolios of directly sold and broker sold funds ( that is constructed using
a sub-sample of funds that report to Morningstar and file forms D) are reported in row Direct
and row Brokered, respectively. The seven-factor model (1.1) is estimated using pre-fee monthly
returns between January 2010 and December 2015. Table displays estimated annualized expected
annualized excess return of portfolio,R¯, estimated annualized alpha, αˆ, the estimated exposures
to the market, βˆMkt, the estimated exposure to size spread factor, βˆSmB, the estimated exposure
to yield curve level factor, βˆT10y, the estimated exposure to credit spread factor, βˆCr.Spr., and
the estimated exposures to bond, commodity and forex trend-following factors, βˆpBD, βˆpFX
and βˆpCOM , as well as the adjusted R
2. Figures in parentheses are the Newey and West (1987)
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.
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Table 1.16: Alphas of directly and broker sold hedge funds
Alpha
(1) (2) (3)
PANEL A: After-fee
Bit -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Assetit−1) — 0.007*** 0.007***
— (0.001) (0.001)
Ageit — -0.0002 -0.001**
— (0.0002) (0.0004)
Vintage No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes
# Obs. 26,572 26,572 26,572
R2 0.1% 4% 6%
PANEL B: Pre-fee
Bit -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Assetit−1) — 0.009*** 0.009***
— (0.001) (0.001)
Ageit — -0.0002 0.0007
— (0.0002) (0.0004)
Vintage No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes
# Obs. 25,712 25,712 25,712
R2 0.2% 4% 6%
Table 1.16 presents estimates of difference in risk-adjusted performance
between directly sold and broker sold hedge funds with panel regression
αˆit = β0+βB ·Bit+βs·Xit−1+βt+ǫ˜it. Fund level controls Xit−1 include logarithm
of assets under management in the previous period, age, and vintage year
and time fixed effects βt. Panel A displays results for after-fee alphas of
hedge funds. Panel B displays results for pre-fee alphas of hedge funds.
The sample covers hedge funds that are listed in Morningstar database
and file form D filings over period from January 2010 to December 2015.
Figures in parentheses are the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors clustered by month. Sta-
tistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and
*** respectively.
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Table 1.17: Value added by directly and broker sold hedge funds
Dollar value added
(1) (2) (3)
PANEL A: After-fee
Bit -0.135*** -0.160*** -0.169***
(0.060) (0.054) (0.055)
Ageit — 0.002 -0.031***
— (0.003) (0.009)
Vintage No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes
# Obs. 26,472 26,472 26,472
R2 0.02% 3% 4%
PANEL B: Pre-fee
Bit -0.101*** -0.127*** -0.141***
(0.068) (0.065) (0.066)
Ageit — 0.001 -0.026**
— (0.004) (0.009)
Vintage No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes
# Obs. 25,712 25,712 25,712
R2 0.01% 4% 4%
Table 1.17 presents estimates of difference in dollar value added (in mil-
lions of dollars) by directly sold and broker sold hedge funds with panel
regression Sˆit = β0 + βB · Bit + βs · Xit + βt + ǫ˜it. Fund level controls Xit in-
clude fund’s age, vintage year and time fixed effects βt. Panel A displays
results for after-fee dollar value added by hedge funds. Panel B displays
results for pre-fee dollar value added of hedge funds. The sample covers
hedge funds that are listed in Morningstar database and file form D fil-
ings over period from January 2010 to December 2015 with an adjustment
for backfill bias. Figures in parentheses are the Newey and West (1987)
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors clus-
tered by month. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is
denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.
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Table 1.18: Heterogeneity of brokers
After-fee alpha
(1) (2) (3)
BIit -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
BOit -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Assetit−1) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ageit -0.0001*** -0.0002 -0.0010**
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Vintage No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes
# Obs. 32,026 32,026 32,026
R2 0.7% 3% 4%
Ho: In-house = Outside
F-test 3.73* 4.36** 4.74**
p-value 0.06 0.04 0.03
Table 1.18 estimates difference in after-fee risk-adjusted performance be-
tween directly sold hedge funds and funds that are sold through in-house
broker or outside broker with panel regression: αˆit = β0 + βI ·BIit + βO ·BOit +
βx ·Xit+βt+ ǫ˜it. BIit is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the fund is
sold through in-house broker and is equal to zero otherwise. BOit is a dummy
variable that is equal to one when the fund is sold through outside broker
and is equal to zero otherwise. Regression includes fund level controls
Xit, such as fund’s age, vintage year and time fixed effects βt. The sample
of funds is restricted to funds that are listed in Morningstar database
and file form D filings over period from January 2010 to December 2015,
using full sample of hedge fund returns observations. Figures in parenthe-
ses are the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors clustered by month. Statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. Table
presents results of F-test for hypothesis that alphas of funds that are
sold through in-house brokers is equal to alphas of funds that are sold
through outside brokers.
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Table 1.19: Heterogeneity of brokers
Pre-fee alpha
(1) (2) (3)
BIit -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
BOit -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Assetit−1) 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ageit -0.0000* -0.0002 -0.0008
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Vintage No Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes
# Obs. 30,929 30,929 30,929
R2 1% 4% 5%
Ho: In-house = Outside
F-test 0.04 0.18 0.38
p-value 0.83 0.67 0.53
Table 1.19 estimates difference in pre-fee risk-adjusted performance be-
tween directly sold hedge funds and funds that are sold through in-house
broker or outside broker with panel regression: αˆit = β0 + βI ·BIit + βO ·BOit +
βx ·Xit+βt+ ǫ˜it. BIit is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the fund is
sold through in-house broker and is equal to zero otherwise. BOit is a dummy
variable that is equal to one when the fund is sold through outside broker
and is equal to zero otherwise. Regression includes fund level controls
Xit, such as fund’s age, vintage year and time fixed effects βt. The sample
of funds is restricted to funds that are listed in Morningstar database
and file form D filings over period from January 2010 to December 2015,
using full sample of hedge fund returns observations. Figures in parenthe-
ses are the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors clustered by month. Statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. Table
presents results of F-test for hypothesis that alphas of funds that are
sold through in-house brokers is equal to alphas of funds that are sold
through outside brokers.
Chapter 2
Order Shredding, Invariance, and
Stock Returns
2.1 Introduction
There is a long-standing debate on what is a good way to model security price
dynamics. It is crucial for our understanding of ﬁnancial markets. Progress has
been made in this important area, but there is still no fully satisfactory answer as to
the mechanism of how returns process is generated. We propose a novel structural
model for price dynamics within the paradigm of market microstructure invariance,
developed recently by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016) and found to be successful in
explaining a number of empirical regularities in the data.
It is known that empirical price processes depart from the Brownian motion, and
price changes are not distributed as normal random variables. Several alternative
models have been proposed in the literature. Mandelbrot (1963) suggests that price
changes may be better described by a stable Pareto distribution with fat tails.
Mandelbrot and Taylor (1967) and Clark (1973) propose that price processes seem
to be closely related to the Brownian motions that evolves not in calendar time
but rather in some business time, which is linked to either arrival of transactions or
trading volume, respectively. Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994), Hasbrouck (1999), Ane´
and Geman (2000), Andersen et al. (2015) study what business clock best ﬁts the
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data. In comparison to these approaches, our structural model of returns dynamics
comes from explicit modelling of how traders trade in real ﬁnancial markets.
The backbone of our model is the arrival process of investment ideas, or bets,
placed by fundamental traders into the market. This process has been earlier cali-
brated within the microstructure invariance paradigm by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016)
who suggested that bets arrive according to a stochastic process with an expected
arrival rate per day approximately proportional to the 2/3 exponent of trading vol-
ume and volatility, and the distribution of bet sizes closely resemble log-normal
random variables with log-variance of 2.53. This large log-variance implies frequent
arrivals of very large bets. We assume that traders execute bets by splitting them
into sequences of transactions according to some bet-shredding algorithm in order
to reduce price impact; we model price impact in response to each transaction as
suggested by invariance-based market impact model. We also introduce arbitrageurs
who implement order anticipation algorithms based on predictive models to detect
execution of large bets and trade ahead of them with hope to make some money.
Market makers clear the market.
The core idea of market microstructure invariance is that business time runs
faster in liquid markets and slower in illiquid markets, whereas a trading game itself
that traders play remains invariant. Our structural model ultimately diﬀers across
stocks and time periods, because it is based on diﬀerent arrival processes of bets.
We also calibrate bet shredding parameters using the method of simulated moments
in order to match the cross-sectional and time-series variation in empirical moments
of stock returns.
We update the evidence on cross-sectional and time-series properties of moments
of daily U.S. stock returns using the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database. We ﬁnd that idiosyncratic excess kurtoses tend to be positive and decrease
with trading activity of stocks; the ratio of idiosyncratic kurtosis for the median least
active stocks to that of the most active stocks is almost always greater than one,
but this diﬀerence becomes less pronounced over time. The total kurtosis without
any adjustment for market returns is also larger for the less active stocks; these
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patterns reverse over during market crashes, when kurtosis of liquid stocks becomes
bigger relative to kurtosis of illiquid stocks, possibly due to staleness of prices. The
idiosyncratic skewness does not exhibit any distinctive cross-sectional patterns and
ﬂuctuates over time around a small positive value, often dropping to negative values
during market crashes.
Our calibration allows us to discuss the properties of implied bet shredding
parameters. Under the assumption that traders target a ﬁxed proportion of overall
expected trading volume, we ﬁnd that traders target a bigger proportion when
executing bets in less liquid securities. We also ﬁnd that bet-shredding has intensiﬁed
over time, and now traders choose to execute bets over two or three times longer
horizons than in 1950s. The prevalence of shredding in modern markets have been
also documented empirically in Kyle, Obizhaeva and Tuzun (2016), Angel, Harris
and Spatt (2015), and Garvey, Huang and Wu (2017). Bet shredding is also optimal
for traders who seek to minimize transaction costs, as shown theoretically by Kyle,
Obizhaeva and Wang (2017). Our structural model can be used as a vehicle to gain
insight into hard-to-observe parameters of trading.
There are two diﬀerent approaches to modelling securities returns. The ﬁrst
approach, usually preferred by economists, relies on calibration of structural equi-
librium models in order to make sure that models are internally consistent with
market clearing and strategic optimizing behavior of traders; the example is a struc-
tural framework of Campbell and Kyle (1993) that helps to model permanent and
temporary shocks to prices. The second approach, usually preferred by statisticians
and econophysicists, relies on agency-based models that simulate actions and inter-
actions of traders to study their eﬀects on the system as a whole, but often assume
mechanic—rather than driven by economic incentives—order placement strategies
and price formation process; examples include Cont and Bouchaud (2000), Farmer,
Patelli and Zovko (2005), Cont, Stoikov and Talreja (2010), and Ladley (2012),
among others.
Our model is a combination of these two approaches, taking the best of both of
them. On the one hand, we pay careful attention to the modelling of how people
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trade as in agency-based models. Indeed, our groups of market participants closely
resemble the classiﬁcation of Kirilenko et al. (2017), who provide a micro-level em-
pirical description of the structure of trading in the market of the E-mini S&P 500
futures during the Flash crash on May 6, 2010. On the other hand, each part of our
model is guided by the insights of existing theories of ﬁnancial economics. Bets arrive
according to general invariance predictions, which one can derive within a number
of equilibrium models such as the dynamics model of Kyle and Obizhaeva (2017c)
and the one-period model of Kyle, Obizhaeva and Wang (2017). Bet-shredding al-
gorithms are similar to optimal trading strategies suggested by the literature on
optimal execution, such as Bertsimas and Lo (1998), Almgren and Chriss (2000),
and Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) among others. Arbitrageurs insure that prices
follow a martingale and markets are eﬃcient. Market makers insure that markets
clear.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I presents empirical analysis of time-
series and cross-sectional properties of moments for returns of the U.S. stock mar-
ket. Section II describes a structural model of returns dynamics based on market
microstructure invariance with bet shredding and arbitrage trading. Section III
discuss its calibration and properties of implied parameters. Section IV concludes.
2.2 Moments of daily returns: empirical analysis
2.2.1 Data
We examine cross-sectional and time-series properties of moments of daily U.S. stock
returns using the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Only
common stocks (CRSP share codes of 10 and 11) listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (Amex), NASDAQ, and NYSE
Arca in the period of January 1926 through December 2016 are included in the
sample. ADRs, REITS, and closed-end funds are excluded.
Estimates of higher moments are very sensitive to large price changes, outliers,
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and errors in the data. We do not windsorize of the data, because we do not want
to eliminate most important large but rare observations. Instead, we carefully clean
the data by trying to ﬁlter out outliers and errors, while keeping large observations
caused by execution of large bets, market crashes, or other events.
First, we adjust for stale prices. For each security, the CRSP mixes two time
series. For days with transactions, the database reports last transaction prices at the
close. For days with no transactions, the database reports averages of bid and ask
prices, marking these averages with a negative sign; these observations are often not
representative of true prices, at which traders could actually transact during that
day. The mixture two price series often leads to large temporary deviations in the
composite series. For example, for the six days from May 17, 2010 to May 24, 2010,
one ﬁnds the following prices in the CRSP for the stock of the ﬁrm Ikonics: $7.1,
$6.52, -$7.225, -$12.76, -$7.07, and $6.81; the three negative prices mean that there
were no transactions at these three days and the average bid-ask prices are reported
instead of actual transaction prices. If one would simply change their negative signs
into positives sign and calculate time-series of returns, then he will get -8, 11, 77,
-45, and -4 percents with large positive price change followed by large negative price
changes in the middle of the sample. At the same time, Yahoo Finance reports
$7.1, $6.52, $6.52, $6.52, $6.52, and $6.81 for the same days implying returns of
-8, 0, 0, 0, and 4 percents. The two time series will have very diﬀerent estimates
of moments, especially for higher moments such as kurtosis. To circumvent this
problem, we use only transaction prices when available, accumulate returns from
the very last transaction price reported, and assign returns of zero to all days with
no transactions.
Second, there remain many large zigzag price changes in the sample. It is usu-
ally unclear whether these are actual prices that we need to keep or errors that we
need to eliminate. As describe in Fischer (1963), the process of creating the CRSP
database required a lot of eﬀort and involved a lot of data cleaning. Some errors
though may still exist due to mistakes in original data collected by exchanges, incor-
rect conversion of the data from paper books into electronic databases, inconsistent
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adjustment for splits and dividends, confusion with tickers, inaccurate treatment of
trades in error accounts that are often cancelled within a few days, and many other
reasons. We checked manually whether large zigzag price deviations in the CRSP
coincide with price patterns in other datasets or whether they can be attributed to
some events. Since unexplained temporary price swings occur especially often in
the earlier pre-war part of the sample, we choose to focus on the data from January
1950 to December 2016.
Third, we eliminate daily observations with fewer than 100 shares traded, be-
cause transaction prices on these days may also be not representative of true prices.
Small trades may be used as vehicles for side payments between traders, soft commis-
sions, or transactions by market makers who are required to maintain some minimal
trading activity in illiquid stocks.
Finally, we exclude stocks with more than ﬁfteen no-trade days in a month and
daily volatility of less than one percent. We also exclude stocks with the median
of prices being less than $5, because estimates of their returns moments are very
unstable, as errors are especially critical for these stocks.
We excluded about 45% of observations from the original sample. The ﬁnal
sample includes 1,576,834 observations for 1,089 months and 19,922 stocks. The
number of stocks vary signiﬁcantly throughout the sample. Initially, there were
only NYSE stocks. The number of stocks rose steadily from 500 stocks in 1926 to
1,100 by 1962, then jumped to about 2000 in July 1962 and 5000 in November 1982,
when the Amex and NASDAQ stocks were included into the sample, respectively.
The number of stocks slightly declined after the market crash of October 1987 and
increased during the dot-com bubble 1995 though 2000, peaking at 7300 in 1997.
Afterwards, the number of stocks dropped, and it is equal to about 4000 at the end
of the sample.
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2.2.2 Estimation of moments
The estimate moments of log-returns are known to be sensitive to outliers. We next
obtain these estimates using robust estimation methods.
We modify the sample estimates of higher moments that usually use the sample
estimates of means and standard deviations and that are prone to several biases.
First, the sample means introduce forward-looking biases by making returns look
less volatile than they are in reality. In our estimation of higher moments, we instead
assume that daily stock returns have zero mean.
Second, the sample standard deviation tends to be overestimated during volatile
periods, and these biased estimates of volatility in turn make the sample estimates
of kurtosis underestimated. We assume means of zero instead sample means and
pre-estimate volatility over the previous three-month period, using one of the robust
iterative estimation methods; we also consider only three-month periods with more
than ﬁfteen non-zero observations of returns and average price above $5. We ﬁrst
estimate volatility over the entire three-month sample, then exclude observations
with absolute values bigger than two sigma, estimate volatility again and repeat
this procedure until either the diﬀerence in subsequent volatility estimates becomes
less than one basis point or the number of excluded outliers exceeds ﬁve percent of
the original sample. These are conservative measure of volatility robust to outliers.
For robustness, we also consider volatility estimated using Inter Quantile Range
methods (IQR-α methods), as proposed by Aucremanne(2004) and Kimber(1990),
respectively, as well as Median Absolute Deviation methods (MAD-β methods),
as proposed by Iglewicz and Hoaglin (1993) and Hampel(1974); all results (not
reported) are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our main reported ﬁndings.1
For each month and each stock, we then calculate the estimates of skewness and
kurtosis using the formulas for sample moments but replacing sample means and
sample standard deviations with our robust estimates. We apply this procedure
1In IQR-α method, volatility is estimated on reduced sample [P25 − α · [P75 − P50], P75 + α ·
[P50 − P25]], where Px denote the percentile x, with most outliers excluded (α = 3 and α = 1.5).
In MAD-β method, volatility is estimated on entire sample excluding observations with |Mi|> β,
where Mi = 0.6745 · (xi −med(X))/MAD and MAD = med(|xi −med(X)|) (β = 3 and β = 2).
CHAPTER 2. ORDER SHREDDING, INVARIANCE, AND STOCK RETURNS82
for both the sample of returns and the sample of idiosyncratic returns, obtained by
subtracting the contemporaneous values of index returns under the assumption that
all stocks’ betas are equal to one.
2.2.3 Time-series and cross-section of empirical moments
To examine empirically cross-sectional patterns, we split all stocks in ten groups
based on daily trading activity, an important characteristic of securities reﬂecting
the speed with which markets operate and levels of liquidity. Trading activity is
deﬁned as the product of dollar volume and volatility and represent the total amount
of risk transferred per day. For each stock and each month, we calculate trading
activity as the product of the average daily dollar volume and volatility over the
previous three months. We then sort all stocks each month into ten groups based
on trading activity. The breakpoints are chosen to be 30th, 50th, 60th, 70th, 75th,
80th, 85th, 90th, 95th of the NYSE traded stocks. Group 1 consists of least actively
traded stocks. Group 10 consists of most actively traded stocks.
Table 2.1 presents a detailed time-series and cross-sectional summary statistics
for high moments of idiosyncratic daily returns. The medians of sample moments
(volatility, skewness, and kurtosis) are shown for seven decades between 1950 and
2016 and for trading activity groups 1, 3, 5, 8, and 10.
Figure 2.1 shows the monthly time series of the 12-month moving averages of
the sample medians of sample kurtosis of idiosyncratic daily stock returns for the
same trading activity groups. The estimates are averaged over a twelve month
period to smooth out unstable estimates. Figure 2.3 shows similar moving averages
of monthly kurtosis estimates for daily stock returns without any adjustment for
market movements. We can draw several conclusions from table 2.1 and ﬁgure 2.1.
First, idiosyncratic kurtoses tend to decrease with trading activity. The daily
kurtoses of the least liquid stocks are stable, ranging between 6.60 and 8.47 across
decades and thus implying fat tails. The daily kurtoses of the most liquid stocks
slightly increase over time from 2.66 in decade 1950-1960 to 4.23 in 2010-2016;
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their values remain being close to 3, suggesting that distributions of their daily
idiosyncratic returns closely resemble the log-normal. Figure 2.2 reveals similar
patterns. The ﬁgure shows that, depicted by the solid horizontal line, the ratio of
idiosyncratic kurtoses of stocks in group 1 to kurtoses of stocks in group 10 is bigger
than one for each month throughout the sample, except for the month of September
2008 when uncertainty reached its peak during the ﬁnancial crisis. The diﬀerence in
kurtoses of least and most active stocks becomes less pronounced over time. Similar
patterns are observed for kurtoses of total daily returns in ﬁgure 2.4. Ratios of
kurtoses of stocks in group 1 to kurtoses of stocks in group 10 drop below one only
during a few episodes in 1956, 1962-1963, 1987-1988, and 1993-1994; these breaks
might be attributed to Kennedy slide in 1962, market crash in October 1987, and
mini-crash in October 1989, respectively.
Second, the monthly time series of the 12-month moving averages of the sample
kurtosis medians in ﬁgures 2.1 and 2.3 are relatively stable over time, but exhibit
several signiﬁcant spikes in May 1962, October 1987, August 1998, September 2008,
and August 2011. Even though the events that triggered large price changes are
relatively short lived, these spikes continue for twelve months due to our calculations
of moving averages using the twelve lags. These spikes correspond to volatile times
mentioned above as well as to the LTCM collapse in 1998. During these periods, the
idiosyncratic kurtoses continue to be larger for less liquid stocks, but the patterns
for kurtosis sometimes ﬂip, and kurtosis of liquid stocks becomes bigger relative to
kurtosis of illiquid stocks, possibly due to staleness of their price.
Figure 2.5 shows the time series of idiosyncratic skewness for the trading activity
groups. Idiosyncratic skewness is usually slightly positive, ﬂuctuating between 0.06
to 0.36 across decades and decreasing over time, on average, from 0.26 in decade
1950-1960 to 0.10 in 2010-2016, as shown in table 2.1. During market dislocations,
skewness tends to drop. Skewness does not exhibit any distinctive cross-sectional
patterns. It remains to be close to zero, thus suggesting that the distribution of
returns is close to a log-normal.
Figure 2.6 shows monthly time series of 12-month moving average of median
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sample volatility of idiosyncratic daily for the ﬁve trading activity groups with two
pronounced spikes during the dot-com bubble in 2000-2001 and ﬁnancial crisis of
2008-2009.
In what follows, we will propose a structural model of price dynamics and cali-
brate it to match the cross-sectional and time-series patterns of higher moments in
table 2.1.
2.3 Invariance-implied structural model of price
dynamics
In this section, we describe a structural model of stock returns dynamics in ﬁnancial
markets. There are three market participants: traders, intermediaries, and arbi-
tragers. Traders are institutional asset managers and retail investors who arrive to
the market with some trading ideas, or bets, and execute these bets by shredding
them over time based on bet shredding algorithms. We assume that these bets are
generated according to the implications of market microstructure invariance. Inter-
mediaries such as traditional market makers and high-frequency traders clear the
market by taking the other side of these transactions. Meanwhile arbitrageurs try
to detect large bets of traders in the order ﬂow and proﬁt by trading ahead of them.
2.3.1 Bets of traders
We start by describing trading strategies of institutional asset managers and retail
investors. These traders submit bets based on either some investment ideas or their
needs to rebalance portfolios. Bets move prices and induce volatility. Small bets
lead to small price changes, large bets trigger large price changes. Invariance implies
a speciﬁc structure of order ﬂow, i.e. the number of bets and distribution of their
size for diﬀerent markets.
Consider a stock i at day t with returns volatility σit, share volume Vit, dollar
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price Pit, and trading activity
Wjt = σjt · Pjt · Vjt. (2.1)
Let γit denote the number of bets placed at day t in the market of stock i. Suppose
that a sequence of bets executed at day t is Qit1, Qit2,..Qitγit ; each kth bet Qitk is
measured in shares, bets are positive for buys and negative for sells, both arriving
with equal probabilities of 1/2. Let Q˜it denote a random variable whose probability
distribution represents the signed size of bets and let γ˜it denote a random variable
whose probability distribution represents the expected arrival rate.
Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016) calibrate these distributions using the sample of
portfolio transitions executed over the period 2001 through 2005 in the U.S. stock
market as the main benchmark sample. As the ﬁrst-order approximation, they ﬁnd
that |Q˜it| is well described by a log-normal distribution with log-variance σ2Q = 2.53
and γ˜it is a Poisson variable with the mean γ¯it; the means of both of these random
variables vary across days t and stocks i,
γ¯it = 85 ·
[ Wit
(0.02)(40)(106)
]2/3
. (2.2)
ln
[ |Q˜it|
Vjt
]
≈ −5.71− 2
3
· ln
[ Wit
(0.02)(40)(106)
]
+
√
2.53 · Z˜, Z˜ ∼ N(0, 1). (2.3)
The 2/3 exponents in these formulas are implications of invariance; the constants
85, −5.71, and 2.53 are calibrated from the data. For the benchmark stock with
daily volatility σ = 0.02, volume V = 106, and price P = 40, for example, there
are on average 85 bets per day, their median dollar size is exp(−5.71) · V · P or
$132,000, and their average dollar size is exp(−5.71 + 0.5σ2Q) · V · P or $470,000.
Both the number of bets γ˜it and their size |Q˜it| increase with dollar volume and
returns volatility.
Intermediaries take the other side of these bets by setting market clearing prices.2
2Under the assumption that the volume multiplier ζ = 2, as consistent with our assumption
that intermediaries take the other side of these bets, and the portfolio transition size multiplier
δ = 1.
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Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016) analyse by how much each bet on average moves prices
and calibrate several price impact models. The ﬁrst model is the linear price impact
model. According to its log-linear version, buying or selling Q shares of a stock with
a current stock price P moves the price on average by ∆P (Q) such that
ln
(
1 +
∆P (Q)
P
)
=
σit
0.02
( κ¯
104
·
[
Wit
(0.02)(40)(106)
]−1/3
+
2 · λ¯
104
·
[
Wit
(0.02)(40)(106)
]1/3
Q
(0.01)Vit
)
,
(2.4)
where κ¯ = 8.21 and λ¯ = 2.50 are calibrated from the data and exponents −1/3 and
1/3 are implications of invariance. The ﬁrst model is the square root price impact
model. According to its log-linear version, buying or selling Q shares of a stock with
a current stock price P moves the price on average by ∆P (Q) such that
ln
(
1 +
∆P (Q)
P
)
=
σit
0.02
( κ¯
104
·
[
Wit
(0.02)(40)(106)
]−1/3
+2· λ¯
104
·
[ Q
(0.01)Vit
]1/2)
, (2.5)
where κ¯ = 2.08 and λ¯ = 12.08 are calibrated from the data and exponents −1/3
and 1/2 are implications of invariance.
Equations (2.2) and (2.3) describe the order-ﬂow process for traders. Equa-
tions (2.4) and (2.5) describe how intermediaries update prices in response to each
bet. Combining price impact of all bets executed during the day, one can calcu-
late implied daily price changes. The set of these equations thus describe a basic
structural model for daily returns, as implied by invariance.
2.3.2 Price changes upon execution of one bet
We next examine moments of price changes induced by one bet. Since buys and sells
arrive with equal probabilities, the distribution of signed bet sizes Q˜it is symmetric,
and all of its odd moments are equal to zero. For example, E
[
Q˜it
]
= 0 and E
[
Q˜3it
]
=
0.
Since the distribution (2.3) of unsigned bet size |Q˜it|= exp(µQ + σQ · Z˜) is a
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log-normal with a log-mean of µQ and a log-variance of σ2Q = 2.53, its moments can
be calculated as,
E
[
|Q˜it|p
]
=
∫
qp · 1
q
· 1√
2πσ2Q
exp
(
−(ln(q)− µQ)
2
2σ2Q
)
dq = ep
2σ2
Q
/2+pµQ . (2.6)
This implies the kurtosis of price changes upon execution of a bet. For the linear
price impact model, it is equal to kurtosis of a bet size itself,
kurt
[
∆P (Q˜it)
]
= kurt
[
|Q˜it|
]
=
E
[
|Q˜it|4
]
E
[
|Q˜it|2
]2 = e4σ2Q = 22, 000. (2.7)
For the square root price impact model, it is equal to
kurt
[
∆P (Q˜it)
]
= kurt
[
|Q˜it|1/2
]
=
E
[
|Q˜it|2
]
E
[
|Q˜it|
]2 = eσ2Q = 12. (2.8)
These values are much larger than kurtosis of 3 for a normal distribution, especially
for the linear model.
2.3.3 Price changes upon execution of bet sequences with
no bet shredding
We next examine moments of price changes induced by one bet. Since buys and sells
arrive with equal probabilities, the distribution of signed bet sizes Q˜it is symmetric,
and all of its odd moments are equal to zero. For example, E
[
Q˜it
]
= 0 and E
[
Q˜3it
]
=
0.
Since the distribution (2.3) of unsigned bet size |Q˜it|= exp(µQ + σQ · Z˜) is a
log-normal with a log-mean of µQ and a log-variance of σ2Q = 2.53, its moments can
be calculated as,
E
[
|Q˜it|p
]
=
∫
qp · 1
q
· 1√
2πσ2Q
exp
(
−(ln(q)− µQ)
2
2σ2Q
)
dq = ep
2σ2
Q
/2+pµQ . (2.9)
This implies the kurtosis of price changes upon execution of a bet. For the linear
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price impact model, it is equal to kurtosis of a bet size itself,
kurt
[
∆P (Q˜it)
]
= kurt
[
|Q˜it|
]
=
E
[
|Q˜it|4
]
E
[
|Q˜it|2
]2 = e4σ2Q = 22, 000. (2.10)
For the square root price impact model, it is equal to
kurt
[
∆P (Q˜it)
]
= kurt
[
|Q˜it|1/2
]
=
E
[
|Q˜it|2
]
E
[
|Q˜it|
]2 = eσ2Q = 12. (2.11)
These values are much larger than kurtosis of 3 for a normal distribution, especially
for the linear model.
2.3.4 Price changes upon execution of bet sequences with
no bet shredding
Daily price change ∆P is equal to the sum of all price changes in response to exe-
cution of independent and identically distributed bets. If there are γ bets executed
in day t and stock i, then kurtosis of daily returns is
kurt [∆P |γ˜it = γ] = kurt
[ γ∑
k=1
∆P (Qkit)
]
=
kurt
[
∆P (Q˜it)
]
γ
, (2.12)
where kurt
[
∆P (Q˜it)
]
is deﬁned in equations (2.10) and (2.11).
To ﬁnd unconditional kurtosis, we should integrate out γ in equation (2.12),
because the number of bets executed per day is a random variable. If no bet arrives,
then we should not update our estimates of kurtosis. The kurtosis of the random
sum of random variables with expected Poisson arrival rate γ¯it is given by
kurt [∆P ] = Eγ (kurt [∆P |γ˜it = γ]) =
+∞∑
j=1

kurt
[
∆P (Q˜it)
]
j
· γ¯
j
it
j!
· e−γ¯it

 . (2.13)
The inﬁnite sum
∑+∞
j=1 [γ
j/j! ] is a converging series, a series {1/j} is a bounded
from above, monotone sequence, and kurt
[
∆P (Q˜it)
]
is a constant. Applying Abel’s
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convergence test, we ﬁnd that the inﬁnite sum (2.13) converges, though it does not
have a close form solution.
It is possible to derive the lower bound for the unconditional kurtosis using
Jensen’s inequality. Indeed,
kurt [∆P ] = Eγ

kurt
[
∆P (Q˜it)
]
γ˜it

 ≥ kurt
[
∆P (Q˜it)
]
Eγ (γ˜it)
=
kurt
[
∆P (Q˜it)
]
γ¯it
. (2.14)
The lower bound is equal to the kurtosis of daily returns (2.12) conditional of the
assumption that the number of bets γ˜it coincides with the average arrival rate γ¯it.
Our simulation analysis shows that this lower bound provides a good approxi-
mation for the daily kurtosis of most stocks, as implied by a structural model. The
diﬀerences created by uncertainty in the Poisson arrival rates and non-linearities of
log-returns are insigniﬁcant. For a stock with median dollar volume and returns
variance in each of the ten trading activity groups, we run 1000 Monte-Carlo simu-
lations and calculate the average theoretical kurtosis with its standard errors. The
simulations are done based on a structural model of price process with bet arrival
rate in equation (2.2), distribution of bet sizes in equation (2.3), and price impact
model (2.4). We also calculate the lower bound using equation (2.14). Table 2.2
shows that the lower bound tracks closely the average kurtosis for all groups, ex-
cept the group of least actively traded stocks. The percentage diﬀerences in the
series of two estimates are 29%, 3%, 2%, 1%, and 0% for groups 1, 3, 5, 8, and 10,
respectively. A large diﬀerence for the ﬁrst group may reﬂect an upward bias in
theoretical estimates of kurtosis. The bet arrival rates for other groups range from
23 to 232, and this eﬀect is less pronounced. As long as the arrival rate of bets is
not too low, the lower bound is a reasonable proxy for kurtosis of daily returns. We
get the following approximation,
kurt [∆P ] ≈
kurt
[
∆P (Q˜it)
]
γ¯it
. (2.15)
Using equations (2.10) and (2.11), the lower bound for daily kurtosis is equal to
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22, 000/γ¯it and 12/γ¯it for the linear and square root models, respectively. Kurtosis
of price changes per each bet is the same across stocks, but the number of bets
per day is larger for more liquid stocks. Therefore daily returns of more liquid
stocks have lower kurtosis. The number of bets γ¯it per day increases with trading
activity at a rate of 2/3 in equation (2.2). Equation (2.15) then implies that kurtosis
decreases with the trading activity approximately at the same rate, i.e., with 2/3
power of the trading activity. In table 2.2, for example, the ratio of kurtosis of
most inactively traded stock to kurtosis of most actively traded stock is about 77
(= 7214/95); it is similar to the ratio of their trading activities in 2/3 power equal
to 59 (= (3600/8)2/3).
Similar intuition suggests that kurtosis decrease with tenor of returns for a given
security. For example, kurtosis of weekly returns is expected to be lower than
kurtosis of daily returns, which in turn is expected to be lower than kurtosis of
one-minute returns.
Our basic structural model implies the values of kurtosis that are too high relative
to empirical estimates. The average theoretical kurtosis in table 2.2 ranges between
95 and 7,214, whereas empirical estimates in table 2.1 do not exceed 8.47, the level
of average kurtoses for stocks in group 1 for decade 1960-1970.
2.3.5 Price changes upon execution of bet sequences with
bet shredding
So far we have assumed each bet is executed instantaneously. In reality, traders
shred orders and execute them over time in sequences of transactions to reduce
transaction costs. Bet shredding smooths out spikes in price dynamics and tends to
make returns kurtoses smaller. We next consider several modiﬁcations of our basic
model that incorporate order shredding and arbitrage trading. These models are
more realistic and more ﬂexible in their ability to match empirical estimates.
Traders decide on “target” inventories and bets based on either their private
information or inventories shocks. Then, they gradually adjust actual inventories
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towards their targets. Let S∗it denote the cumulative target order imbalances for
stock i at the end of day t, calculated as the signed sum of all bets placed into the
market place by that time,
S∗it =
∑
m≤t
Qimk. (2.16)
Suppose next that each bet Qimk is shredded into a sequence of transactions ximk(s),
where s is a day count in execution package.
Let Sit denote cumulative realized order imbalance for stock i at the end of day
t, calculated as the signed sum of all transactions placed into the market by that
time.
Sit =
∑
m≤t,s≤t
ximk(s). (2.17)
The structural model of trading (2.16) and (2.17) is consistent with the equilib-
rium strategies in a continuous-time model of smooth trading of Kyle, Obizhaeva,
Wang (2016). In that model, symmetric, relatively overconﬁdent, oligopolistic in-
formed traders calculate target inventories based on how their own estimates of the
long-term dividend growth rate diﬀer from the estimates of other traders. Since the
market oﬀers no instantaneous liquidity for block trades, each trader only partially
adjusts his inventory in the direction of a target inventory; the rate of adjustment
is determined by the deep parameters of the model, it is larger when private infor-
mation decays faster and when there is more disagreement between traders.
The diﬀerence between the time series of S∗it and Sit depends on the speciﬁcs of
bet shredding algorithms. Bet shredding algorithms are not directly observable. We
assume that each algorithm is characterized by two main decisions. For each bet,
traders ﬁrst choose execution horizon and then parameters of shredding method.
We consider several alternative speciﬁcations.
First, traders determine an appropriate execution horizon Titk for each bet Qitk.
For example, traders may target a ﬁxed time horizon t, say one day,
Method-T (t): Titk = t. (2.18)
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We refer to this algorithm as “Method-T (t)”; for example, “Method-T (1)” or “Method-
T (5)” correspond to cases when all trades are executed their bets over one day or
one week.
Traders may also target a small fraction η, say equal to 5%, of expected contem-
poraneous volume Titk · Vit or Titk · γ¯it · E
[
|Q˜it|
]
,
|Qitk|= η · Titk · γ¯it · E
[
|Q˜it|
]
. (2.19)
This implies the execution horizon that is linearly proportional to bet size,
Method-V (η): Tkit =
|Qkit|
η · γ¯it · E
[
|Q˜it|
] . (2.20)
We refer to this algorithm as “Method-V (η)”; for example, “Method-V (0.05)”
or “Method-V (0.10)” for execution algorithms targeting 5 percent and 10 percent
of daily volume, respectively.
Traders may also target to induce a small fraction η, say equal to 5%, of expected
returns variance Tkit · σ2it under the assumption that each transaction is expected to
move price by λ · |Qkit|,
(λ · |Qkit|)2 = η · Tkit · γit · λ2 · E
[
|Q˜it|2
]
. (2.21)
This implies that the execution horizon is proportional to the square of bet size,
Method-σ2(η): Tkit =
|Qkit|2
η · γit ·E
[
|Q˜it|2
] . (2.22)
We refer to this algorithm as “Method-σ2(η)”; for example, “Method-σ2(0.05)” or
“Method-σ2(0.10)” for execution algorithms targeting 5 percent and 10 percent of
daily volatility, respectively.
In all cases, larger bets are executed over longer period of time. In the third
case (2.20) larger bets are spread over longer periods of time than in the second
case (2.22) and returns distribution is expected to exhibit smaller kurtosis. For the
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square root impact model, targeting a given fraction of returns variance is equivalent
to targeting a given fraction of volume, so we do not consider this case separately.
Next, traders have to choose an appropriate shredding method. We consider
two bet shredding methods. Each bet Qkit can be shredded at a uniform rate and
executed in equally-sized transactions xkit(s),
xitk(s) =
|Qitk|
Titk
, s = 1, ..Titk. (2.23)
Bertsimas and Lo (2001) ﬁnd that this simple execution is optimal when a risk-
neutral trader needs to execute an order.
Alternatively, each bet Qitk can be shredded at a monotonically decreasing rate,
where sinh and cosh are the hyperbolic sine and cosine functions. Each day
a trader executes some fraction of the remaining part of the bet, determined by
parameter ρ. This parameter is related to the speed of information decay, risk
aversion, and riskiness of securities. The larger is parameter ρ, the faster the bet
is executed. Almgren and Chriss (2000) ﬁnds that execution is optimal when a
risk-averse trader executes a bet. Similar solution can be also found in Grinold and
Kahn (1999).
We choose to focus on simple execution strategies. In reality, execution strategies
are more complicated. Execution algorithms are often price dependent, as discussed
in Obizhaeva (2012). Other order shredding algorithms are for example discussed
in Gatheral and Schied (2013), Schied and Schoeneborn (2009), and Obizhaeva and
Wang (2013). If necessary, sophisticated execution strategies may be built into our
structural model as well.
The structural model for bet arrival (2.2) and (2.3) augmented with speciﬁc
order shredding algorithm represent the structural model describing the order-ﬂow
process. Together with price impact model, they allow to construct implied time-
series of prices. In what follows, we consider linear price impact rule.
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2.3.6 Price dynamics with shredding and arbitrageurs
Bet shredding introduces positive autocorrelation in stock return process and makes
future price changes predictable. For example, execution of a large buy bet is
expected to inject a positive trend into the price dynamics, while execution of a
large sell bet induces a downward price dynamics. Arbitrageurs notice that prices
are not martingales and construct order anticipation algorithms to detect execution
of orders.
We next describe how to model trading by arbitrageurs. If intermediaries ob-
served target bet imbalances, they would set prices according to their market clearing
rule,
P ∗it = λit · S∗it, (2.24)
and price changes would be unpredictable. In reality, intermediaries may at best
identify only actual signed order imbalances Sit and set prices as,
Pˆit = λit · Sit. (2.25)
To the extent that unexecuted order imbalance S∗it − Sit are predictable based on
past information, these price process is not a martingale.
Arbitrageurs build a model to forecast S∗it−Sit and trade Et{S∗it−Sit} at day t.
When target order imbalances are higher than actual order imbalances, arbitrageurs
buy ahead of other traders. When target inventories are lower than actual inven-
tories, arbitrageurs sell ahead of other traders. Market makers set clearing prices
based on the aggregate order ﬂow of both traders and arbitrageurs,
Pit = Et{P ∗it} = λit · Sit + λit · Et{S∗it − Sit} = λit · Et{S∗it}. (2.26)
Trading by arbitrageurs restore martingale properties of stock prices and makes price
process Pit = E{P ∗it} a martingale based on arbitrageurs’ ﬁltration. Essentially, the
price is set based on the market’s forecasts of current target imbalances.
Our structural model is ﬂexible to be consistent with various predictive models of
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arbitrageurs. We suppose that arbitrageurs know daily volatility and daily volume
of an asset. They are also familiar with all invariance formulas and bet shredding
algorithms that traders use. Arbitrageurs thus can simulate hypothetical bet arrival
process and how bets are shredded into sequences of transactions. Then, they can
perform a large estimation on the simulated sample to build a model for forecasting
unexecuted order imbalances.
This procedure can be summarized as follows,
1. Simulate N paths of bet histories for an asset with volume Vit and volatility
σit based on formulas (2.2) and (2.3);
2. Using the conjectured parameters of bet shredding algorithm, aggregate bets
and transactions, calculating histories of target imbalances and actual imbal-
ances, S∗it,n and Sit,n for each of simulated paths n = 1, ..N ;
3. Run a rolling-window predictive regression for unexecuted imbalances with k
lags of linear and quadratic terms of realized past imbalances,
Et{S∗it,n−Sit,n} = α+
k∑
j=1
β1j ·Si,t−j,n+
k∑
j=1
β2j·S2i,t−j,n+ǫtn, t = 1, ..T, n = 1, ..N,
(2.27)
to estimate coeﬃcients βˆ1j and βˆ2j, j = 1, ..k. For example, we use k = 5 as our
benchmark model, i.e. an arbitrageur using information on actual inventories
over the previous week.
Equipped with estimated model βˆ1j and βˆ2j , j = 1, ..k, arbitrageurs construct fore-
casts based on current information about past order imbalances Si,t−j , j = 1, ..k,
as
Et{S∗it − Sit} = α+
k∑
j=1
βˆ1j · Si,t−j + βˆ2j · S2i,t−j. (2.28)
This is a model for forecasting an unexecuted order imbalances.
In what follows, we mostly apply bet shredding method that targets a given
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fraction of daily volume, split all bets into equally-sized transactions, and assume a
linear price impact function.
2.3.7 Properties of simulated returns
We ﬁrst illustrate our structural model using the example of a hypothetical bench-
mark stock with price P of $40 per share, daily volume V of one million shares, and
daily volatility σ of 2% per day. This benchmark stock would belong to the bottom
tercile of S&P 500.
We simulate 1,000 paths of 90-day bet arrival histories for the benchmark stock
using formulas (2.2) and (2.3). We then apply several bet shredding algorithms
by ﬁrst selecting the execution horizon depending on the fraction of daily volume
targeted and second by shredding each bet into a sequence of equally-sized trans-
actions. The execution of some packages extends beyond the boundary of a 90-day
sample. We cut tails of these unﬁnished packages at the end of each sample path,
multiply remaining sequences by 1 or −1 with equal probabilities to model buy and
sell orders, and insert them into the beginning of the same sample path. This mimics
a typical situations when some of large bets arrived in the past are continuing to
get executed at the beginning of selected sample paths.
We then estimate forecasting model (2.27) of arbitrageurs, who seek to predict
unexecuted bet imbalances at each point of time using the last ﬁve realized bet
imbalances and their squares. This estimation is done on the entire simulated sample
on a rolling-window basis.
Table 2.3 reports the results for the three bet shredding algorithms with η =
1%, η = 5%, and η = 10%. The lower is fraction η of volume targeted in the
execution, the more execution is extended over time, the more past imbalances are
autocorrelated with current unexecuted imbalances, and the larger are estimated
coeﬃcients. For example, when η = 1%, the coeﬃcients are 1.98, 0.97, 1.02, 1.25,
and 5.32. When η = 10%, the coeﬃcients are only 0.17, 0.16, 0.19, 0.30, and 0.89.
Using these estimates, we construct predictive model (2.28) and price paths using
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equation 2.4.
Figure 2.7 shows the averages, medians, and standard error bounds for returns
autocorrelation coeﬃcients at diﬀerent lags, ranging from one day to forty days for
the simulated sample under the assumption that there are no arbitrageurs. The four
panels show the results for the cases of η = 1%, η = 5%, η = 10%, and the case with
no shredding, i.e. η =∞. As expected, when there is no shredding, autocorrelations
are equal to zero at all lags. In the other panels, autocorrelations are high at ﬁst
lags, decaying with time. The lower is the fraction η of bet shredding algorithm and
the longer are execution horizons of large bets, the bigger autocorrelations at ﬁrst
lags are and the slower they decay.
Figure 2.8 show the same statistics but under the assumption that there are
arbitrageurs. Most of the autocorrelation coeﬃcients are now close to zero, since
arbitrageurs eliminate most of returns predictability. Based on the linear terms and
squared terms, their forecasting model works reasonably well, except for reducing
autocorrelations at the boundaries of their forecasting window, which is assumed to
have the length of ﬁve days in our example.
Table 2.4 presents the autocorrelations and their standard errors. As before, in
panel A when the model has no arbitrageurs, many of the coeﬃcients are statisti-
cally bigger than zeros, especially when η is small. In panel B when we introduce
arbitrageurs, most coeﬃcients become insigniﬁcant. For example, when η = 1%,
the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation is equal to 0.696 with standard errors of 0.092 with
no arbitrageurs and 0.033 with standard errors of 0.119 with arbitrageurs.
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 present distributions of the four moments of simulated
returns for the cases without and with arbitrageurs, respectively. There are distri-
butions of the four moments in the four columns. Each of the four rows corresponds
to diﬀerent bet-shredding methods with η = 1%, η = 5%, η = 10% as well as the
case with no shredding. Table 2.5 reports the summary statistics for these distribu-
tions. On both ﬁgures, the means and the skewness are centered around zero, since
the base model is symmetric for buy and sell orders. The volatility is much lower
than initially assumed daily volatility of σ = 2% when there are no arbitrageurs,
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especially when η is low. Intuitively, bet-shredding converts returns volatility into
the price drift. Trading by arbitrageurs “restores” martingale properties of prices
and brings volatility back to the assumed levels. For example, when η = 1%, the
daily volatility of simulated returns is equal to 0.005 with no arbitrageurs and 0.022
with arbitrageurs.
2.4 Properties of implied shredding parameter
The properties of daily returns depend on the assumptions about parameters of
the bet-shredding algorithm. We next use the method of simulated moments and
calibrate these parameters to match empirical moments of daily returns.
As before, we assume that traders generate bets according to invariance, design
execution to target a given fraction η of expected daily volume, and split bets into
equally-sized transactions. Meanwhile, arbitrageurs apply the forecasting model
described in section 2.3.6 and market makers clear the market. We generate N =
*** paths of daily returns. The bet-shredding parameter η is then estimated by
matching the kurtoses of simulated returns kurt(∆P |η, n) to the empirical estimates
of kurtoses kurt(∆P |Data),
η∗ = argminη
(∑N
n=1 kurt(∆P |η, n)
N
− kurt(∆P |Data)
)
. (2.29)
The empirical estimates are taken from table 2.1 for diﬀerent trading activity groups
and time periods.
Table 2.6 reports the estimates of implied parameter η for median stocks in the
ﬁve out of ten trading activity groups and for the seven decades from 1950 to 2017.
The table also presents information about trading activity used for simulation of
daily returns; its values coincide with statistics reported in table 2.1. There are two
patterns.
First, the implied parameter η decreases over time. For the stocks in group
1, parameter η decreased from 8.875 during 1950–1960 to 5.04 during 2010–2017.
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For the stocks in group 10, parameter η decreased from 3.225 during 1950–1960 to
1.39 during 2010–2017. This implies that, conditional of bet size, bet shredding
increased over time. Similarly, ? document a signiﬁcant change in trading patterns
in the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) dataset, as the decimalization and use of electronic
interfaces has recently led to a signiﬁcant increase in order shredding; the market for
block trades seems almost to have disappeared, and most trading is now dominated
by transactions of 100 shares, the minimum lot size. The feature of increased bet
shredding implied by our structural model suggests that it has reasonable properties.
Second, the implied parameter η decreases with trading activityW . For example,
for the time period 1990 through 2000, η is equal to 8.36, 4.22, 3.46, 2.52, and 1.66
for groups 1, 3, 5, 8, and 10, respectively. For the time period 2010 through 2017, η is
equal to 5.04, 2.69, 2.32, 1.80, and 1.39, respectively. This implies that, conditional
on bet size, execution of bets is spread over longer periods for more actively traded
stocks.
Table 2.7 shows implied execution horizons for the two periods before and after
decimalization. Panel A shows results for 1990-2000. Panel B shows results for
2010-2017. We calculate bet sizes using equation (2.3) and then calculate implied
execution horizons using equation (2.20) and calibrated bet-shredding parameters
ηˆ from table 2.6. For the median stock in group 1, it takes 2.69, 13.22, 64.86,
and 318.23 minutes to execute 4-std, 5-std, 6-std, and 7-std bets during 1990–2000,
respectively, and 0.79, 3.86, 18.93, and 92.87 minutes for similar bets during 2010–
2017. For the median stock in group 10, it takes 0.17, 0.85, 4.16, and 20.39 minutes
to execute 4-std, 5-std, 6-std, and 7-std bets during 1990–2000, respectively, and
0.05, 0.26, 1.29, and 6.32 minutes for similar bets during 2010–2017. The speed of
execution increased by a factor of 3.
The inspection of estimates in table 2.7 reveals that diﬀerences in bet-shredding
parameters are similar to diﬀerences in trading activity in −1/3 power. For example,
the ratio in parameters ηi and ηj for stock i and j are related to the ratio of their
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trading activities Wi and Wj as approximately,
ηi
ηj
≈
(Wi
Wj
)−1/3
. (2.30)
We can also extrapolate these estimates to the overall market with daily trading
volume of $292 billion (futures and stocks combined) and daily volatility of 2 percent,
as noted in Kyle and Obizhaeva (2017b). Using parameters for the median stock
in group 10 during 2010–2017 as the benchmark, equation (2.30) implies that bet-
shredding parameter for the entire U.S. market ηmkt ≈ 1.39 · ( Wi7,141,896 )−1/3 ≈ 0.20,
i.e. traders are targeting about 20 percent of expected contemporaneous volume
when executing bets in the U.S. market. This is broadly consistent with information
in Staﬀs of the CFTC and SEC (2010b) that the large trader whose trading caused
the Flash crash on May 6, 2010, has been targeting 9 percents of contemporaneous
volume when executing a bet in the E-mini S&P500 futures market.
2.5 Conclusions
We propose a new structural model of stock returns dynamics, which is inspired by
the recently developed ideas of market microstructure invariance. Traders generate
investment ideas, or bets, and execute them by shredding large orders over time to
minimize transaction costs, arbitrageurs trade to proﬁt on any detectable trends in
prices, and market makers clear the market. Bets are assumed to arrive according to
the processes calibrated by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016); parameters of bet-shredding
algorithms are chosen to match empirical moments of stock returns.
Our structural model captures realistically the economics of trading. It is the
model of stochastic volatility, because arrival of bets and their sizes are stochastic,
and large bets lead to bursts in volume, volatility, and intermediation. The model
is ﬂexible in terms of modelling trading behavior of arbitrageurs and bet-shredding
algorithms, while precise and grounded in theory in terms of using a speciﬁc structure
of bet ﬂow from traders and intermediaries. It can be calibrated either to ﬁt the data
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or to infer the implied parameters of trading, for example, such as hard-to-observe
bet-shredding parameters.
We focus mostly on the price dynamics, but the framework also generates quanti-
tative predictions about overall trading volume and order ﬂow generated by diﬀerent
groups of traders. As an extension, it is possible to calibrate the model to match
cross-sectional and time-series properties of both stock returns and trading volume,
or even some empirical ﬁndings about trading by diﬀerent groups of traders, for
example, such as deﬁned in Kirilenko et al. (2010).
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2.6 Tables and ﬁgures
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Figure 2.1: Idiosyncratic kurtosis of daily stock returns for 1950 through 2016.
Figure shows
five monthly time series of 12-month moving averages of median sample kurtosis for idiosyncratic daily stock returns
for each of the five trading activity groups (groups 1, 3, 5, 8, and 10 out of ten groups). Group 1 (10) contains the
least (most) actively traded stocks. The period ranges from January 1950 to December 2016.
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Figure 2.2: Ratio of idiosyncratic kurtosis (Group 1 to Group 10) for 1950 through 2016.
Figure shows the time series of ratio of median sample kurtosis of idiosyncratic daily stock returns for stocks in Group
1 (least actively traded stocks) to the one of Group 10 (most actively traded stocks). The horizontal line marks the
value of one. The sample ranges from January 1950 to December 2016.
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Figure 2.3: Kurtosis of daily stock returns for 1950 through 2016.
Figure shows five monthly time series of 12-month moving average of median sample kurtosis of daily stock returns for
each of the five trading activity groups (groups 1, 3, 5, 8, and 10 out of ten groups). Group 1 (10) contains the least
(most) actively traded stocks. The period ranges from January 1950 to December 2016.
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Figure 2.4: Ratio of kurtosis (Group 1 to Group 10) for 1950 through 2016.
Figure shows the time series of ratio of median sample kurtosis of daily stock returns for stocks in Group 1 (least
actively traded stocks) to the one of Group 10 (most actively traded stocks). The horizontal line marks the value of
one. The sample ranges from January 1950 to December 2016.
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Figure 2.5: Idiosyncratic skewness of daily stock returns for 1950 through 2016.
Figure shows five monthly time series of 12-month moving average of median sample skewness of idiosyncratic daily stock
returns for each of the five trading activity groups (groups 1, 3, 5, 8, and 10 out of ten groups). Group 1 (10) contains
the least (most) actively traded stocks. The period ranges from January 1950 to December 2016.
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Figure 2.6: Idiosyncratic volatility of daily stock returns for 1950 through 2016.
Figure shows five monthly time series of 12-month moving average of median sample volatility of idiosyncratic daily
stock returns for each of the five trading activity groups (groups 1, 3, 5, 8, and 10 out of ten groups). Group 1 (10)
contains the least (most) actively traded stocks. The period ranges from January 1950 to December 2016.
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Table 2.1: Kurtosis and skewness for trading activity groups across decades
Group 1 Group 3 Group 5 Group 8 Group 10 Total
Decade 1950-1960
Activity 101 517 967 1,926 5,925 440
Kurtosis 7.174 4.253 4.387 3.205 2.656 4.825
Skewness 0.199 0.243 0.305 0.317 0.357 0.262
# Stocks 676 766 623 511 328
Decade 1960-1970
Activity 277 1,650 3,375 6,999 26,727 1,197
Kurtosis 8.472 5.419 5.188 4.141 2.972 6.002
Skewness 0.303 0.306 0.303 0.302 0.338 0.310
# Stocks 2,126 1,839 1,378 1,056 557
Decade 1970-1980
Activity 210 2,249 5,103 11,519 39,913 1,284
Kurtosis 6.605 5.511 4.928 4.327 3.289 5.627
Skewness 0.182 0.210 0.178 0.159 0.076 0.179
# Stocks 3,697 1,894 1,435 1,028 583
Decade 1980-1990
Activity 1,176 12,893 29,588 70,470 271,798 4,935
Kurtosis 7.133 5.734 4.939 4.321 2.851 5.938
Skewness 0.144 0.201 0.192 0.205 0.157 0.173
# Stocks 5,642 3,084 1,852 1,236 677
Decade 1990-2000
Activity 2,895 38,104 88,975 245,021 1,232,159 14,012
Kurtosis 8.102 6.450 6.174 5.226 4.220 6.884
Skewness 0.098 0.184 0.202 0.197 0.192 0.143
# Stocks 7,721 5,082 3,265 2,237 1,089
Decade 2000-2010
Activity 8,640 190,720 468,578 1,364,880 6,704,911 62,135
Kurtosis 7.583 5.963 5.491 4.699 4.002 6.542
Skewness 0.059 0.098 0.087 0.106 0.096 0.076
# Stocks 5,894 3,545 2,398 1,736 820
Decade 2010-2017
Activity 18,363 411,722 940,703 2,216,188 7,141,896 83,929
Kurtosis 6.808 6.315 6.085 4.918 4.232 6.396
Skewness 0.107 0.074 0.075 0.077 0.098 0.096
# Stocks 3,364 1,659 1,018 766 441
Table presents the sample medians of trading activity, idiosyncratic skew-
ness, and idiosyncratic kurtosis as well as the number of stocks for the ten
groups of U.S. stocks, based on their trading activity. The sample ranges
from January 1950 to December 2016 and split into decades. Group 1 (10)
consists of stocks with lowest (highest) trading activity in the previous
three months.
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Table 2.2: Simulated theoretical kurtosis and low bounds.
Group 1 Group 3 Group 5 Group 8 Group 10
Trading Activity 8,000 210,000 460,000 1,000,000 3,600,000
Number of Bets 4 35 59 99 232
Avg Kurtosis 7,214 651 381 225 95
Stand. Error (4.81) (0.12) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01)
Low Bound 5,576 631 374 259 95
%∆ 29% 3% 2% 1% 0%
Table reports trading activity σ · V · P , bet arrival rate per day γ, the
average daily returns kurtosis and its standard errors of the means from
Monte-carlo simulations, low bound for kurtosis, and percentage differ-
ence between the average kurtosis and the low bound for the median stock
in each of the five trading activity groups (groups 1, 3, 5, 8, and 10 out of
ten groups). Group 1 (10) contains the least (most) actively traded stocks.
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Table 2.3: Imbalance forecasting model of arbitrageurs.
Shredding const Si,t−1 S2i,t−1 Si,t−2 S
2
i,t−2 Si,t−3 S
2
i,t−3 Si,t−4 S
2
i,t−4 Si,t−5 S
2
i,t−5 R
2
η = 1% 39,719 1.98 0.00 0.97 0.00 1.02 0.00 1.25 0.00 5.32 0.00 12%
η = 5% 32,925 0.37 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.49 0.00 13%
η = 10% 12,190 0.17 -0.00 0.16 -0.00 0.19 -0.00 0.30 0.00 0.89 -0.00 13%
Table reports estimates βˆ1j and βˆ2j, j = 1, .5 of arbitrageurs’ model for forecasting unexecuted imbalances
S∗it,n − Sit,n = α+
5∑
j=1
β1j · Si,t−j,n +
5∑
j=1
β2j · S2i,t−j,n + ǫtn, t = 1, ..T, n = 1, ..N,
estimated based on the simulated sample for a benchmark stock with daily volatility 2 percent, price $40, and daily
volume 1 million shares. The simulated sample consist of 1,000 of 90-day paths. The three bet-shredding algorithms are
used: “Method-V (1%)”, “Method-V (5%)”, and “Method-V (10%)”.
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Figure 2.7: Returns autocorrelations without arbitrager.
Panel A: η = 1% Panel B: η = 5%
Panel C: η = 10% Panel D: No Shredding
Figure shows autocorrelation coefficients of daily returns at different
lags for different models of bet shredding without arbitragers: “Method-
V (1%)”, “Method-V (5%)”, “Method-V (10%)”, and no bet shredding. The sim-
ulation consists of 1,000 of 90-day paths. There are averages, medians, and
standard errors of autocorrelation coefficients in dark solid, dashed, and
light solid lines, respectively.
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Figure 2.8: Returns autocorrelations with arbitrager.
Panel A: η = 1% Panel B: η = 5%
Panel C: η = 10% Panel D: No Shredding
Figure shows average autocorrelation coefficients of daily returns at
different lags for different models of bet shredding with arbitragers:
“Method-V (1%)”, “Method-V (5%)”, “Method-V (10%)”, and no bet shredding.
The simulation consists of 1,000 of 90-day paths. There are averages, me-
dians, and standard errors of autocorrelation coefficients in dark solid,
dashed, and light solid lines, respectively.
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Table 2.4: Returns autocorrelations.
Order of autocorrelation
lag 1 lag 2 lag 3 lag 5 lag 10 lag 20
Panel A: Model without arbitragers
η = 1% 0.696 0.523 0.417 0.294 0.157 0.068
(0.092) (0.128) (0.152) (0.172) (0.194) (0.211)
η = 5% 0.437 0.249 0.167 0.094 0.038 0.009
(0.101) (0.119) (0.127) (0.137) (0.133) (0.138)
η = 10% 0.331 0.125 0.096 0.051 0.025 -0.001
(0.106) (0.114) (0.119) (0.121) (0.118) (0.127)
No Shredding -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.093) (0.091) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.10)
Panel B: Model with arbitragers
η = 1% 0.033 0.047 0.098 -0.16 -0.052 -0.005
(0.119) (0.140) (0.106) (0.103) (0.122) (0.130)
η = 5% 0.085 0.093 0.157 0.41 -0.04 0.002
(0.131) (0.150) (0.111) (0.114) (0.133) (0.141)
η = 10% 0.123 0.094 0.14 0.413 -0.022 0.000
(0.132) (0.150) (0.115) (0.120) (0.132) (0.140)
No Shredding -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.093) (0.091) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.10)
Table reports average autocorrelation coefficients of daily returns at
different lags for different models of bet shredding: “Method-V (1%)”,
“Method-V (5%)”, “Method-V (10%)”, and no bet shredding. Panel A presents
results for the model without arbitragers. Panel B presents results for
the model with arbitragers. The simulation consists of 1,000 of 90-day
paths.
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Figure 2.9: Distributions of simulated moments without arbitrageurs
Mean Volatility Skewness Kurtosis
η = 1%
η = 5%
η = 10%
No Shredding
Figure shows distributions of simulated moments of order flow for a benchmark stock. There are 1,000 simulations of 90-
day paths of returns. The case with no bet shredding and the three bet-shredding algorithms are used: “Method-V (1%)”,
“Method-V (5%)”, and “Method-V (10%)”.
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Figure 2.10: Distributions of simulated moments with arbitrageurs
Mean Volatility Skewness Kurtosis
η = 1%
η = 5%
η = 10%
No Shredding
Figure shows distributions of simulated moments of order flow for a benchmark stock with arbitrageurs. There are
*** simulations of 90-day paths of returns. The case with no bet shredding and the three bet-shredding algorithms are
used: “Method-V (1%)”, “Method-V (5%)”, and “Method-V (10%)”.
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics for daily returns.
η = 1% η = 5% η = 10% No Shredding
Panel A: Model without arbitrager
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
St.dev 0.005 0.010 0.012 0.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Skewness 0.252 0.722 0.451 8.564
(140) (74) (61) (178)
Kurtosis 0.927 0.338 0.281 7.331
(1.745) (0.632) (0.556) (10.421)
Panel B: Model with arbitrager
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
St.dev 0.022 0.017 0.017 0.021
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Skewness -1.152 -0.497 -0.457 8.564
(46) (48) (49) (178)
Kurtosis 0.517 0.229 0.171 7.331
(0.943) (0.553) (0.556) (10.421)
Table reports statistics for simulated daily returns such as mean, standard
deviation, skewness, and kurtosis for different models of bet shredding:
“Method-V (1%)”, “Method-V (5%)”, “Method-V (10%)”, and no bet shredding.
Panel A presents results for the model without arbitragers. Panel B
presents results for the model with arbitragers. The simulation consists
of *** 90-day paths.
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Table 2.6: Calibrated bet-shredding parameters.
Group 1 Group 3 Group 5 Group 8 Group 10
Decade 1950-1960
W 101 517 967 1,926 5,925
ηˆ 8.875 6.288 6.500 3.675 3.225
Decade 1960-1970
W 277 1,650 3,375 6,999 26,727
ηˆ 9.400 6.888 5.200 4.013 2.588
Decade 1970-1980
W 210 2,249 5,103 11,519 39,913
ηˆ 9.40 6.89 5.20 4.01 2.59
Decade 1980-1990
W 1,176 12,893 29,588 70,470 271,798
ηˆ 9.17 4.84 3.71 2.79 1.59
Decade 1990-2000
W 2,895 38,104 88,975 245,021 1,232,159
ηˆ 8.36 4.22 3.46 2.52 1.66
Decade 2000-2010
W 8,640 190,720 468,578 1,364,880 6,704,911
ηˆ 6.34 2.94 2.41 1.79 1.37
Decade 2010-2017
W 18,363 411,722 940,703 2,216,188 7,141,896
ηˆ 5.04 2.69 2.32 1.80 1.39
Table presents calibrated parameter η and trading activity W for the me-
dian stocks in the five trading activity groups and for each decade for the
period 1950 through 2017.
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Table 2.7: Implied execution horizons.
Group 1 Group 3 Group 5 Group 8 Group 10
Panel A: Decade 1990-2000
W 2,895 38,104 88,975 245,021 1,232,159
ηˆ 8.36 4.22 3.46 2.52 1.66
std-1 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
std-2 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
std-3 0.55 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.04
std-4 2.69 0.91 0.60 0.39 0.17
std-5 13.22 4.44 2.93 1.92 0.85
std-6 64.86 21.80 14.36 9.42 4.16
std-7 318.23 106.96 70.46 46.22 20.39
Panel B: Decade 2010-2017
W 18,363 411,722 940,703 2,216,188 7,141,896
ηˆ 5.04 2.69 2.32 1.80 1.39
std-1 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
std-2 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
std-3 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01
std-4 0.79 0.19 0.12 0.09 0.05
std-5 3.86 0.91 0.61 0.44 0.26
std-6 18.93 4.46 2.98 2.17 1.29
std-7 92.87 21.88 14.63 10.65 6.32
Table presents implied execution horizons for bets of different sizes for
different trading activity groups and time periods. There are calibrated
parameter η, trading activity W , and execution horizons (in minutes) for 1
through 7 standard deviation bets.
Chapter 3
Size of Share Repurchases and
Market Microstructure
3.1 Introduction
Share repurchases are among the most important corporate decisions. This study
concerns what determines the size of repurchase programs and interprets these pro-
grams in the context of the market microstructure, as bets on the valuation of
companies that managers place in the marketplace. Inspired by market microstruc-
ture invariance of Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016), the study documents quantitative
empirical relationships between the size of share repurchase programs and trading
activity of company stocks, volatility, and the duration of repurchase programs.
According to invariance theory, stock trading can be described as a trading game,
in which market participants place bets on asseta. The number of bets and distri-
bution of their sizes diﬀers across assets with diﬀerent levels of trading volume and
volatility in a particular manner. If share repurchases are simply a special type
of buy bets, then the insights of invariance theory have to be applicable to these
corporate decisions as well. This interpretation of share repurchases allows us to
formulate several hypotheses about their sizes.
The ﬁrst hypothesis of target size is based on the intuition that the size of a re-
purchase program is simply proportional to the size of bet, typical for the underlying
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stock market; it predicts that size of repurchase programs as a fraction of expected
trading volume is proportional to trading activity to the power of -2/3, where trading
activity is deﬁned as the product of dollar volume and return volatility.
The second hypothesis of target imbalance says that the size of repurchase pro-
grams is proportional to some percentile of the expected sum of all buy bets that
company managers expect to generate over the duration of the repurchase program;
it predicts that size of repurchase programs as a fraction of expected trading volume
is proportional to trading activity to the power of -1/3 and also depends on the
duration of the repurchase program.
The third hypothesis of target cost says that the size of repurchase program is
determined by the execution costs of repurchases; it predicts that size of repurchase
programs as a fraction of expected trading volume is proportional to trading activity
to the power of -1/3 and also depends on the volatility of the underlying security.
I test the hypotheses using the sample of U.S. share repurchase programs over
the period from March 1985 to January 2014. I ﬁnd that trading activity does
indeed have high explanatory power for the authorised and realised size of share
repurchase programs; the regression r-square is equal to 41 percent for authorised
sizes and 26 percent for realised sizes. The estimated coeﬃcient on trading activity
is -0.33, which conforms to predictions of target imbalance and target (linear) cost
hypotheses. The formal statistical tests, however, reject these hypotheses.
I implement a formal model selection procedure with a Bayesian information
criterion. Target imbalances and target (linear) costs hypotheses ﬁt repurchase
data best. Furthermore, the target imbalance hypothesis is selected on the open
market repurchase programs, which are the most popular type of such programs.
This paper relates to literature on corporate payout policies and share repur-
chases. Dittmar (2000) argues that companies repurchase shares for various reasons.
Firstly, there is market undervaluation theory. Vermaelen (1981), Brav et al. (2005),
Buﬀa and Nicodano (2008) argue that companies initiate share repurchases to signal
disagreement with current market valuations of their stocks. Ikenberry, Lakonishok
and Vermaelen (1995), Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000) document positive abnormal
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returns several years after repurchase announcements. Secondly, there is a free
cashﬂow theory of share repurchases. Jensen (1986), Jensen and Meckling (1976),
and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) argue that ﬁrms should distribute all available
cash to the shareholders through dividends or share repurchase to avoid agency costs
arising due to a conﬂict of interests between management and shareholders. Thirdly,
there is optimal corporate structure theory. Modigliani and Miller (1958), Bagwell
and Shoven (1988), and Opler and Titman (1996) argue that companies repurchase
shares to adjust their capital structures.
These theories identify several factors that inﬂuence share repurchase activity,
such as past performance of underlying stock, volatility of stock, free cashﬂows,
and market capitalization of the company. I assess the explanatory power of these
theories relative to the hypotheses motivated by invariance theory. I ﬁnd that the
R2 of regression speciﬁcation that includes only trading activity equals 41 percent.
Adding control motivated by theories of share repurchases increases the R2 by 12
percent. It implies that trading activity of the stock is an important determinant of
the size of a share repurchase program.
This paper also contributes to growing literature on market microstructure in-
variance. Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016) introduce market microstructure invariance
principles that explain a substantial fraction of the cross-sectional and time-series
variation in bet size and transaction costs across stocks. Kyle and Obizhaeva (2017c)
derive invariance relationships in the inﬁnite-horizon model of informed trading,
noise trading, market making, and endogenous production of information. Kyle and
Obizhaeva (2017a) establish invariance principles through dimensional analysis ar-
guments. Andersen et al. (2014) document robust empirical patterns of intra-day
trading in E-mini futures S&P 500 futures market. Kyle et al. (2011) apply invari-
ance intuition to explain cross-sectional and time-series variation in news arrival
rates. Bae et al. (2014) uncover invariant patterns in Korean stock market data.
Kyle and Obizhaeva (2017b) apply invariance motivated market impact costs to ex-
plain market crashes. Kyle, Obizhaeva and Tuzun (2016) apply invariance principles
to explain the number of trades and the distribution of trade sizes in the Trades and
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Quotes database.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief description
of key principles of the market microstructure invariance framework and formulates
three hypotheses about distribution of the size of repurchase program. Section II
describes the data used in empirical tests. Section III empirically tests the hypothe-
ses, selects the model that best ﬁts the data, and compares alternative determinants
of size of share repurchase programs. Section IV concludes the discussion.
3.2 Share repurchases and invariance
This section reviews market microstructure invariance and suggests several ways of
how one can think about sizes of share repurchase programs in the context of this
paradigm.
3.2.1 Review of market microstructure invariance
Market participants such as institutional and retail investors trade for various rea-
sons. They trade to proﬁt on their information or to meet their hedging needs.
Invariance theory implies that the order ﬂow of stocks is determined by risky bets.
Bets arrive into market place according to the Poisson process with expected num-
ber of bets per day γ. The size of the bet Q is measured in shares. It is positive
for buy and negative for sell bets. The order ﬂow of stocks diﬀers according to how
many bets arrive and to the distribution of bet size.
Kyle and Obizhaeva (2017c) express bet size Q˜, expected number of bets γ, and
execution cost of bet of size Q, C(Q), in terms of observable trading activity of the
stock W .
W = P · V · σ, (3.1)
where σ is the volatility of the stock, V is trading volume of the stock, and P is its
price level.
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The distribution of bet size Q˜ as a fraction of expected daily trading volume
V adjusted for trading activity of stock as Q˜
V
·W 2/3 has invariant distribution. It
implies that
Q˜
V
∼W−2/3 · I˜ , (3.2)
where I˜ is a random variable with an invariant probability distribution. Kyle and
Obizhaeva (2016) use the sample of portfolio transition trades in the U.S. stock
market over the period from 2001 to 2005 and calibrate the distribution of bet size.
They ﬁnd that I˜ is close to a log-normal distribution with log-variance σ2Q = 2.53.
The expected number of bets γ is predicted to be proportional to W 2/3,
γ ∼ W 2/3. (3.3)
The execution cost of a bet of size Q, C(Q), is predicted to be
C(Q) = σ ·W−1/3 · ı2 · C¯B · f
(
W 2/3
ı
· Q
V
)
, (3.4)
where f(·) is the invariant average cost function and ı := (E[ ˜|I|])−1/3 and C¯B are
some constants. Invariance is consistent with any functional form of f(·), but most
often assume linear or square root cost functions.
For the benchmark stock with daily returns volatility σ∗ = 2%, trading volume
V ∗ = 106 shares, price P ∗ = $40, and trading activity W ∗ = 800, 000 there are on
average γ∗ = 85 bets per day, the average size of bet is equal to 33, 000 shares, and
the execution cost of an average sized bet for a linear cost model is equal to 14 basis
points.
3.2.2 Share repurchases hypotheses
Under the assumption that company management actively participates in the trad-
ing process of company’s stock, I formulate three hypotheses about the size of share
repurchase programs.
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Hypothesis 1: target size hypothesis. The ﬁrst hypothesis says that a share
repurchase program represents a buy bet that the company executes in the market.
Thus, the invariance predictions have to apply to the size of repurchase program.
Let X denote the size of repurchase program. Equation (3.2) implies the following
relation between the size of the repurchase and trading activity of the underlying
stock.
X
V
∼W−2/3 · I˜. (3.5)
The size of repurchase program as a fraction of expected daily volume adjusted for
trading activity of stock has invariant distribution.
This hypothesis can be tested with the following log-linear regression using the
panel of share repurchase programs.
ln
[
Xit
Vit
]
= α0 + αW · ln
[
Wit
W ∗
]
+ ǫ˜it, (3.6)
where Xit denotes the size of share repurchase program i initiated at time t. At time
t the stock i has expected daily trading volume Vit, expected price level Pit, expected
daily return volatility σit, expected trading activity Wit, and trading activity of the
benchmark stock W ∗ = 800, 000. Target size hypothesis predicts that αW = −2/3
in regression model (3.6).
Hypothesis 2: target imbalance hypothesis. The second hypothesis says that
the size of repurchase program is related to total size of buy bet-ideas that the
company is expected to generate over the duration of a repurchase program.
Let T denote duration of repurchase program. It is most likely that a manager
will come up with several bets on the company over the length of a repurchase
program. For example, over a three year repurchase program the company generates
the following bets. In the ﬁrst year the company decides to buy back 1 million
shares since it believes that its stock is undervalued. In the second year the ﬁrm
repurchases 400,000 shares to adjust its capital structure. In the third year the
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company repurchases 600,000 shares to pay back cash to its shareholders. In this
case T = 3 and the size of repurchase program is equal toX = 1, 000, 000+400, 000+
600, 000 = 2, 000, 000 shares.
Target imbalance hypothesis asserts that at the announcement of a repurchase
program, the size of program may reﬂect forward looking estimates of the total size
of buy bets that the company expects to generate over the duration of the program.
Let γf denote the expected number of bets that management of a company is
expected to generate every day. The actual number of bets that a company generates
γ˜f is a random variable that has a Poisson distribution with expected number of
bets γf . I assume that the expected number of bets that a company generates γf is
proportional to expected number of bets in the underlying stock market γ.
γf = zf · γ, (3.7)
where zf denotes some proportionality constant.
Suppose that on day t the manager of the company generates γ˜ft = γft bets
Q˜1t = Q1t, Q˜2t = Q2t, ..., Q˜γftt = Qγftt. Since the number of bets and their sizes are
random variables, the bet imbalance at time t Ψ˜t - a sum of all bets that company
generates at time t - is a random variable as well.
Ψ˜t =
γ˜ft∑
i=1
Q˜it. (3.8)
Suppose the size of repurchase program represents some upper percentile estimate
of the distribution Ψ˜t, such as the 95th percentile of total bet imbalance. Therefore,
the manager should estimate the standard deviation of bet imbalance Ψ˜t. I apply the
law of total variance to equation (3.8) to estimate variance of daily bet imbalance.
Var
[
Ψ˜t
]
= E

Var

 γ˜ft∑
i=1
Q˜it



+ Var

E

 γ˜ft∑
i=1
Q˜it



 . (3.9)
The second term in equation (3.9) is equal to zero, since the average size of each bet
Q˜it is equal to zero E
[
Q˜it
]
= 0 and E
[∑γ˜ft
i=1 Q˜it
]
= 0.
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Since the number of bets has a Poisson distribution with expected number of
bets γf , I apply equation (3.11) and compute the ﬁrst term of equation (3.9) as
E

Var

 γ˜ft∑
i=1
Q˜it



 = ∞∑
k=1
Var

 γ˜ft∑
i=1
Q˜it
∣∣∣∣γ˜ft = k

 · γkf
k!
· e−γf = (3.10)
= Var
[
Q˜it
]
·
∞∑
k=1
k · γkf
k!
· e−γf = γf · Var
[
Q˜it
]
.
Since bets are independent, the variance of bet imbalance conditional on the number
of bets equals
Var

 γ˜ft∑
i=1
Qit
∣∣∣∣γ˜ft = k

 = k ·Var[Q˜it]. (3.11)
Since the share repurchase program lasts for T days, I calculate standard deviation
of bet imbalance generated by the company over the T days of the program Ψ˜(T ).
Substituting (3.7) and (3.10) into (3.9), gives the following standard deviation of
bet imbalance.
std
[
Ψ˜(T )
]
=
√
T · γf · Var
[
Q˜it
]
. (3.12)
If the size of repurchase program is proportional to the standard deviation of bet
imbalance that the company is expected to generate over the T days of share repur-
chase program, then
X¯ ∼
√
T · γf · Var
[
Q˜it
]
. (3.13)
For example, the proportionality constant may be equal to 1.96 if the manager wants
to target the 95th percentile.
Finally, I express the authorised size X of share repurchase program as a fraction
of daily volume V . I substitute equations (3.2), (3.3), and (3.7) into equation (3.13).
X¯
V
∼
√√√√
T · γ ·
Var
[
Q˜it
]
V 2
∼
√
T ·W−1/3. (3.14)
This hypothesis can be tested with the following log-linear regression using the panel
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of share repurchase programs
ln
[
Xit
Vit
]
= α0 + αW · ln
[
Wit
W ∗
]
+ ατ · ln(Tit) + ǫ˜it. (3.15)
Target imbalance hypothesis predicts that αW = −1/3 and ατ = 1/2 in the regres-
sion model (3.15).
Hypothesis 3: target cost hypothesis. The execution cost of share repurchase
program is an important factor. The third hypothesis asserts that managers choose
the size of repurchase program to target the percentage execution cost of share
repurchase program, zc. For example, the company may want to repurchase 1 million
shares and target execution cost of 50 basis points. In this case, X = 1, 000, 000
shares and zc = 50 basis points. I apply invariance percentage cost formula (3.4) to
formalise this hypothesis. Inverting equation (3.4), I express the size of repurchase
program X as a fraction of expected daily volume V as
X
V
= ı ·W−2/3 · f−1
(
zc · σ−1 ·W 1/3 · 1
ı2 · C¯B
)
. (3.16)
Next, I assume that execution cost function f(x) has a power functional form,
f(x) = λ · xβ. (3.17)
The literature typically considers linear and square root market impact functions,
as in Kyle (1985) and Gabaix et al. (2006), respectively. The linear execution cost
function corresponds to the case of β = 1. The square root execution cost function
corresponds to the case of β = 1/2. The inverse of the power function (3.17) is
f−1(x) =
(
x
λ
) 1
β .
Substituting equation (3.17) into equation (3.16), yields the size of repurchase
program as a fraction of trading volume,
X
V
∼ σ− 1β ·W 1−2·β3·β . (3.18)
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For the linear execution costs function β = 1 and expression (3.18) simpliﬁes to
X
V
∼ σ−1 ·W−1/3. (3.19)
For the square root execution costs β = 1/2 and expression (3.18) simpliﬁes to
X
V
∼ σ−2. (3.20)
This hypothesis can be tested with the following log-linear regression using the panel
of share repurchase programs
ln
[
Xit
Vit
]
= α0 + αW · ln
[
Wit
W ∗
]
+ ασ · ln(σit) + ǫ˜it. (3.21)
Target cost hypothesis makes the following predictions for the cases of linear and
square root execution cost functions. For the case of linear cost function αW = −1/3
and ασ = −1 in the regression model (3.21). For the case of square root cost function
αW = 0 and ασ = −2 in the regression model (3.21).
3.2.3 Nested models
All hypotheses make diﬀerent predictions about the relationship between size of
repurchase program and trading activity of the underlying stock. The target size
hypothesis (3.6), target imbalance hypothesis (3.15), and both target cost hypothe-
ses (3.21) may be described by the nested regression model
ln
[
Xit
Vit
]
= α0 + αW · ln
[
Wit
W ∗
]
+ ατ · ln(Tit) + ασ · ln(σit) + ǫ˜it. (3.22)
The target size hypothesis predicts that the only factor determining the size of re-
purchase program is trading activity of the stock, while the duration of a repurchase
program and volatility of the stock should not matter. It predicts that αW = −2/3,
while ατ = 0 and ασ = 0.
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The target imbalance hypothesis predicts that trading activity of the stock and
duration of repurchase program determine the size of the repurchase program, while
volatility of the stock should not matter. It predicts that αW = −1/3, while ατ =
1/2 and ασ = 0.
The target linear impact cost hypothesis predicts that trading activity of the
stock and volatility of the stock determine size of the repurchase program, while
duration of the program should not matter. It predicts that αW = −1/3, ατ = 1/2,
while ασ = 0.
Target square root impact cost hypothesis predicts that only volatility of the
stock should determine the size of the repurchase program, while trading activity
of the stock and duration of the repurchase program should not matter. It predicts
that αW = 0 and ατ = 0, while ασ = −2.
Table 3.1 summarizes hypotheses predictions for the nested regression (3.22).
Table 3.1: Hypotheses predictions
Hypothesis αW ατ ασ
1. Target size hypothesis -2/3 0 0
2. Target imbalance hypothesis -1/3 1/2 0
3. Target cost hypothesis:
Case 1: Linear cost -1/3 0 -1
Case 2: Square root cost 0 0 -2
In the next section I test these hypotheses empirically.
3.3 Data
I use data from the Securities Data Company Platinum (SDC) database on the U.S.
share repurchase programs covering period from March 1985 to January 2014. It
contains information about the date when a repurchase program was authorised by
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the board of directors, the end date of a repurchase program, the authorised size of
share repurchase program, the realised size of the program, methods of repurchase,
and reasons for share repurchase.
I merge the repurchase database with information on trading activity of the
underlying stock from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database
using 8-digit historical CUSIP numbers. Only US ordinary common shares (with
share codes 10 or 11) that are listed on NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq, and NYSE Arca
are considered. At the initial merge stage I cannot match 3,477 observations and
exclude 2 observations due to obvious typographical errors. Furthermore, I exclude
2,069 observations because because information required for construction of the
explanatory variables is absent from the CRSP database. The resulting sample
contains 14,369 repurchase programs.
I estimate trading activity of stocks using CRSP data. For each share repurchase
program i, i = 1, ..., 14369, I estimate expected daily trading volume Vi of corre-
sponding stock as a sample average daily volume in a calendar month prior to the
authorisation date of the share repurchase program. I estimate expected volatility
of stock returns σi as a sample standard deviation of daily log-returns in a calendar
month before the initiation of the repurchase program. To account for possible stock
splits, I estimate expected dollar volume of the stock Pi ·Vi as an average daily dollar
trading volume in a calendar month before the share repurchase authorisation. I
estimate expected trading activity of the stock Wi as a product of expected dollar
volume and expected return volatility Wi = Pi · Vi · σi.
Trading activity of the stock may be aﬀected by the initiation of a repurchase
program. For example, it may substantially increase the trading volume because
of ampliﬁed public attention. As a robustness check I also consider an alternative
estimate of expected trading activity and expected volume using data in the calendar
month prior to the completion of the share repurchase program. The results that
use alternative estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the base case
results. These results are available upon request.
I do analysis on the sample of U.S. repurchase programs and on three sub-
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periods. The ﬁrst period is from March 1985 to December 2000. The second period
is from January 2001 to December 2007. The third period is from January 2008 to
September 2014.
The ﬁrst period starts shortly after implementation of the safe-harbor Rule 10b-
18 by the Security and Exchange Commission in November 1982. Grullon and
Michaely (2002) argue that the new legislation stimulated repurchase activity in the
United States. The aggregate amount of cash spent on share repurchases tripled
a year after the adoption of this rule and the number of companies that initiated
share repurchases increased from 14 percent during the 1970s to 30 percent during
the 1990s.
The second period corresponds to the period of low dividend taxes introduced
by George W. Bush in 2001, also known as “Bush tax cuts”. Chetty and Saez (2006)
ﬁnds that the tax reduction from 35 percent to 15 percent resulted in a sharp increase
in the size of repurchase programs. Authors also established no substitution eﬀect
between dividends and share repurchases.
The third period corresponds to the post 2008 ﬁnancial crisis period. Adverse
economic conditions aﬀect the payout policy of companies. As illustrated in Figure
3.1 the number of share repurchase programs that were initiated during the ﬁnancial
crisis in the United States dropped from 700 to 500. The dollar size of repurchase
programs experienced a sharp decline from $8 billions in 2008 to $3 billions in 2009.
Share repurchase activity recovered to the pre-crises levels in 2010.
Table 3.2 reports characteristics of the considered sample of share repurchase
programs over the period from 1985 to 2000 as well as for the three sub-periods.
Panel A of Table 3.2 reports characteristics such as the authorised size of repur-
chase programs, the realised size of repurchase programs, and the duration of the
programs. Over the considered period the median authorised size of repurchase pro-
gram is 1.76 million shares. It increased from 1 million shares in the ﬁrst period to
4 million shares in the third period. The Authorised size of repurchase program as
a fraction of trading volume, however, decreases from 31 in the ﬁrst period to 12 in
the third period, because the trading volume of the stocks increases faster than size
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of repurchase program.
Usually companies do not repurchase all the shares that they are authorised to
repurchase. The median realised size of repurchase program is 1 million shares. It
increased from 0.69 million shares in the ﬁrst period to 2 millions shares in the third
period.
I also estimate the duration of the repurchase program as the number of days
between the authorisation date and end date of the repurchase program. The median
duration of the program is 317 days. It decreased from 334 days in the ﬁrst period to
248 days in the third period, which implies that companies are buying back shares
faster.
Panel B of Table 3.2 characterises trading activity of the stocks in the SDC
repurchases sample. Median daily dollar volume is $1.27 million. It increased from
$0.5 million in the ﬁrst period to $8.6 million in the third period. Median daily
volatility of log returns is stable at 2%. Median trading activity of stocks is 30, 000.
Stocks become more actively traded over time, as trading activity increased from
12, 000 in the ﬁrst period to 195, 000 in the third period.
Companies may use diﬀerent methods to buy back their stocks. There are six dif-
ferent methods that companies usually use: open market, negotiated, Dutch auction
tender oﬀers, accelerated, ﬁrst price tender oﬀers, and odd lot repurchases. Some-
times companies employ several methods to repurchase shares within one repurchase
program.
Table 3.3 provides summary statistics of share repurchase programs across diﬀer-
ent repurchase methods. The most popular is open market repurchases. According
to Stephens and Weisbach (1998) open market share repurchase programs repre-
sent approximately 90 percent of the dollar value of all announced share repurchase
programs. Open market repurchases usually last around one year, which gives a
company ﬂexibility on the timing and quantity of actual shares repurchased. The
median authorised size of share repurchases is 1.58 million shares and the num-
ber of actual shares repurchased by companies is 1 million shares. Consistent with
Stephens and Weisbach (1998), this study ﬁnds a completion rate of approximately
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64 percent of repurchase programs.
Dutch auction, accelerated and ﬁrst price repurchases require commitment by
the company to repurchase shares. To achieve eﬀective signaling, these repurchase
programs are larger and of shorter duration - usually around 2 months - than open
market share repurchase programs. The median authorised size is equal to 3.55
million shares for Dutch auction, 6.15 million shares for accelerated repurchases,
and 3.49 million shares for ﬁrst price repurchases. The median total number of
shares repurchased is 2.29 million, 6.54 million, and 1.85 million shares for Dutch
auction, accelerated, and ﬁrst price repurchases, respectively.
Another method is negotiated repurchases. Pursuing this method, a company
negotiates the deal privately and repurchases stock from one or a few large share-
holders. Dittmar (2000) suggests that this method is usually used to prevent a
takeover threat. On average negotiated repurchases last for approximately a year.
The median authorised size is 2.00 million shares and the median total number of
shares repurchased is 1.19 million shares.
Finally, some companies engage in odd-lot share repurchases to eliminate odd-lot
shareholders. Vermaelen (2000) argues that companies use this method to reduce
shareholder servicing costs. Odd-lot programs usually last about two months. Their
median authorised size is 1.6 million shares and the median total number of shares
repurchased is 1.00 million shares.
3.4 Results
This section tests the hypotheses concerning the size of repurchase programs and
discusses which model conforms best to the data.
3.4.1 Hypothesis testing
Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between the size of a share repurchase program
and the trading activity of the underlying stock. Panel A of Figure 3.2 displays
the logarithm of authorised sizes of repurchase programs on the x-axis versus the
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logarithm of trading activity of the stocks on the y-axis. Apart from the four out-
liers that correspond to small odd-lot repurchase programs, all observations cluster
tightly around the line with the slope of -1/3. This implies that trading activity
of stock has a high explanatory power for the authorised size of a share repurchase
program, which is consistent with implications of invariance theory.
Table 3.5 presents the estimates of regression (3.6) on the whole sample of repur-
chase programs over the period from 1985 to 2014 and the sub-periods from 1985
to 2000, from 2001 to 2007, and from 2008 to 2014. Panel A of Table 3.5 displays
results for the authorised size of repurchase program. On the whole sample of re-
purchase programs the estimated αˆW = −0.33 with a standard error of 0.005. Stock
trading activity explains 40 percent of variation in the authorised size of repurchase
programs. The estimated coeﬃcient estimate αˆW is -0.30, -0.33, and -0.33 with stan-
dard errors of 0.01, 0.01, and 0.02 for the considered sub-periods. Trading activity
explains 28 percent, 45 percent, and 46 percent of total variation of the authorized
size of repurchase program over the considered sub-periods. The estimates are eco-
nomically close to -1/3. This is consistent with the predictions of target imbalance
and target costs hypotheses, but not with the target size hypothesis.
Table 3.5 presents the estimates of regression (3.6), controlling for time and
industry ﬁxed eﬀects, on the whole sample of repurchase programs over the period
from 1985 to 2014 and the sub-periods from 1985 to 2000, from 2001 to 2007, and
from 2008 to 2014. Panel A of Table 3.5 displays results for the authorised size of
repurchase programs. On the whole sample of repurchase programs the estimated
αˆW = −0.34 with a standard error of 0.007. The estimated coeﬃcient αˆW is -0.32,
-0.33, and -0.36 with standard errors of 0.01, 0.01, and 0.01 respectively for the
considered sub-periods. The results are robust, controlling for time and industry
variation.
Figure 3.3 reports the estimates of regression (3.6) every year from 1994 to 2014.
I exclude 121 share repurchase programs that were initiated before 1994 to avoid
the problem of small sample bias. I ﬁnd that estimate αˆW is outside 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals of -1/3 in only 5 out of 20 years. Year by year estimates of αˆW
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are between -0.381 and -0.275.
The trading activity of stock appears to explain well the cross-sectional variation
in the authorised size of repurchase programs. The estimated αˆW is economically
close to -1/3. A formal F-test rejects the targeted size hypothesis that predicts that
αW = −2/3 on the whole sample of repurchase programs and over the considered
sub-periods. However, the above empirical ﬁndings are consistent with the target
imbalance and target execution costs hypotheses that predict αW = −1/3.
I also analyze relationship between trading activity of stock and the realised size
of repurchase programs. Panel B of Figure 3.2 displays the relationship between
the logarithm of the total number of shares repurchased on the y-axis versus the
logarithm of trading activity of the underlying stocks on the x-axis. Trading activity
does not explain well the total number of repurchased shares. Limited explanatory
power may be attributed to the endogous termination of share repurchase programs
that may be aﬀected by various economic factors.
Panel B of Table 3.5 presents estimates of regression (3.6) for the realised number
of shares repurchased. On the whole sample of repurchase programs αˆW = −0.31
with a standard error of 0.007. The trading activity of the underlying stocks explains
26 percent of variation in the realised size of repurchase programs. The estimated
αˆW is -0.31, -0.27, and -0.29 with the standard errors of 0.01, 0.01, and 0.01 for the
considered sub-periods. Results, controlling for time and industry ﬁxed eﬀects, are
found to be robust.
I estimate the nested regression model (3.22) to test the predictions of the target
imbalance hypothesis and two speciﬁcations of the target costs hypothesis. Table
3.6 reports regression estimates for the total sample of repurchase programs and the
considered sub-periods. The estimate αˆW is economically close to -1/3. I ﬁnd that
αˆτ = 0.22 with a standard error of 0.01 and αˆσ = −0.21 with standard error of
0.09. Estimates of αˆτ and αˆσ outside the 95 percent conﬁdence interval predicted
by the target imbalance hypothesis are ατ = 0.5 and ασ = 0. The target imbalance
hypothesis is rejected with the joined F test. The estimates αˆτ and αˆσ are outside
the 95 percent conﬁdence interval predicted by the target linear execution costs
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hypothesis, at ατ = 0 and ασ = −1. The target linear costs hypothesis is also
rejected with the joined F test. The estimate αˆW is outside the 95 percent conﬁdence
interval predicted by the target square root execution costs hypothesis, at αW = 0.
The targeted square root costs hypothesis is rejected with the joined F test as well.
Table 3.7 reports estimates of nested regression (3.22) across diﬀerent repurchase
methods: open market, negotiated, Dutch auction, accelerated, ﬁrst price and odd
lot repurchases programs. For the sample of open market share repurchases, I ﬁnd
αˆW = −0.328, αˆτ = 0.403, and αˆσ = −0.216 with clustered by year standard errors
of 0.006, 0.021, and 0.027, respectively. The estimates are economically close to
predicted αW = −1/3, ατ = 1/2, and ασ = 0. However, a formal joint F test rejects
the target imbalance hypothesis with F statistics of 41. The target imbalance and
both speciﬁcations of the target costs hypothesis are also rejected with the F test.
I ﬁnd no evidence that supports the considered hypotheses for negotiated, Dutch
auction, accelerated, ﬁrst price and odd lot repurchase programs. Although formal
statistical tests reject the considered hypotheses, open market repurchase programs
conform to the target imbalance hypothesis.
3.4.2 Model selection
Next I implement model selection with Bayesian information criterion to identify
which model best conforms with the data. I estimate the Bayesian information cri-
terion on the total sample of repurchase programs and sub-samples that correspond
to diﬀerent repurchase methods. BIC = −2 ln Lˆ+k · ln(n), where Lˆ is the likelihood
of the corresponding regression model, k is the number of parameters in the model,
and n is the number of observations. For the target size hypothesis, k is equal to
1. For the target imbalance and both target costs hypotheses, k is equal to 2. The
model that has the lowest estimate of BIC describes data the best.
Table 3.8 reports the results of model selection. The Bayesian information crite-
ria selects the target imbalance hypothesis on the total sample of share repurchase
programs and sub-samples of open market, ﬁrst price, Dutch auction, and odd lot
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repurchase programs. The target size hypothesis is selected only for the case of
accelerated share repurchases. The Target cost hypothesis (linear case) is selected
for negotiated and accelerated share repurchases.
3.4.3 Alternative hypotheses
Previous sections established that trading activity of the stock is an important factor
determining the size of a share repurchase program. In this section I consider other
factors motivated by alternative theories and assess their explanatory power relative
to the considered hypotheses inspired by invariance theory.
The literature on share repurchases identiﬁes several factors that inﬂuence share
repurchase activity of companies. Firstly, signalling and market undervaluation
theories imply that a company repurchases its shares after a period of underperfor-
mance when the stock is undervalued. It predicts a negative relation between past
performance of the stock and the size of repurchase program. This study uses past
log-return of stock over three months R3mit to assess signalling theory.
Secondly, free cashﬂow theory implies that a company repurchases its shares
when it has excess cash to avoid an agency problem. It predicts that cash of the
company should be positively related to the size of its share repurchase program.
Consistent with Stephens and Weisbach (1998), I use the cash of the company in
the quarter before the repurchase announcement Cit−1 reported in Compustat as a
proxy for free cashﬂows of the company to assess the free cashﬂow theory.
Thirdly, targeted corporate structure theory predicts that a company repurchases
its shares to alter its debt-to-equity ratio. It implies that the size of repurchase
program relates negatively to the leverage of the company and the volatility of its
stock σit. I use the volatility of the stock σit to assess targeted corporate structure
theory.
Fourthly, the study examines the economy of scale argument, implying that a
company may repurchase more shares when it has a larger market capitalisation
Mit. I use the market capitalization of the company Mit to assess the economy of
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scale argument.
Finally, I consider the target size, the target imbalance, and both target costs
hypotheses. These hypotheses state that trading activity of the underlying stockWit,
volatility of the stock σit, and duration of a repurchase program τit determine the
size of repurchase program. I use these variables to assess the invariance motivated
hypotheses.
To assess explanatory power of diﬀerent theories, I estimate the nested regression
model
ln
[
Xit
Vit
]
= α0 + αW · ln
[
Wit
W ∗
]
+ ατ · ln [Tit] + ασ · ln
[
σit
σ∗
]
+
+α3m · R3mit + α$ · Cit−1 + αM ·Mit + ǫ˜it.
(3.23)
I assess the explanatory power of the alternative theories relative to the baseline
cases of regression (3.23) that corresponds to target imbalance and target costs
(linear case) hypotheses. The baseline speciﬁcation corresponds to regression (3.23)
with imposed constraints on regression coeﬃcients αW = −1/3, ατ = 0, ασ = 0,
α3m = 0, α$ = 0, and αM = 0. To assess the explanatory power of alternative
theories, I compare how much the R2 increases relative to the R2 in the base case
speciﬁcation.
Table 3.9 reports estimates of regression (3.23) for speciﬁcations that correspond
to the considered theories. Column (3) of Table 3.9 assesses signalling and market
undervaluation theory. Consistent with the prediction of the theory, I ﬁnd that
the size of repurchase program is negatively related to past performance of the
underlying stock. However, after controlling for trading activity W of the stock,
the estimated coeﬃcient αˆ3m = −0.2 is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. Regression speciﬁcation that controls for past performance increases R2 by 3
percent relative to the baseline speciﬁcation that has R2 = 41 percent.
Column (4) of Table 3.9 assesses free cashﬂow theory. Consistent with the pre-
diction of the theory, I ﬁnd that the size of repurchase program is positively related
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to the cash of the company. However, after controlling for trading activity W of
the stock, the estimated coeﬃcient αˆ$ = 0.4 is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. The regression speciﬁcation that controls for the cash of the company
increases R2 by 4 percent relative to the baseline speciﬁcation that has R2 = 41
percent.
Column (1) of Table 3.9 assesses targeted corporate structure theory. Consis-
tent with the prediction of the theory, I ﬁnd that the size of repurchase program is
negatively related to volatility of the underlying stock. After controlling for trading
activity W of the stock, estimated coeﬃcient αˆσ = −0.32. The regression speciﬁ-
cation that controls for volatility of the company’s stock increases R2 by 5 percent
relative to the baseline speciﬁcation that has R2 = 40 percent.
Column (5) of Table 3.9 assesses the economy of scale argument. Consistent with
this argument, I ﬁnd that the size of repurchase program is positively related to the
market capitalization of the company. After controlling for trading activity W of
the stock, the estimated coeﬃcient αˆM = 0.02. The regression speciﬁcation that
controls for cash of the company increases R2 by 6 percent relative to the baseline
speciﬁcation that has R2 = 40 percent.
The regression speciﬁcation that includes the ﬁve considered control variables has
R2 = 53 percent, which is 12 percent higher than the baseline regression speciﬁcation
that controls only for trading activity of the underlying stock. Applying Occam’s
razor principle, the trading activity of the underlying stock is the key factor that
explains variation in the size of share repurchase programs.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper proposes an innovative way to think about company share repurchases.
Using the insights of market microstructure invariance of Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016),
I interpret companies’ share repurchases as buy bets placed by the company manage-
ment and formulate three hypotheses about the size of repurchase programs: target
size, target imbalance, and target cost hypotheses. I ﬁnd that trading activity of
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the stock is an important determinant of the size of a share repurchase program.
Formal tests establish that target imbalances and target (linear) costs hypotheses ﬁt
repurchase data the best. Furthermore, the target imbalance hypothesis is selected
on the open market repurchases – the most popular type of repurchase programs.
In future research would be interesting to analyse other corporate decisions,
such as secondary share issuances and dividend payouts, from the perspective of
market microstructure invariance. For example, share issuances may represent sell
bets placed by the company management. Similar to the analysis of this paper, I
conjecture that the sizes of secondary issuance programs depend on trading activities
of the stocks.
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3.6 Tables and ﬁgures
Figure 3.1: Historical share repurchase activity.
Figure 3.1 displays historical yearly share repurchase activity of US com-
panies over period from 1994 to 2014. Panel A displays average size of
repurchase program ( in billions of dollars). Panel B displays number of
repurchase programs initiated.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics.
ALL 1985-2000 2001-2007 2008-2014
Panel A: Repurchase program characteristics
X¯ 1.76 1.00 2.20 3.93
X¯/V 21.97 30.82 16.53 12.10
X 1.02 0.69 1.50 2.10
X/V 14.36 21.69 11.55 6.66
Duration 317 334 334 248
Panel B: Stock characteristics
V · P 1.27 0.48 3.83 8.59
σ 0.022 0.024 0.019 0.023
W 30.5 11.8 80.7 194.9
#Obs. 14,182 5,751 5,616 2,815
Table 3.2. Table describes the SDC Platinum sample of share repurchase
programs over the period from January 1985 to January 2014 and three
sub-periods from 1985 to 2000, from 2001 to 2007, and from 2008 to 2014.
Panel A reports characteristics of share repurchase programs, such as the
median authorised size of share repurchase program X¯ (in millions of shares
and as a fraction of daily volume), the median realised size of share repur-
chase program X (in millions of shares and as a fraction of daily volume),
and the median duration of repurchase program (in days).Panel B reports
characteristics of the repurchased stock, such as the median average daily
dollar volume (in millions of dollars), the median daily volatility, and the
median expected trading activity (in thousands of dollars).
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics by repurchase method.
X¯ X Duration #Obs.
Open Market 1.58 1.00 351 12,965
Negotiated 2.00 1.19 327 6,730
Dutch Auction 3.55 2.29 34 342
Accelerated 6.15 6.54 66 162
First Price 3.49 1.85 37 164
Odd Lot 1.59 1.00 41 272
Table 3.3. Table presents characteristics of the SDC Platinum share re-
purchase programs over the period from January 1985 to January 2014 for
different share repurchase methods. The median authorised size of share
repurchase program X¯ ( in millions of shares), the median realised size of
share repurchase program X¯ ( in millions of shares), and the median dura-
tion of repurchase program ( in days) are reported for different types of
share repurchases.
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Figure 3.2: Sizes of share repurchase programs versus trading activity of stocks
Figure 3.2 visualizes relationship between the logarithm of the size of
share repurchase program and trading activity of stocks. Panel A displays
relation between the logarithm of authorised size of share repurchase pro-
gram ln(X¯) on the y-axis and logarithm of trading activity of the stock
ln(W ). Panel B displays relation between the logarithm of the realised size
of share repurchase program ln(X) on the y-axis and logarithm of trading
activity of the stock ln(W ).
CHAPTER 3. SIZE OF SHARE REPURCHASES AND MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE146
Table 3.4: Size of repurchase program and trading activity.
All 1985-2000 2001-2007 2008-2014
PANEL A: Authorised size
αˆ0 2.014*** 2.22*** 1.95*** 1.883***
(0.037) (0.044) (0.017) (0.05)
αˆW -0.329*** -0.303*** -0.327*** -0.332***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.017)
R2 40% 28% 45% 45%
# Obs. 14,200 6,703 4,677 2,820
PANEL B: Realised size
αˆ0 1.595*** 1.768*** 1.624*** 1.314***
(0.052) (0.064) (0.061) (0.074)
αˆW -0.311*** -0.306*** -0.273*** -0.289***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
R2 26% 20% 23% 24%
# Obs. 11,884 6,018 3,949 1,917
Table 3.4 presents estimation of regression: ln
[
Xit
Vit
]
= α0+αW · ln
[
Wit
W ∗
]
+ ǫ˜it on
total sample of share repurchase programs and sub-samples corresponding
to periods 1985-2000, 2001-2007, and 2008-2014. Panel A reports estimation
for the authorised size of share repurchase program. Panel B reports
estimation for the realised size of share repurchase program. Stock has
expected daily volume Vit, expected price level Pit, expected daily return
volatility σit, expected trading activity, Wit. The benchmark stock has
expected trading activity W ∗. I report estimates αˆ0 and αˆW along with
standard errors that are clustered at industry group, regression R2 and
number of observations. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
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Table 3.5: Size of repurchase program and trading activity.
All 1985-2000 2001-2007 2008-2014
PANEL A: Authorised size
αˆ0 2.273*** 3.033*** 0.686*** 2.643***
(0.067) (0.09) (0.000) (0.320)
αˆW -0.335*** -0.321*** -0.333*** -0.358***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 44% 33% 48% 49%
# Obs. 14,200 6,703 3,949 1,917
PANEL B: Realised size
αˆ0 1.478*** 4.33*** 1.007*** 2.037***
(0.121) (0.323) (0.075) (0.160)
αˆW -0.293*** -0.302*** -0.269*** -0.306***
(0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 30% 25% 28% 29%
# Obs. 11,884 6,018 3,949 1,917
Table 3.5 presents estimation of regression: ln
[
Xit
Vit
]
= α0+αW ·ln
[
Wit
W ∗
]
+Zit+ ǫ˜it
on total SDC share repurchase sample and sub-samples that correspond
to periods from 1985 to 2000, from 2001 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2014.
Panel A reports estimation for the authorised size of share repurchase
program. Panel B reports estimation for the realised size of share re-
purchase program. Stock has expected daily volume Vit, expected price
level Pit, expected daily return volatility σit, expected trading activity,
Wit. The benchmark stock has expected daily volume of 1 million shares,
expected price level $40, expected daily return volatility of 2%, and ex-
pected trading activity W ∗. Regression includes time and industry fixed
effects Zit. I report estimates αˆ0 and αˆW and standard errors that are
clustered by industry group, regression R2 and number of observations.
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **,
and *** respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Size of repurchase program and trading activity (yearly).
Figure 3.3 presents year by year estimation of regression: ln
[
Xit
Vit
]
=
α0 + αW · ln
[
Wit
W ∗
]
+ Zit + ǫ˜it on total SDC share repurchase sample over the
period from 1994 to 2014. Where Xit is an authorised size of a repurchase
program and Vit, Pit, σit, and Wit are expected daily trading volume, ex-
pected price level, expected daily return volatility, and expected trading
activity of the stock, respectively. The benchmark stock has expected
daily volume of 1 million shares, expected price level $40, expected daily
return volatility of 2%, and expected trading activity W ∗. Panel A
displays year by year variation of estimates αˆW (green circles) with a
95% confidence interval. Red dashed line displays the -1/3 level. Panel B
displays year by year estimates αˆ0 (green circles) with a 95% confidence
interval.
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Table 3.6: Nested regression.
All 1985-2000 2001-2007 2008-2014
PANEL A: Authorised size
αˆ0 0.888*** 0.844*** 0.971*** 1.176***
(0.082) (0.172) (0.084) (0.092)
αˆW -0.333*** -0.316*** -0.326*** -0.348***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
αˆτ 0.217*** 0.254*** 0.193*** 0.147***
(0.013) (0.026) (0.010) (0.021)
αˆσ -0.210** -0.287*** -0.186** -0.144
(0.094) (0.094) (0.105) (0.087)
R2 47% 37% 50% 49%
# Obs. 12,351 5,367 5,010 1,974
PANEL B: Realised size
αˆ0 0.328*** 0.434*** 0.382*** 0.579***
(0.082) (0.169) (0.114) (0.149)
αˆW -0.318*** -0.313*** -0.283*** -0.303***
(0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018)
αˆτ 0.239*** 0.259*** 0.231*** 0.145***
(0.011) (0.024) (0.016) (0.026)
αˆσ -0.492*** -0.573*** -0.497*** -0.399***
(0.107) (0.110) (0.129) (0.084)
R2 33% 29% 33% 28%
# Obs. 11,884 5,187 4,780 1,917
Table 3.6 presents estimation of regression model presents estimation of re-
gression: ln
[
Xit
Vit
]
= α0+αW ·ln
[
Wit
W ∗
]
+ατ ·ln(Tit)+ασ ·ln(σit)+Zit+ ǫ˜it on total SDC
share repurchase sample and sub-samples that correspond to periods from
1985 to 2000, from 2001 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2014. Panel A presents es-
timation for authorised size of share repurchase program. Panel B presents
results for total number of shares repurchased in the program. Stock has
expected daily volume Vit, expected price level Pit, expected daily return
volatility σit, and expected trading activity, Wit. The benchmark stock
has expected daily volume of 1 million shares, expected price level $40,
expected daily return volatility of 2%, and expected trading activity W ∗.
Regression includes time and industry fixed effects Zit. I report estimates
αˆ0, αˆW , αˆτ and αˆσ, standard errors that are clustered by industry group,
regression R2 and number of observations. Statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.
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Table 3.7: Nested regression across repurchase types.
Open Negotiated Dutch Accelerated First Odd
market auction price Lot
PANEL A: Authorised size
αˆ0 -1.105*** 0.347 1.731*** 0.807 2.919*** 3.991***
(0.180) (0.123) (0.502) (0.531) (0.445) (0.761)
αˆW -0.328*** -0.358*** -0.419*** -0.396*** -0.412*** -0.374***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.024) (0.048) (0.031) (0.039)
αˆτ 0.403*** 0.177*** 0.062 0.010 0.152 -0.096
(0.021) (0.018) (0.058) (0.026) (0.094) (0.118)
αˆσ -0.216*** -0.182*** -0.123 -0.218 0.238 0.420***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.090) (0.125) (0.121) (0.188)
R2 54% 50% 63% 28% 62% 26%
# Obs. 10,719 5,614 307 113 137 203
PANEL B: Realised size
αˆ0 -1.613*** 0.592*** 1.939*** 1.621*** 1.995*** 1.754***
(0.191) (0.080) (0.314) (0.252) (0.433) (0.554)
αˆW -0.309*** -0.342*** -0.428*** -0.279*** -0.418*** -0.437***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.024) (0.160) (0.048) (0.050)
αˆτ 0.557*** 0.179*** 0.022 0.029 0.092 -0.126
(0.037) (0.014) (0.080) (0.058) (0.109) (0.151)
αˆσ -0.523*** -0.438*** -0.150 -0.404 0.103 0.134
(0.077) (0.101) (0.112) (0.236) (0.225) (0.218)
R2 43% 34% 43% 15% 44% 22%
# Obs. 10,719 5,431 306 107 125 197
Table 3.7 presents estimation of regression model presents estimation of
regression ln
[
Xit
Vit
]
= α0 + αW · ln
[
Wit
W ∗
]
+ ατ · ln(Tit) + ασ · ln(σit) + Zit + ǫ˜it for dif-
ferent types of share repurchases, such as open market, negotiated, dutch
auction, first price, and odd lot repurchases in SDC Platinum database
over the period from 1985 to 2014. Panel A presents estimation for au-
thorised size of share repurchase program. Panel B presents results for
total number of shares repurchased in the program. Stock has expected
daily volume Vit, expected price level Pit, expected daily return volatility
σit, and expected trading activity, Wit. The benchmark stock has expected
daily volume of 1 million shares, expected price level $40, expected daily
return volatility of 2%, and expected trading activity W ∗. Regression in-
cludes time and industry fixed effects Zit. I report estimates αˆ0, αˆW , αˆτ
and αˆσ, standard errors that are clustered by industry group, regression
R2, and number of observations. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels is denoted by *, **, and *** respectively.
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Table 3.8: Model selection.
Target size Target imbalance Target cost
Linear Square root
All 44,299 38,433 39,588 41,282
Open Market 40,031 30,819 35,328 41,282
Negotiated 19,691 17,927 17,866 20,918
Dutch Auction 941 852 914 1,107
Accelerated 313 408 319 374
First Price 466 421 473 556
Odd Lot 877 859 877 942
Table 3.8 reports the results of model selection according to bayesian
information criteria for different types of repurchase programs, such
as open market, negotiated, dutch auction, accelerated, first price, and
odd lot repurchase programs. Considered models are bet hypothesis, tar-
geted imbalance hypothesis, and two versions of targeted cost hypothesis.
Bayesian information criteria BIC = −2 ln Lˆ+ k · ln(n), where Lˆ is likelihood,
k is number of parameters in a model and n is number of observations. Best
fitted model is highlighted in bold.
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Table 3.9: Alternative hypotheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Unrestricted specification
αˆ0 2.200*** 5.011*** 2.906*** 3.248*** 2.341*** 1.003***
(0.075) (0.115) (0.067) (0.092) (0.095) (0.195)
αˆW -0.364*** -0.349*** -0.337*** -0.331*** -0.334*** -0.373***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010)
αˆσ -0.317*** — — — — -0.19
(0.095) (0.115)
αˆτ — 0.208*** — — — 0.216***
(0.012) (0.012)
αˆ3m — — -0.196 — — -0.128
(0.105) (0.104)
αˆ$ — — — 0.392 — 0.018
(0.390) (0.309)
αˆM — — — — 0.015*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 45% 49% 44% 45% 46% 53%
#Obs. 14,200 12,351 13,844 8,561 14,200 7,227
Panel B: Restricted specification
FE No No No No No No
R2 40% 40% 41% 41% 40% 41%
Table 3.9 presents estimation of regression that is motivated by alterna-
tive hypotheses on share repurchase ln
[
Xit
Vit
]
= α0 + αW · ln
[
Wit
W ∗
]
+ α3m · R3mit +
α$ ·Cit−1+αM ·Mit+ατ · ln [τit]+ασ · ln
[σit
σ∗
]
+ ǫ˜it on a sample of share repurchase
programs from SDC Platinum that covers period from 1985 to 2014. Xit is
an authorised size of the share repurchase program with the stock that
has expected daily trading volume Vit, expected price level Pit, expected
daily return volatility σit, and expected trading activity, Wit. R
3m
it is log-
return during 3 months prior to the repurchase announcement. Cit−1 is
cash of the company for the quarter before the repurchase announcement
from Compustat. Mit is market capitalization of the company. Tit is du-
ration of the repurchase program (number of days between announcement
date and end of repurchase program date). The benchmark stock has ex-
pected daily volume of 1 million shares, expected price level $40, expected
daily return volatility of 2%, and expected trading activity W ∗. Panel
A reports estimates of the regression with standard errors clustered by
industry, regression R2 and number of observations. Panel B reports R2 of
regression with imposed constraint of αW = −1/3 and zero coefficients on
corresponding control variables.
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